Re: Ideal chinese carrier thread
Another critical note is that a large task force, transiting an area with multiple ASW helos and other assets patrolling, will clear the potential approach vectors for enemy subs (and with the US, they will use one or two fast attack subs to haunt those vectors as well). In the end, in the open sea, the enemy sub has to come to the task force to prosecute its targets...or at the very least know where the task force is if they want to use missiles...which will be effective against a well defended task force in my mind than torpedoes. It's just that you have to do a lot more to get in a position to fire a torpedo.
This is always an advantage to the defender because they will scour those areas of approa chand set their sonar bouys accordingly.
When a task force has to transit a choke point, the advantage shifts...but still the ASW assetts know that the enemy subs may well use those choke points and lie in wait so you can bet that the ASW assets of the task force will also focus there when the time comes.
In the end, strategies, feints, the technical capabilities of the equipment, the experience levels of those using that equipment, and the rules of engagement on both sides will all come together to effect the outcome.
Please note, my comments were based on the premise that the sub already had a good idea of where the sub was, either from its own bouys, or from other assets...and then began prosecuting that location. If there is a sub there, he's in deep kaka if two ASW helos are on him at that point.The problem of ASW helos is that they use active sonars,which means they can be heard from afar, giving their general location well ahead of any sub so that the sub can take countermeasures. Long range low frequency passive sonars have to be huge and requires a lot of juice, which means they can only be fitted on ships and subs. Especially nuclear subs. You can't carry those around in a helo. Even if found, some of the newer subs are getting pretty good in countering active echoes, like in the way they are shaped, or with newer developments in the coating. Coatings around subs are not meant for quieting, they're meant for absorbing active sonars.
Helos can only use light torpedos. That's going to have limitations on depth. Even if they can physically reach that deep, they lack the speed and endurance of heavy torpedoes which can carry more battery power or fuel and can be encased with greater protection against deep water pressures. Furthermore, the heavy torpedo can also be wire guided, which means they can be commanded guided after launch by the ship or sub (well very few surface ships carry heavy torpedos anyway like the Udaloys). The light torpedo once it hits the surface, is pretty much on its own.
So Popeye is correct. Best counter to a sub is another sub.
Another critical note is that a large task force, transiting an area with multiple ASW helos and other assets patrolling, will clear the potential approach vectors for enemy subs (and with the US, they will use one or two fast attack subs to haunt those vectors as well). In the end, in the open sea, the enemy sub has to come to the task force to prosecute its targets...or at the very least know where the task force is if they want to use missiles...which will be effective against a well defended task force in my mind than torpedoes. It's just that you have to do a lot more to get in a position to fire a torpedo.
This is always an advantage to the defender because they will scour those areas of approa chand set their sonar bouys accordingly.
When a task force has to transit a choke point, the advantage shifts...but still the ASW assetts know that the enemy subs may well use those choke points and lie in wait so you can bet that the ASW assets of the task force will also focus there when the time comes.
In the end, strategies, feints, the technical capabilities of the equipment, the experience levels of those using that equipment, and the rules of engagement on both sides will all come together to effect the outcome.