In envisioning what 002 may potentially be is in my view a classic horse and cart consideration. The so called rumours seem to be more of some reflection of desire rather than a fit into China's strategic grand plan. In other words, the game plan determines the program configuration and output as opposed to the converse nature.
Oooh I'd be very careful in saying that.
The "so called" rumours which are being considered are typically meant to be from individuals with some insider knowledge of what may be going on officially (aka plans and development being undertaken officially as part of China's strategic plans).
What you're suggesting is that the rumours we try to consider are a reflection of personal desire -- aka fanboy ruminations. Most rumours of
that kind are always acknowledged as such unless any evidence comes to light suggesting that they may be true, or if more traditionally knowledgeable/insider individuals come out backing up such rumours, whereupon they are considered with more seriousness and credibility.
I am unclear from the many discussions as to what is China's game plan with regards to its intended carrier operations and its fit into overall naval strategy. I would think they are the major drivers. My basic understanding is China intends to build up its carrier operation capability around a carrier sizing of initially 3 to maybe 5 further down the road. We can reasonably conclude in order to have one carrier in operation at any given time, a minimun sizing of three would be required with one for training while the remaining one is in some form of maintenance. If we take the view that the Liaoning (STOBAR) as the training carrier, 001A (STOBAR maybe) and 002 (CATOBAR but around similar tonnage) for operations, would that provide the PLAN with a better configuration in terms of building up carrier operations experience both in depth and width besides optimal interoperability as opposed to a more ambitious configuration as some have suggested? My point is, what are the coherent building blocks because carrier configuration development don't happen in a vacuum outside of some naval plans. I would ask what are the leading thoughts on this subject within the Chinese naval community?
If I had to define the Chinese Navy's future strategy/doctrine for the next decade and a half up to 2030, it would be: "To develop a navy that is 1: capable of contesting and winning a high intensity conflict in the western pacific when in conjunction friendly air and missile forces, against opposing air-naval-missile forces, and 2: for such a navy during peacetime (AKA when 1 is not occurring) to also have the capability to conduct long duration/persistent medium sized power projection missions across the globe in support of Chinese interests against low capability foreign national military forces, irregular military forces, or other low capability opponents in a low intensity environment"
How the Chinese Navy would seek to achieve this is dependent on technological development as well as China's own economic growth and whatever new threats that may arise... but assuming surface navies remain relevant for the next few decades, assuming China continues a slower paced but consistent economic growth (let's say an average of 6%), and assuming China's geopolitical position doesn't drastically worsen or improve, I'd guess the navy would probably be indeed to aim for 5 operational carriers by 2030. That would be accompanied by 3 or so amphibious assault type groups made up of an LHD and two LPDs each, and enough surface combatants to provide escort for all the carriers and amphibious assault groups while having enough left over to provide for a few surface action groups and independent surface combatant operations.
Chinese naval surface combatant production will be the big thing to watch, as it will likely reflect the eventual number of power projection vessels that China wants to have.
China's current main surface combatant arm is made up of six destroyer flotillas, each with four destroyers and four frigates each, and are currently being rapidly modernized. But the question is whether the navy will seek to
expand the size of the DESFLOTs as well. I will illustrate this below:
24 054As will be produced and commissioned, which is enough to fully modernize the frigate divisions in all six DESFLOTs (4 054As per DESFLOT), but we don't know if the navy will also seek to expand its frigate division within each DESFLOT. Specifically, currently we are in a position where many expect a successor to 054A to emerge in the next few years, but of course such a hypothetical 054B would not be replacing 054As as the 054As are very young and only just entered service in the 2000s and early 2010s. If 054B production continues at the same pace at 054As did at two shipyards (HP and HD) then they could theoretically pump out another 24 054Bs by the mid to late 2020s. Will they do so? Who knows.
Same goes for 052D. At present, we know that we will have 12 052Ds produced, with the possibility of another 12 for 24 total 052Ds. If that order does occur, then even accounting for JNCX and DL both producing an 055 each continuously, that means they could quite potentially get 24 052Ds in service by 2025. By 2025, all the destroyers prior to the initial six 052Cs could possibly be retired, but that still leaves some 30 potential 052C/Ds in service -- a substantial increase in number compared to the current 24 mix and match of a few 052C/Ds, some Sovs, some 051B/Cs, a couple of 052 and couple of 052B and some 051s that will be retired imminently.
Then the big question of 055 pops up. Rumours of 055 production numbers are not firm, but 4 are said to be part of the first order with possibility of 8-12 in total. Again, assuming JN and DL both produce 055, and assuming that the first 055 from JN is launched late next year or early 2017 and that DL begins producing its first 055 around 2018, then they could quite conceivably commission up to 12 055s by 2025 or slightly later. How would 055s be integrated into the DESFLOT organization? Would they be considered destroyers like 052C/Ds, or would they be considered "large destroyers" or "destroyer leaders"? How would frigates factor in, and would they substantially out number 052C/Ds and 055s?
Personally, if I had to lay out a vision, I'd say that by the late 2020s, the Chinese naval surface combatant force may look something like so:
-48 FFGs (24 054As and 24 "054Bs")
-24+ DDGs (24 052Ds with a few 052Cs still in service)
-12 large DDGs (055s, possibly with later ships being of an "055A" variant)
Each destroyer flotilla would then be made up of 2 055s, 4 052Ds, 8 frigates (4 054A + 4 054B), and each destroyer flotilla could then neatly be separated again to become 1 055, 2 052Ds, and 4 frigates (2 054A + 2 054B) that could neatly function as an escort for any carrier or amphibious task force, and fleet wide such a force could be mixed and matched to provide enough escorts for the operational carriers and amphibious ships while retaining enough ships left over for independent SAG duties or other escort duties.
Of course, this is based on a collection of some rumours but mostly my own prediction of what the Navy may need to fulfill its future missions. Obviously any real prediction of the navy's orbat to a period as distant as 2030 is impossible and the accuracy or practicality and opportunity-cost of any orbat guess can be challenged.
