PLA strike strategies in westpac HIC

ACuriousPLAFan

Brigadier
Registered Member
i am skeptical if ROK is able to 100% control the matter, things could quickly spiral out of control once someone fires the first shot, there isnt even time to manage the crisis - all it takes is just one squadron cmdr to disobey. I mean ROK military fought side by side with US for 70 years, all their officers are heavily influenced by US.

Maybe several PHL16 batallions will be secretly deployed north of DMZ, prepared to overwhelm ROKAF immediately once things go south.
I don't think that's going to work.

North Korean troop movements are always strictly monitored by South Korean and US forces on the peninsula. If the PHL-191s are fitted with 300mm rockets with only 130km range, then they would have to get close to the DMZ, thus risking detection by South Korea and the US. 370mm rockets with 180km range wouldn't fair much better either.

On the other hand, if the PHL-191s are fitted with 750mm tactical ballistic missiles with 500+km range, then those launchers can reliably cover the DMZ and even Seoul from Liaoning province, thus negating the need for deployment into North Korea.

Besides, there is the problem with cover. Who's going to cover those PHL-191 battalions stationed inside North Korea against the ROK and US military? The KPAF can never be depended upon - all their warplanes are Cold War-era relics. Stationing those launchers inside North Korea would only make them easy prey for the ROKAF and the USAF.

Moreover, there is the problem with logistics. North Korea is largely mountainous. Resupplying those PHL-191 battalions is going to be more difficult in unfamiliar territory. There is also the concern where without sufficient aerial cover, resupply convoys for those launchers are going to get hammered hard from above.
 
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ACuriousPLAFan

Brigadier
Registered Member
(Sorry if my ramblings veer out of thread towards the end, not in my best shape right now)

Airstrip #2 is proactively turning itself into a smaller (but more barren) version of Murica in the South Pacific.



Thinking back the times when Australia played a very important role of bridging China in the east and the US in the west - All of that happened barely a decade ago.

And yet, here we are today, with Australia being at its most hostile behavior against China ever since the foundation of the People's Republic, whom many of its elites and professionals are blabbering about waging war against China right up against China's doorstep like breathing air.

And it isn't just about having B-21s either - Many Ozzies are already calling that Australia should have their own ballistic missiles, and even going as far as building their own nukes in order to "deter China".

I think we can agree that initially, China truly desired a very limited scope of military operation for reunifying Taiwan, which would only revolve around the immediate surroundings of Taiwan itself. But now, the expected scope of operation in a Taiwan AR scenario would have to be expanded across East Asia and the Western Pacific.

In response to that, perhaps not even the Dongfeng IRBMs and ICBMs are sufficient anymore. I think China needs a conventional strategic bombing capability that can deal significant blows to Australia's war waging capability on a prolonged strategic warfare basis. This means China would require a formidable bomber fleet.

For that, I think perhaps China should procure two bomber models at the same time - one for strategic, another for tactical. Strategic bomber would be the H-20, nuff said about that.

Tactical bomber would (hopefully) be the JH-XX. However, I do hope that the JH-XX would have the combat range and payload capacity that is at least half the stats of its larger cousin, the H-20. As long as the JH-XX can have sufficient range to operate as far as and around the Second Island Chain, I don't think having supersonic capability or not actually matters much.

Assuming those JH-XX are based in Hubei, to reach New South Wales and Victoria (which is where significant portions of the industries and population are located) would require either aerial refueling over the South China Sea, or carrying ULR standoff missiles - Or both. However, having ULR standoff missiles mean that the JH-XX only need to fly around the northern coastal regions of Australia, or don't even have to fly anywhere close to Australia at all.

Moreover, compared to the H-20s, I expect that the JH-XXs could be manufactured and procured in larger numbers, less labor and material-demanding, and would definitely be cheaper to procure and operate. Since many of China's expected enemies lie within 5000 kilometers of China, having a large JH-XX fleet size would certainly grant the PLAAF a significant firepower arm advantage over her adversaries, alongside complementing the PLARF and PLAN in a Westpac/Indopac scenario.
 
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TK3600

Major
Registered Member
Can you still call that a JH-XX? H-6 is a strategic bomber and it can't reach that far, not even close. Can it be called tactical bomber at that point?

Edit: Did some measurement on Google map it is 8250km from Wuhan to Melbourne. Can H-6 even hit Melbourne with mid air refuel? You need something no smaller than B-21 at that point.
 
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caohailiang

Junior Member
Registered Member
I don't think that's going to work.

North Korean troop movements are always strictly monitored by South Korean and US forces on the peninsula. If the PHL-191s are fitted with 300mm rockets with only 130km range, then they would have to get close to the DMZ, thus risking detection by South Korea and the US. 370mm rockets with 180km range wouldn't fair much better either.

On the other hand, if the PHL-191s are fitted with 750mm tactical ballistic missiles with 500+km range, then those launchers can reliably cover the DMZ and even Seoul from Liaoning province, thus negating the need for deployment into North Korea.

Besides, there is the problem with cover. Who's going to cover those PHL-191 battalions stationed inside North Korea against the ROK and US military? The KPAF can never be depended upon - all their warplanes are Cold War-era relics. Stationing those launchers inside North Korea would only make them easy prey for the ROKAF and the USAF.

Moreover, there is the problem with logistics. North Korea is largely mountainous. Resupplying those PHL-191 battalions is going to be more difficult in unfamiliar territory. There is also the concern where without sufficient aerial cover, resupply convoys for those launchers are going to get hammered hard from above.

i suggest that as a complement to other measures like SRBM or tactical strike fighters.

true, 180km range does not cover all of SK, but it does cover all of Seoul, important airbases such as Osan and Cheongju. Consider the target set to prosecute and limited orbat in NTC, a few additional PHL16 batallions could make a lot of difference.

i consider neutralizing ROKAF only a pathway towards large scale strike on Japan, the sooner it can be dealt with the better.

as to other matter you pointed out, like secrecy, supply and air cover, i think they are all problems to sovle, not insurmountable deal breaker.
 

caohailiang

Junior Member
Registered Member
(Sorry if my ramblings veer out of thread towards the end, not in my best shape right now)

Airstrip #2 is proactively turning itself into a smaller (but more barren) version of Murica in the South Pacific.



Thinking back the times when Australia played a very important role of bridging China in the east and the US in the west - All of that happened barely a decade ago.

And yet, here we are today, with Australia being at its most hostile behavior against China ever since the foundation of the People's Republic, whom many of its elites and professionals are blabbering about waging war against China right up against China's doorstep like breathing air.

And it isn't just about having B-21s either - Many Ozzies are already calling that Australia should have their own ballistic missiles, and even going as far as building their own nukes in order to "deter China".

I think we can agree that initially, China truly desired a very limited scope of military operation for reunifying Taiwan, which would only revolve around the immediate surroundings of Taiwan itself. But now, the expected scope of operation in a Taiwan AR scenario would have to be expanded across East Asia and the Western Pacific.

In response to that, perhaps not even the Dongfeng IRBMs and ICBMs are sufficient anymore. I think China needs a conventional strategic bombing capability that can deal significant blows to Australia's war waging capability on a prolonged strategic warfare basis. This means China would require a formidable bomber fleet.

For that, I think perhaps China should procure two bomber models at the same time - one for strategic, another for tactical. Strategic bomber would be the H-20, nuff said about that.

Tactical bomber would (hopefully) be the JH-XX. However, I do hope that the JH-XX would have the combat range and payload capacity that is at least half the stats of its larger cousin, the H-20. As long as the JH-XX can have sufficient range to operate as far as and around the Second Island Chain, I don't think having supersonic capability or not actually matters much.

Assuming those JH-XX are based in Hubei, to reach New South Wales and Victoria (which is where significant portions of the industries and population are located) would require either aerial refueling over the South China Sea, or carrying ULR standoff missiles - Or both. However, having ULR standoff missiles mean that the JH-XX only need to fly around the northern coastal regions of Australia, or don't even have to fly anywhere close to Australia at all.

Moreover, compared to the H-20s, I expect that the JH-XXs could be manufactured and procured in larger numbers, less labor and material-demanding, and would definitely be cheaper to procure and operate. Since many of China's expected enemies lie within 5000 kilometers of China, having a large JH-XX fleet size would certainly grant the PLAAF a significant firepower arm advantage over her adversaries, alongside complementing the PLARF and PLAN in a Westpac/Indopac scenario.

i think the current H6 fleet is mainly to procecute targets within 3000km, beyond that, such as north Australia, either H20 or navy fleet.

i dont see there is room in between for JH-xx, unless PLA budget is really redundant, even in that case, why not just build extra H20 and H6?

in the long run, maintaining multiple fleets, all with small size, is gona have negative impact on readiness and cost.
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
(Sorry if my ramblings veer out of thread towards the end, not in my best shape right now)

Airstrip #2 is proactively turning itself into a smaller (but more barren) version of Murica in the South Pacific.



Thinking back the times when Australia played a very important role of bridging China in the east and the US in the west - All of that happened barely a decade ago.

And yet, here we are today, with Australia being at its most hostile behavior against China ever since the foundation of the People's Republic, whom many of its elites and professionals are blabbering about waging war against China right up against China's doorstep like breathing air.

And it isn't just about having B-21s either - Many Ozzies are already calling that Australia should have their own ballistic missiles, and even going as far as building their own nukes in order to "deter China".

I think we can agree that initially, China truly desired a very limited scope of military operation for reunifying Taiwan, which would only revolve around the immediate surroundings of Taiwan itself. But now, the expected scope of operation in a Taiwan AR scenario would have to be expanded across East Asia and the Western Pacific.

In response to that, perhaps not even the Dongfeng IRBMs and ICBMs are sufficient anymore. I think China needs a conventional strategic bombing capability that can deal significant blows to Australia's war waging capability on a prolonged strategic warfare basis. This means China would require a formidable bomber fleet.

For that, I think perhaps China should procure two bomber models at the same time - one for strategic, another for tactical. Strategic bomber would be the H-20, nuff said about that.

Tactical bomber would (hopefully) be the JH-XX. However, I do hope that the JH-XX would have the combat range and payload capacity that is at least half the stats of its larger cousin, the H-20. As long as the JH-XX can have sufficient range to operate as far as and around the Second Island Chain, I don't think having supersonic capability or not actually matters much.

Assuming those JH-XX are based in Hubei, to reach New South Wales and Victoria (which is where significant portions of the industries and population are located) would require either aerial refueling over the South China Sea, or carrying ULR standoff missiles - Or both. However, having ULR standoff missiles mean that the JH-XX only need to fly around the northern coastal regions of Australia, or don't even have to fly anywhere close to Australia at all.

Moreover, compared to the H-20s, I expect that the JH-XXs could be manufactured and procured in larger numbers, less labor and material-demanding, and would definitely be cheaper to procure and operate. Since many of China's expected enemies lie within 5000 kilometers of China, having a large JH-XX fleet size would certainly grant the PLAAF a significant firepower arm advantage over her adversaries, alongside complementing the PLARF and PLAN in a Westpac/Indopac scenario.

No offense but this has been discussed to some length years ago back when H-20 and JH-XX roles were discussed and compared with one another when it was still unclear whether they would go for one or the other.
Almost point for point, everything you mentioned has been raised before. That's fine, you weren't around at the time, so raising these points again from your own observations is not unreasonable.

However, since then, we know that they are definitely going for H-20, while JH-XX remains a big question mark.
And up to this point the H-20 is still expected to be a fairly large subsonic four engine stealthy flying wing bomber.

Ultimately our discussions and speculation should be derived from rumours, so until such a point that we have indications that the PLA are actually pursuing a JH-XX, our ability to speculate has some practical limits and confidence intervals.


In other words, it doesn't really matter how much our rationale makes sense for JH-XX (or procuring both as you suggest) -- if we do not have indications that they are actually developing and intending to procure a JH-XX, then we can't really talk about such an aircraft with any modicum of seriousness.
 

ZeEa5KPul

Colonel
Registered Member
There's an interesting exchange between @Lethe and @Blitzo in the Fujian thread that I wanted to respond to, but I don't think my response is appropriate to that thread because it veers far from the Fujian and into the PLA's strategic direction over the next decade. Therefore, I've decided to post it in this thread.

I want to distinguish between two objectives or imperatives facing China: The first is the need to deter the US from launching a war against China given the deteriorating geopolitical environment; the second is the need for China to develop sufficient force projection capability to decisively win a high-intensity war against the US no matter how broad the geographical scope of such a war. We might consider these two conditions to be the minimal and maximal expressions, respectively, of China's military ambitions. I argue that China will pursue the latter maximalist ambition over the long term, but my arguments and evidence for that position are tangential to this discussion so I'll just take it as axiomatic.

The question I want to consider here is the role played by aircraft carriers (both conventional and nuclear) in the two scenarios. To my mind, carriers play a much more important role in the latter scenario over the former, and nuclear carriers a much more important role there than conventional ones. While it's certainly true that vast carrier fleets deter conflict, the investment required in time and resources would crowd out other much more efficient means. Worse, I can think of no better way to entice aggression from the United States than it becoming generally accepted that China was out to build such carrier fleets in its present state of incomplete and inadequate deterrence.

Much more important than building another Fujian-type carrier is to address the two most critical vulnerabilities that afflict China: its inadequate nuclear deterrent and the SSN asymmetry with the US. The most crucially important naval system for China to develop and field in vast quantities as soon as humanly possible is the Type 09-V SSN. Better still, this submarine is relevant to both deterring war and winning a high-intensity war in the Pacific - it has a starring role in both scenarios. Developing this system is the best use of the PLAN's resources at the present time, but even that takes a backseat to the much more pressing problem of expanding and strengthening China's nuclear deterrent. Although a taboo discussion here, it must be appreciated that absolute nuclear deterrence is the foundation on which everything else is built.

Does this preclude any other carriers from being built until China's conventional and nuclear deterrents are complete? Not entirely. But I would argue that developing another conventional carrier would be useful in the near and medium term only through its secondary effects - developing expertise in naval construction of this kind of ship, and raising a cadre sailors, officers, airmen, etc. around the ship. How useful that is depends on how well one thinks Liaoning, Shandong, and Fujian are doing that job and what the marginal utility of adding a fourth carrier would be. The direct military utility is limited and if I were making the decision, I would rather have whatever number of Type 09-Vs that money could purchase. I'm also confident that by the time China's deterrence is where it needs to be and it has made some strategic room for itself, nuclear propulsion and other technologies will have matured to the point where conventional carriers are no longer considered satisfactory.
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
There's an interesting exchange between @Lethe and @Blitzo in the Fujian thread that I wanted to respond to, but I don't think my response is appropriate to that thread because it veers far from the Fujian and into the PLA's strategic direction over the next decade. Therefore, I've decided to post it in this thread.

I want to distinguish between two objectives or imperatives facing China: The first is the need to deter the US from launching a war against China given the deteriorating geopolitical environment; the second is the need for China to develop sufficient force projection capability to decisively win a high-intensity war against the US no matter how broad the geographical scope of such a war. We might consider these two conditions to be the minimal and maximal expressions, respectively, of China's military ambitions. I argue that China will pursue the latter maximalist ambition over the long term, but my arguments and evidence for that position are tangential to this discussion so I'll just take it as axiomatic.

The question I want to consider here is the role played by aircraft carriers (both conventional and nuclear) in the two scenarios. To my mind, carriers play a much more important role in the latter scenario over the former, and nuclear carriers a much more important role there than conventional ones. While it's certainly true that vast carrier fleets deter conflict, the investment required in time and resources would crowd out other much more efficient means. Worse, I can think of no better way to entice aggression from the United States than it becoming generally accepted that China was out to build such carrier fleets in its present state of incomplete and inadequate deterrence.

Much more important than building another Fujian-type carrier is to address the two most critical vulnerabilities that afflict China: its inadequate nuclear deterrent and the SSN asymmetry with the US. The most crucially important naval system for China to develop and field in vast quantities as soon as humanly possible is the Type 09-V SSN. Better still, this submarine is relevant to both deterring war and winning a high-intensity war in the Pacific - it has a starring role in both scenarios. Developing this system is the best use of the PLAN's resources at the present time, but even that takes a backseat to the much more pressing problem of expanding and strengthening China's nuclear deterrent. Although a taboo discussion here, it must be appreciated that absolute nuclear deterrence is the foundation on which everything else is built.

Does this preclude any other carriers from being built until China's conventional and nuclear deterrents are complete? Not entirely. But I would argue that developing another conventional carrier would be useful in the near and medium term only through its secondary effects - developing expertise in naval construction of this kind of ship, and raising a cadre sailors, officers, airmen, etc. around the ship. How useful that is depends on how well one thinks Liaoning, Shandong, and Fujian are doing that job and what the marginal utility of adding a fourth carrier would be. The direct military utility is limited and if I were making the decision, I would rather have whatever number of Type 09-Vs that money could purchase. I'm also confident that by the time China's deterrence is where it needs to be and it has made some strategic room for itself, nuclear propulsion and other technologies will have matured to the point where conventional carriers are no longer considered satisfactory.

This has broadly been my thinking for the last 2 years.

Overall, I think there is some evidence that the CMC sees the 2020s as a "decade of concern" as much as the US DoD has been, and that makes me think that for this period (including the latter half of this decade), conventional systems with greater cost effectiveness in terms of strategic effect, while also aiming for systems/platforms that can be put into service faster rather than slower, and also being more numerous/distributed in nature.
Among the various naval conventional platforms that would be more desirable, SSNs would certainly be there, and the more competitive naturally the better. Surface combatants of course are also important, but for the PLAN, SSNs are the biggest gap.

At minimum, one could argue that carriers (whether nuclear or conventional) certainly do not meet those characteristics, and if anything carriers are among the most limited in quantity, slowest to procure, and slowest to work up and make combat effective, as well as one of the most resource intensive platforms out there.


The augmentation of strategic nuclear deterrence is something that has been discussed extensively already and we already know they are pursuing this regardless, so there isn't much to be said on the matter. It is conventional procurements that is most vague.

Good decision moving the reply here.
 

Biscuits

Major
Registered Member
To reiterate from the other thread, which was starting to go off topic, when it comes to defending itself, carriers are not the most effective by a wide margin. It is way better to invest in the air force, new missiles, as well as a large SSN force to surround invaders with an invisible threat from behind.

If the conflict moves towards a counterinvasion stage, then carriers have their merits when it comes to enforcing a siege on Japan.

But at that distance it will not matter if they're nuclear or not.

As I see it, in high intensity war, PLAN carriers will mainly stay in the back line, close to the mainland rather than close to the first island chain. Just as there is an immense propaganda value for China to sink American supercarriers, the reverse will be true.

If China opts for CVN, it will be a far future investment, for eventual happenings in Latin America, Middle East or the subcontinent.
 

gelgoog

Lieutenant General
Registered Member
Much more important than building another Fujian-type carrier is to address the two most critical vulnerabilities that afflict China: its inadequate nuclear deterrent
This is much less of a problem than it was a decade and a half ago. While the US was hiperventilating over North Korea getting nukes, China put the DF-31/A/AG, and DF-41 into service. These systems, unlike the old ones, can hit the entire Northern Hemisphere, and are way more survivable than the older silo based hypergolics which only had at best enough range to hit California. The total amount of deliverable warheads probably also increased quite a lot as older large unitary warheads were replaced with lots of smaller yield ones. The remaining question is what if China has to defend itself against a much larger US led block, and strike past modern air defenses, for this increasing the amount of warheads and delivery systems up to 10x is justifiable. Given the size of the modern Chinese economy and available technology it would also be much more affordable to do than like 30-40 years ago.

and the SSN asymmetry with the US. The most crucially important naval system for China to develop and field in vast quantities as soon as humanly possible is the Type 09-V SSN.
I agree with you on this point. Unless China can somehow counter the US's submarine fleet there is simply no chance of expecting to remain in control of the sea lanes in case of an attempt by the US to impose a naval blockade on China.

I would rather have whatever number of Type 09-Vs that money could purchase. I'm also confident that by the time China's deterrence is where it needs to be and it has made some strategic room for itself, nuclear propulsion and other technologies will have matured to the point where conventional carriers are no longer considered satisfactory.
I think China needs more than just the Type 095 submarine. It also needs to vastly ramp up the construction of Type 055 cruisers. But this would imply a strategy where China is trying to be the world hegemon in place of the US which is not likely to happen soon.
 
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