PLA strike strategies in westpac HIC

caohailiang

Junior Member
Registered Member
Look, I don't want to come off as mean, but you should probably do some more reading on how airpower works as a system before you start making speculation like this. I'd like to respond to your points with some primer questions that'll hopefully get you thinking about the right things, and to do some more research on them:
you do come off as very mean...but i still immensely appreciate how enlightening you have been with your recent posts

in all honesty, i know what i said is probably not true, and as an amateur, it is a pity i lack the energy to go through all the literature like you suggested

1 - Which Sqns are these (name them)? how many PMAI aircraft do they host? What missions do they typically train for, and what kind of supporting facilities do they have to support them?

i only have a little excel which i extracted from scramble last year, the ones i counted are: F35A: 355/356/4/34/421, F22A: 90/525/19/43/95/27/94. Maybe not accurate? appreciate if you care to correct me.
but nevertheless i think in terms of gen5 total inventory, US/JP still have around 5:1 ratio compare to PLAAF. I know both sides only have a portion to be combat coded and for each side that portion is different, what does it mean for the final PMAI comparison, maybe 3:1?

then it comes to a question for which i think some of the professionals on this forum cannot agree on: how many squadrons can/will USAF commit to westpac theater once there is a major war?

i dont really buy the argument which says "USAF has other global commitment so only a small portion to westpac", i think once there is a major war with China, US will throw everything they have, even if it means temporary vacuum in other theater. i think the only bottleneck is basing


2/3 - What is it about a military airfield/airbase that is better for flight ops than a civilian airfield? Once an aircraft shows up somewhere, what does it need so as to contribute to the system of airpower? How do aircraft get to an airfield this far away?

4 - What ***exactly*** do you put in those C-17s, where do you land them, how do you get them close enough *to* land them, who unloads them and transfers those supplies to active aircraft, what facilities support those aircraft, etc.?

5 - Lol I'm not even gonna grace this one with a response. This one is just a simple "no, please stop saying stupid things"
well, i do know it must be a complex procedure to actually get a fighter plane into combat, i guess at least some of the maintenance tool/spare parts/personnel/fuel/ammo can be carried in C17 plane, but i dont know which of them cannot be, hence impairing the fighter plane to operate continuously

My real question is not about ACE though, it is about how well can PLARF hamper USAF operation in Japan main islands?
there are obviously many factors to consider, the list i can think of includes: lower efficiency of civilian airports, ACE, missile defense, decoys on the ground, SAR jamming from the ground, how quick/accurate can PLARF do damage assessment, limited PLARF missile inventory, but i dont have the ability to put them all together for an answer
 

vincent

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Moderator - World Affairs
My real question is not about ACE though, it is about how well can PLARF hamper USAF operation in Japan main islands?
there are obviously many factors to consider, the list i can think of includes: lower efficiency of civilian airports, ACE, missile defense, decoys on the ground, SAR jamming from the ground, how quick/accurate can PLARF do damage assessment, limited PLARF missile inventory, but i dont have the ability to put them all together for an answer
If Japan allows the Americans to use their civilian airports, that will simply invite attacks on all civilian aviation fuel depots from the PLARF
 

tphuang

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
VIP Professional
Registered Member
Something our friend @Patchwork_Chimera posted today. I'm seriously amazed at his stamina in writing thesepposts.
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

Imo, he has pointed out how much effort is required to launch one major antishipping sortie against a us naval carrier group. In the past, he has also discussed how much difficulty is required for 3 csg air wing to generate strike missions against fixed target in mainland.

Anyway, I would love to hear him share some thoughts about what would be needed to coordinate subsonic anti shipping attacks from j16s and hypersonic attacks from df17s or 055s in at around the same time. I have heard a lot of talks about needing to give defense different looks in a saturation attack. So it would make sense to me that they might want to try air launched yh83k as well hypersonic missiles in the same package.
 

zhangjim

Junior Member
Registered Member
Well, I think I should share some valuable things. This article will be more suitable for this topic.
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

A US Army officer conceived the means to deal with A2/AD system.
The team’s US Air Force JTAC coordinated to strike the targets with an AGM-158 air-to-surface missile delivered by a C-17 over 100 nautical miles away.
I don't think a transport plane is suitable for such a task. If it works, I suggest that they do not need to spend money to develop the B-21 bomber.
This cross-domain troop had trained together prior to the operation, which helped minimize friction once the team inserted into the objective area. Getting the MDRT ashore in an environment with denied airspace was nevertheless a challenge. Leveraging the joint force, the troop was embarked on a US Coast Guard cutter, which moved them to a launch point off the coast of the objective area. From there, the reconnaissance team used small combat rubber raiding craft to reach the beach, before moving swiftly into the jungle where concealed movement was tenable. Once the MDRT was ashore, the forces split into three smaller teams of six to seven personnel and established hide sites to observe the enemy positions and begin collecting information.
This is a bold idea, but there are two problems that have not been considered: 1. The area of Chinese Mainland; 2. Population density in coastal areas.
This idea may be very suitable for raiding small islands in the South China Sea, but it is too much like COD's script to attack air defense weapons deployed in Chinese Mainland.
 

caohailiang

Junior Member
Registered Member
It seems like a ridiculous idea that's simply not worth our time to explore. How is something like C-17 going to be survivable close to Chinese air space?

if they are just launching JASSM-XR, maybe, but the problem is US doesn't have that many of those to make a meaningful dent
 

bjj_starter

New Member
Registered Member
A while back, there was a graphic shared showing PLA salvo sizes at various ranges from the mainland, with big bubbles cover the areas where they could go etc. I believe Patchwork shared it. Does anyone still have it and could share it with me? I've been unable to find it in my local files
 

ZeEa5KPul

Colonel
Registered Member
I wanted to share some thoughts I've been bouncing around about a US-China war in the western Pacific. I've split them up into three broad topics: What China must do to improve its resilience, what it must do to be successful in warfighting, and what political opportunities are available.

Resilience and hardening

Before any military action is even considered, China must be self-sufficient in three crucial areas: food, energy, and technology. The last is the key to the first two. It is certain that in the timeframe contemplated for this war, China's food production will increase greatly both through the use of agricultural technology and increased efficiency through consolidating small farmholds into large agribusinesses as rural dwellers migrate to the city.

Energy self-sufficiency will come about through electrifying transportation - a process well underway today - and expanding the use of renewable energy, battery storage, and advanced nuclear power in the grid (I will mention under my breath that I expect coal to continue to play an important role in China's grid, sadly). The distributed nature of wind and solar power makes the grid more resilient since these sources of energy are diffuse, meaning they're not vulnerable to localized points of failure as we see in a traditional grid like Ukraine's.

Technological self-sufficiency is almost too obvious to mention, but it must be said that China has to be completely immune to any technological blockade like the one imposed today on semiconductor fabrication equipment. Thankfully, the US is unwittingly helping China to achieve precisely this through rallying all relevant actors in the Chinese economy behind this goal simply out of self-preservation.

There are other areas besides these three but they are of far less importance - for example, although China imports a lot of iron ore today (primarily from Australia), that will stop within the coming two decades as China completes its urbanization - thus greatly reducing demand - and finds alternative, secure suppliers. Lithium might appear to be a critical input that China is substituting for oil, but the dynamics of each is very different - oil is combusted, it's gone once it's used. Lithium remains in the battery and can be reclaimed once the battery's useful life is exhausted.

This is the bare minimum standard for China to meet; however, it is still far from sufficient. It is misleading to think of a war in the western Pacific purely as a high-intensity conflict. There will certainly be a high-intensity phase to the conflict, but it is almost certain that residual US forces not destroyed during this phase - which we must assume to be considerable, especially the submarine force - will mount an attritional war for as long as they are able. It would be foolhardy to assume that the US would accept defeat even after it suffers a grievous blow in the initial phases of a Chinese Pacific campaign. A sound plan must take as given that the US would fight to the last man (or whatever politically correct term the US military substitutes for "man" these days). Accordingly, China must plan to not just defeat forward-stationed US forces decisively, it must also overwhelm whatever survives its onslaught and eliminate all US capacity to wage war in the Pacific.

Given the scope of the problem I outlined above, China needs further hardening to prevail in this war. It must start the war with a positively disgusting military overmatch. It must protect its industrial machine with a nigh impenetrable air and missile defense shield. It must stockpile sufficient materiel throughout the country to replace the inevitable losses it will suffer. It must stockpile the capacity - the tools and production facilities - to produce the most sensitive and critical equipment by building fallback facilities under mountains where even nuclear weapons can't reach them. It must recall the spirit of yesteryear that built the Underground Great Wall to safeguard China's nuclear weapons. Fortunately, China today has a prodigious capacity to build infrastructure that will only grow more preponderant as China advances.

Strengthening

We've discussed what conditions need to be met for China to become resilient. But the strongest shield is useless without the other hand wielding a sword. We here consider what China requires to have sufficient offensive capacity: First, China simply needs more of everything. It has reached a sufficient level of technological sophistication that the relevant question now is whether it has those systems in sufficient quantity. More Type 055 destroyers, more J-20 stealth fighters, more DF-26 IRBMs, more J-16 and H-6X bomb trucks and the bombs and missiles that hang from them, etc. Of particular note is the expansion of China's nuclear force - this is absolutely crucial if a Pacific war is to have any chance of ending in China's favour.

Second, China requires sufficient battlefield awareness that its initial strike is as devastating and complete as possible. China requires more satellites of all kinds, more drones, and more reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering aircraft. It must continue and intensify patrols with these assets and utilize novel AI technologies to synthesize these data and distribute them effectively throughout the PLA. It must intensify joint operations training throughout its military forces. Initiative is the strongest weapon China wields in this war and its effective use can determine the outcome.

Third, China needs novel systems, and in sufficient quantity, to expand the scope of its operations far deeper into the Pacific - H-20 stealth bombers, Type 09-V SSNs, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, new classes of hypersonic aircraft and weapons, etc.

Fourth, China must correct its deficiencies in nuclear warfighting by enormously expanding both its strategic and tactical nuclear arsenals.

Politics

China has understood since antiquity that the battlefield must be shaped before the first shot is fired (or, in antiquity, the first blade is drawn), and politics is the instrument to effect this. As China's power grows and it becomes clearer to all that it's prepared for war, new political opportunities will present themselves. Steadfast US allies will question the chances of their patron prevailing and what the consequences will be for them if it cannot. This will allow China to neutralize countries like Japan and South Korea and factor them out of its calculations. This might require distasteful concessions on China's part, like accepting Japan as a de facto nuclear weapons state and foregoing revenge for its outrages in WWII, but that will be a determination for the politicians of the day to make.

The exception to this is Australia. Unlike every other country in the region with many centuries of experience in dealing with a powerful China, Australia is a foreign graft. It's an outsider with an ignoble history we all know and needn't mention. Given this, it will clutch its Anglo-Saxon patron's skirt tightly enough that its knuckles will burst through its skin. Political suasion is futile and Australia will almost certainly need to be dealt with forcefully.

Incidentally, that's why AUKUS was conceived - because America understands that Japan and Korea can be turned while Australia can't.

China should seek to strengthen its alliances with friendly countries like Russia, North Korea, and Pakistan. Russia's bountiful resources will be crucial to any Chinese war effort, as would its cooperation if not active participation in military operations. North Korea and Pakistan will pin down South Korea and India, respectively, and severely complicate any opportunistic actions they would like to take during a China-US war.

Paradoxically, the best chances for politics to prevail come about when China plans under the assumption that all its political endeavours will fail. Only once it is strong enough to prevail even in the face of maximum hostility from its opponents and total indifference from its partners can it hope to subdue its opponents without fighting and compel its partners to fight by its side.
 

BoraTas

Captain
Registered Member
The exception to this is Australia. Unlike every other country in the region with many centuries of experience in dealing with a powerful China, Australia is a foreign graft. It's an outsider with an ignoble history we all know and needn't mention. Given this, it will clutch its Anglo-Saxon patron's skirt tightly enough that its knuckles will burst through its skin. Political suasion is futile and Australia will almost certainly need to be dealt with forcefully.

Incidentally, that's why AUKUS was conceived - because America understands that Japan and Korea can be turned while Australia can't.
Australia has a long history of joining US aggressions. Its political history is basically aiding British and Americans conducting imperialism. It needs to be deterred by force. Then there is the UK. In the current situation, the Chinese military can not strike these nations without significant risks as of now. Especially the UK is practically out of reach. The same cannot apply in reverse because of the said militaries' ancillary nature to the US Military.

In one vs one China could send 055 and 052Ds to conduct cruise missile strikes. But that's not going to happen. The easy way to remedy this is to prioritize the H-20. In fact, even a non-stealthy bomber like the B-52 would work just fine as an interim option, if the introduction of the H-20 is far away. The Tu-160 is being produced so it is an immediate option. It would also be a good political bargaining chip to have Russia open its skies to PLAAF against Britain. The DF-20's range is unknown but I would extend that to 3500 km if it is possible. The same goes for the recently seen stealthy missile too. It would be an even better option if such a range is possible.

The combination of a long-range stealthy ALCM, a long-range bomber (H-20 if possible) and access to the Russian airspace would put both the UK and Australia in the range of low-risk and sizeable strikes. Access to Russian airspace has other benefits as well.

Of topic: Access to Pakistani and Myanmar airspaces would make the H-20 a menace over the Indian ocean too. Stealth aircraft can just overfly Myanmar though. The H-20 is the most important project of China in my opinion
 
Top