PLA strike strategies in westpac HIC

gelgoog said:

This is much less of a problem than it was a decade and a half ago. While the US was hiperventilating over North Korea getting nukes, China put the DF-31/A/AG, and DF-41 into service. These systems, unlike the old ones, can hit the entire Northern Hemisphere, and are way more survivable than the older silo based hypergolics which only had at best enough range to hit California. The total amount of deliverable warheads probably also increased quite a lot as older large unitary warheads were replaced with lots of smaller yield ones. The remaining question is what if China has to defend itself against a much larger US led block, and strike past modern air defenses, for this increasing the amount of warheads and delivery systems up to 10x is justifiable. Given the size of the modern Chinese economy and available technology it would also be much more affordable to do than like 30-40 years ago.


I agree with you on this point. Unless China can somehow counter the US's submarine fleet there is simply no chance of expecting to remain in control of the sea lanes in case of an attempt by the US to impose a naval blockade on China.


I think China needs more than just the Type 095 submarine. It also needs to vastly ramp up the construction of Type 055 cruisers. But this would imply a strategy where China is trying to be the world hegemon in place of the US which is not likely to happen soon.

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i happen to see this

ZeEa5KPul said:

I want to distinguish between two objectives or imperatives facing China: The first is the need to deter the US from launching a war against China given the deteriorating geopolitical environment; the second is the need for China to develop sufficient force projection capability to decisively win a high-intensity war against the US no matter how broad the geographical scope of such a war.

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If you want to talk about strategy you have to consider the fundamentals first. Strategy is not about military operations but about all the other things that contextualize military operations. It's "why we fight" which provides the means for war.

China doesn't need and shouldn't fight a maximalist scenario against the US to achieve strategic victory unless it's goals are imperialist.

Russia didn't need to attack Ukraine in 2014 and invade it in 2022 to achieve its optimal strategic goals. It did both because Kremlin's goals were imperialist. That put Russia in an unwinnable situation where it has to fight an entire population of a country instead of just its political structure.

Compare with historical precedent: British Empire was not defeated in either WW1 or WW2 and it collapsed by 1971. German Empire surrendered without invasion of territory in WW1. What was undermined was the foundation of political power - the monetary system in Britain, the imperial system in Germany.

US has the world's largest and most unsustainable economic system that hinges on US ability to enforce USD monopoly through provision of security.

Absent that the USD system collapses and US immediately enters an economic crisis of the type that causes a systemic revolution. The revolution doesn't have to be violent or cause a civil war. All it needs is to prevent Washington from generating force necessary to perpetuate the USD system - and it's British Empire 2.0. Then you just have to wait.

Strategic dimension of war is not about troops or ships but about money and will. You need money to buy will unless it is your will to survive. If China doesn't threaten survival of Americans then Washington will have to buy their will to fight. But how can they buy the will to fight if the will to fight is what makes money? Russia made the fatal mistake of giving Ukraine the motivation to fight for free. If China doesn't make the same mistake then who is going to fight for the US?

ZeEa5KPul said:

The question I want to consider here is the role played by aircraft carriers

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What are the carriers and why does USN have so many?

vs Soviet Union (3600x2000px)


At the end of Cold War USN had 13-14 carriers but all of them would perform combat operations either in at open sea or in proximity to between to friendly territory. NATO navies - especially RN - had significant assets that would augment USN as did Japan. Atlantic deployment is in relative proximity to CONUS.

Map shows 8 (of 14) carriers on deployment in Atlantic and Pacific. Blue circles are approximate F-18 radii. Use imagination to apply them to area on the map.

vs China (3600x2000px)


No true "friendly" territory (no markers on this map) apart from Japan and individual stations/bases. Deployments fo Indian and Pacific oceans are not in proximity to CONUS. Blue lines mark transit routes. Green lines are key economic transit lines for China. Dashed green line indicates potential economic diversion/expansion that will absorb USN and allied assets.

As for strategy: look up the share of USD reserves in WestPac region and Gulf states role in the system - the clay feet of American giant. Put pressure there and they will crack. The US needs to provide security for the system to function. Make it impossible and it all falls like a house of cards

Map shows 6 (of 11) carriers on deployment. Blue circles are approximate F-35 radii.

This is the current threat projection for PLAN involving USN CSGs.

I don't see the need for PLAN carriers. Carriers are useful but they are not necessary until marine traffic will need PLAN protection on the Atlantic or across the Pacific.

What is necesary in the meantime is a lot of submarines and all other asymmetric/grey forms of warfare to make USN carrier deployment problematic which doesn't need to target the carriers - just the support ships for the CSGs. Carriers can't fight without their escort and escort can't fight without replenishment. And if for whatever reason the carriers can't arrive in time in those two crucial regions...

Geography doesn't favor US in this strategic contest as it did before. It still provides the comfort of physical security of homeland but no longer the comfort of being able to fight from behind the backs of allies - which is America's way of war.

I think CMC sees it the same way as I do. Make USN power projection to expensive or too risky in the key regions and US empire will deflate like Britain before. Technology doesn't matter. It's better means to an end. Iraq and Afghanistan had none and they dealt America a severe wound.

As a parting note:

Playing the game of carriers is playing to USN's strength because shipborne aviation is the greatest advantage that USN has over PLAN, far greater than submarines because the complexity of the entire system is an order of magnitude greater.

Japan vs US and Germany vs Allies in WW2. Which one fared better in absolute and relative numbers?

And let's not forget that regardless of the scale of the economic crisis caused by the war Russia will keep fielding its submarines until at least end of this decade. The fleet is not in a particularly good condition (lots of 971s in the dock right now) but this year they should have ~12 SSN/SSGN and 12 SSBNs and that is something USN has to cover with SSNs because of geography.

As Sun Tzu wroge: Huludao goes chop chop and the stocks on Wall Street drop.

Blitzo said:

This has broadly been my thinking for the last 2 years.

Overall, I think there is some evidence that the CMC sees the 2020s as a "decade of concern" as much as the US DoD has been, and that makes me think that for this period (including the latter half of this decade), conventional systems with greater cost effectiveness in terms of strategic effect, while also aiming for systems/platforms that can be put into service faster rather than slower, and also being more numerous/distributed in nature.

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I agree, and I actually find the contrast interesting

The CMC thinks the 2020s are a "decade of concern" because after 2030, China will have amassed the military capabilities to match its status as an economic superpower and be able to deter the US from intervening in the Western Pacific. And from then onwards, China will continue accelerating away from a lagging US.

Some in the DOD and think tanks believe the 2020s are a "decade of concern" because China will peak and then stagnate/decline after the 2030s. So that China has to strike first before this happens. Plus the US military will have reoriented sharply towards China and the Western Pacific by 2030

Based on my discussion with Patch and others, I tend to think of everything in light of:
ISR
fire/missiles
delivery platform

We are seeing a lot of improvement in all 3 with PLA. I think they are pretty good with first 2 and okay with the 3rd.

We discuss 093B's importance because it opens up a different delivery platform that brings unique attributes of its own.

So, if we think about things from the perspective of an overwhelming first strike, then they need to be able to move 093Bs into position without being tailed by USN subs or Japanese MPAs.

In my mind, putting 093B in sea of japan and Phillipine Sea would give them additional axis attack against the 7th fleet and JSDF. It's one of those things we haven't really thought about as much, because the rumors of 8 093B came out relatively recently. Now, it seems like those rumors have some support, so I think it's worth exploring how much it would help PLA in the opening hours of a westpac conflict. I don't think there is any question it would help them.

tphuang said:

Based on my discussion with Patch and others, I tend to think of everything in light of:
ISR
fire/missiles
delivery platform

We are seeing a lot of improvement in all 3 with PLA. I think they are pretty good with first 2 and okay with the 3rd.

We discuss 093B's importance because it opens up a different delivery platform that brings unique attributes of its own.

So, if we think about things from the perspective of an overwhelming first strike, then they need to be able to move 093Bs into position without being tailed by USN subs or Japanese MPAs.

In my mind, putting 093B in sea of japan and Phillipine Sea would give them additional axis attack against the 7th fleet and JSDF. It's one of those things we haven't really thought about as much, because the rumors of 8 093B came out relatively recently. Now, it seems like those rumors have some support, so I think it's worth exploring how much it would help PLA in the opening hours of a westpac conflict. I don't think there is any question it would help them.

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How can 093B get to the Sea of Japan when there are SOSUS net in every waterway in the first island chain? The only way I can think of is the subs are based in Vladivostok

vincent said:

How can 093B get to the Sea of Japan when there are SOSUS net in every waterway in the first island chain? The only way I can think of is the subs are based in Vladivostok

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Well, they can alwasy move there when they want, but the problem is getting tailed by US SSNs. This is where a little cooperation with Russians would help. Have a major exercise in Sea of Japan with Russian Navy, so you have an excuse with a large fleet there protected by a couple of 093Bs. And then instead of sticking around there, 093B sail further north West of Sakhalins and into Sea of Okhotsk. This is where getting permission from the Russians to operate in their territory or sea waters is important. Of course,

All of this is predicated on 093B having noise level comparable to middle LA class sub and having a VLS section.

Blitzo said:

This has broadly been my thinking for the last 2 years.

Overall, I think there is some evidence that the CMC sees the 2020s as a "decade of concern" as much as the US DoD has been, and that makes me think that for this period (including the latter half of this decade), conventional systems with greater cost effectiveness in terms of strategic effect, while also aiming for systems/platforms that can be put into service faster rather than slower, and also being more numerous/distributed in nature.
Among the various naval conventional platforms that would be more desirable, SSNs would certainly be there, and the more competitive naturally the better. Surface combatants of course are also important, but for the PLAN, SSNs are the biggest gap.

At minimum, one could argue that carriers (whether nuclear or conventional) certainly do not meet those characteristics, and if anything carriers are among the most limited in quantity, slowest to procure, and slowest to work up and make combat effective, as well as one of the most resource intensive platforms out there.


The augmentation of strategic nuclear deterrence is something that has been discussed extensively already and we already know they are pursuing this regardless, so there isn't much to be said on the matter. It is conventional procurements that is most vague.

Good decision moving the reply here.

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carriers aren't necessarily slow to build. Going by US experience, Forrestal carriers were built 2 at a time with 2 laid down in 1952, finished in 1954, then the next 2 laid down in 1954/55, finished in 1958/59. Kitty Hawks were built rapidly in sequence taking on average 3 years to complete and were laid down while Forrestals were still being built. From 1952-1964, US built 8 large conventional carriers.

Given Chinese shipbuilding capability, 2 shipyards (Jiangnan/Dalian) pumping out 2 carriers per year once 003 is fully understood will be possible, as this is simply matching US capability from last century.

If the buildout starts in 2024, then its possible to get 4 carriers commissioned and 2 in trials by 2030.

Carriers have a gigantic ASW capability. That's why the Soviets dedicated so much to stopping US CBGs in the Arctic - not as offense, but to protect their SSBN bastions.

If China has to choose between SSN and carrier, I'd say, pick carrier. It plays more to Chinese strengths in geography, industry and tech:

1. carriers work equally well in green water and blue water while SSNs are better in blue water (less obstacles and noise), and China's main focus in a defensive conflict is to secure the green water of the 1st island chain and SCS.

2. carriers better use China's huge surface shipbuilding industry instead of needing specialized facilities.

3. carriers better utilize and expand on China's existing doctrine of networked warfare, while SSNs can't talk to other assets easily. Carriers act as a force multiplier for PLAGF, PLAAF and PLARF assets by giving them more scouting eyes and can take cues from their sensors.

Indeed I'd say that PLAN should have not just a large CV buildout but a concurrent LHD buildout that includes ASW helicopters and ASW drone ships launched from well decks.

FairAndUnbiased said:

Indeed I'd say that PLAN should have not just a large CV buildout but a concurrent LHD buildout that includes ASW helicopters and ASW drone ships launched from well decks.

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I'd say that an LHD (at 35-40k tonnes displacement) is just too big a target and oversized for the role of operating ASW helicopters and ASW drone ships launched from well-decks

A smaller ship like the HMS Ocean (20-25K tonnes) can operate 18 helicopters which is more than enough for any fleet.

tphuang said:

Well, they can alwasy move there when they want, but the problem is getting tailed by US SSNs. This is where a little cooperation with Russians would help. Have a major exercise in Sea of Japan with Russian Navy, so you have an excuse with a large fleet there protected by a couple of 093Bs. And then instead of sticking around there, 093B sail further north West of Sakhalins and into Sea of Okhotsk. This is where getting permission from the Russians to operate in their territory or sea waters is important. Of course,

All of this is predicated on 093B having noise level comparable to middle LA class sub and having a VLS section.

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I think you have it backwards, 093Bs are not meant to be part of the alpha strike. The Alpha strike is instead a means to allow the PLAN to unleash its 093B’s full potential.

Firstly, China has such overwhelming numbers and variety of platforms and munitions, the few VLS and tube launched cruise missiles even the entire 093B fleet can pump out isn’t going to make any meaningful difference.

Secondly, defending against multi-directional time-on-target saturation attacks has become so normalised in modern naval and land forces that going to all that trouble just to lob a few missiles from an unexpected direction really isn’t worth the effort.

Lastly, having spend so much effort to break out into the open pacific free and clear, it would be an incredible waste for the 093Bs to immediately give away their locations with missile barrages and then have to return to port to rearm.

Right now, the PLAN is hemmed in by geography and USN forward deployed SSNs and sensor networks along the first island chain.

But in the event of direct open conflict between China and the US, pretty much all of those obstacles disappear.

US forward bases would be destroyed in the opening hours, removing MPAs from the equation. US and US allied fixed sensor networks would also be part of the first round to targets to be hit and taken out. Any USN SSNs that isn’t racing east into the deep pacific at top speed would be in massive danger as PLA MPAs and surface groups would likely be aggressively sweeping for any and all foreign subs in the first island chain and especially along potential break-out routes for 093Bs.

Just think of how much havoc, delay and damage 8 93Bs free and clear in the pacific can cause for the USN for when they want to get CSGs into range. Especially since all PLAN subs have mine laying capabilities that they can use without giving away their locations.

Hell, even using them super-conservatively as passive forward listening posts could result in overwhelming success if an 093B picks up a USN CSG way outside the second island chain and cued up space based ISR to get positive ID and track for a massed DF26 strike well before the CSG thought it was in the danger zone.

The 093Bs are not needed for the phase one alpha strike against existing forward deployed US forces because the PLA already have that covered many times over. Where they will come into their own is for phase 2, when the USN tries to move new assets in range to intervene in Taiwan and the PLA tries to counter them.