Cont from above
If USN is willing to dedicate 20% of their active destroyers (let's say 50 in high readiness) and 25% of their active SSNs in defense of HI, then PLA would not be able to overcome it with the 1 CSG + 1 Type 076 SAG that I mentioned.
In which case, they may want to just leave a few 052Ds around there with H-6s, some drones and ground based launchers and blast everythings off as war starts. If they loose that, not end of the world.
I was under the impression that you thought USN would just leave a couple of destroyers at Pearl Harbour, which would actually give the fleet I described enough of an advantage to overpower that small surface fleet and air defense/runway at Pearl Harbor before aerial based assets can get involved.
Completely disagree. The endurance of ISR drones will continue to improve in the next 15 years. China will likely have a true long endurance drone that can hang in the air for 30 to 40 hours at a time.
I'm aware of the endurance that future UAVs will have.
That doesn't change my calculations, because PLA UAVs will be too busy monitoring the waters and airspace around Kiribati and the CSG itself and monitoring the waters searching for US SAGs to be able to do intensive and continuous ISR on Hawaii.
The US OTOH, will have a chain of continuous ISR of PLA CSGs deploying from the mainland all the way to centpac, because the first and second island chains during peacetime and periods of tension will be populated by many US ISR assets and surface vessels that will provide continuous tracking and overwatch of PLA CSGs as they make their way across into centpac, and have handovers every time to ensure continuous track is never lost.
You and I have a fundamental disagreement about strength of USN nuclear subs vs PLAN nuclear subs. My strategy is fundamentally stationing carrier groups closer to land where they can be backed up missiles launchers, air cover, diesel subs, undersea network of sonar/glider and whatever else they can come up with that don't get lost in Pacific ocean. Your strategy is fundamentally about having more CSGs to push USN CSGs further out. I don't think having another CSG in Westpac will change things as much as just operating a couple of hundred kms closer to mainland.
I believe the PLA needs at minimum, 6 CSGs operational in westpac to be able to fight the kind of war that the US is likely to try to impose on China, to have a chance of achieving an outcome in the FPO is not complete disastrous.
Initially, the US will position their carriers outside the first island chain, while using land based strike systems and air bases in the first island chain to conduct as extensive strikes against PLA positions and naval forces in the first island chain as possible to exact as much damage to the PLA as possible before they get destroyed by the PLA.
Then, the US will use CSGs and SSNs in the middle between the first and second island chains, and operate bombers from Guam (and bombers from Hawaii, with air refuelling from Guam), all of which together will launch standoff distance strikes at least 1500km away, against Chinese land based targets and Chinese naval forces operating in the first island chain. In other words, a long range missile siege, to gradually wear away PLA defenses and naval forces and land based air bases. Over time, the US will reinforce that westpac presence with CSGs redeployed from Europe and more aircraft redeployed from CONTUS and the rest of the world, to further intensify their siege or even to carry out a decisive coup de grace after a sufficiently long siege.
The PLA either has the choice of hoping that the US runs out of missiles and resolve before the PLA gradually loses its ability to wage war -- or the PLA carries out an action to destroy US forces operating in the second island chain, of which the linchpin is Guam (as a large airbase and naval base which will enjoy extensive air and missile defense fortifications), and their CSGs.
In the modern era, where static defense without offensive action/counter attack potential is death, this is really no choice at all --- the PLA needs the ability to fight a comprehensive, high intensity and robust conflict at distances up to the second island chain. Land based long range strike systems like hypersonics, IRBMs and stealth bombers are all fine and good, but the density of fires is just not great enough.
To be able to defeat Guam defended by 4-5 USN CSGs operating in the same region, will require the PLA to have a large scale oceanic maneuver force of at minimum equal capability and quantity, supported by at minimum equal long range land based fires and ISR.
However, even such a battle must not be a pyrrhic victory, because the US still has 6 CSGs in the rest of the world that they'll be spooling up to send to westpac in a few months afterwards, meaning the PLA must be able to achieve a thoroughly beneficial exchange rate.
Or to put it in a more shorthand way, I believe the PLA needs a warfighting capability where they can fight a high intensity conflict in the First Phase of Operations (FPO) up to the second island chain against the US forces which will include up to 5 US CSGs, in a manner where the outcome is:
Post-FPO PLA total CSG count > Post-FPO US total CSG count
The greater the disparity in favour of the PLA, the better.
If the PLA ends the FPO with 6 CSGs in total versus the US having 5 CSGs in total, then sure, good.
If the PLA ends the FPO with 8 CSGs in total versus the US having 4 CSGs in total, better.
So on and so forth.
The above disparity will depend on:
- How many CSGs the PLA has prior to conflict, and how many CSGs the US has prior to conflict
- How many CSGs the PLA loses and how many CSGs the US loses in the FPO (which is also dependent on how many CSGs they have operational in westpac during the FPO)
Hypothetically, lets say if the PLA has 16 CSGs prior to conflict and the US has 11 CSGs prior to conflict.
During FPO, lets say the PLA can surge 12 CSGs and the US can surge 5 CSGs to westpac. In that scenario, ideally the PLA are able to destroy all 5 CSGs while losing a minimal number of its own 12 CSGs, because those 12 CSGs will be operating alongside each other in a mutually supporting manner and thus much more survivable and defensible.
Thus, at the end of the FPO, in terms of total CSG count, the PLA will still have 15 CSGs in total, while the US will have 6 CSGs in total.
That sort of outcome (along with the PLA being able to wipe out US forces in the western pacific, up to and including Guam and denying those islands to the US, or even using those as resupply bases for PLA naval ships and aircraft), would be the sort of Post-FPO outcome that would allow the PLA to pursue a robust offensive strategy into the central pacific, and certainly capable enough to easily sweep aside any potential US counter attack.
That is the sort of strategy I think the PLA should be aiming to achieve.
