This is why I say China is trying to do a bloodless armed unification. The timing of that will be dynamic not fixed. And it is likely to happen given the relative strengths of China and the US. This doesn't mean China hasn't prepared for a bloody one though.
The best time for Taiwan to declare independence and succeed has always been in the last year.
The 2027 deadline once wildly circulated on the Chinese internet, IIRC, started when Xi removed the term limits for himself. People were hoping that by 2027, when his third term ends, and in the year of the 100th anniversary of PLA, the Taiwan issue will have been resolved. At the time IMF, World Bank, etc. were also, coincidentally I think, predicting China surpassing the US in nominal GDP by 2027.
Then somehow the western picked up it believing it a deadline set by CCP or Xi himself.
I don't think anyone who seriously studies geopolitics takes the 2027 date seriously. You're likely right that the timing and prospects of a Taiwan conflict will depend almost entirely on the situation at hand, specifically the actions taken by Taiwan and her allies.
I see only a few instances in which China will immediately launch a Taiwan operation, even if she isn't fully prepared:
- Pre-emptive Taiwanese/US strike on Chinese bases or even the mainland itself
- Taiwan's decision to develop/acquire WMDs
- Taiwan's decision to allow the US to deploy long-range weaponry (or nuclear weapons) on its territory
I am even going so far as to posit that China does not see a Taiwanese declaration of independence as crossing its red line, as such an act would mostly be symbolic without follow-up actions. In the same vein, I suspect that the Chinese leadership is actually quite satisfied with the currently status quo, one in which Taiwan does not undertake overt actions to assert its "independence" and China continues its military modernization in peace.
Military and economic considerations are very often trumped by local political considerations. For example if China attempts a Taiwanese reunification during a US president's first term, the chance of war between the US and China are EXTREMELY high regardless of any balance of power considerations. Also, China may already believe it can currently handedly win a war over Taiwan between itself and the US/Japan +/- other allies.
If China's biggest concern in a Taiwan contingency is US involvement, then it would focus on economic and military indicators vis-a-vis that of the US rather than which president is currently in charge. The current administration is by no means a guarantor of US non-involvement whereas overwhelming military superiority in the region could very well be.
I have a suspicion this time may have already passed. I believe China's recent (last several years') rapid/massive military buildup has been to shorten the time interval during which the US believes it can still reasonably win a war with China. The speed of the buildup as well as the level of China's military technology maturation has probably caught the West by surprise, and now they are developing desperation tactics like "Hellscape" to deal with a Chinese military that they can no longer deal with by the usual brute force-on-force means.
The US does not need to militarily defeat China in a war to strengthen its position in the Pacific. All it needs is to let China expend her resources and money on a war of attrition while it uses the situation as a pretext to deploy even more military assets in the region.
You guys are overcomplicating the “is China intent on armed reunification” stuff. If they can ensure unchallenged regional hegemony in a reasonable time horizon (say in the next decade) armed reunification is not appealing because it’s completely unnecessary to get the desired end state. If not then expressing intent to do armed reunification is a baseline requirement just to keep strategic pressure in China’s favor. There is no scenario where China chooses to initiate the war without provocation from either Taiwan or the US though because the One China policy already gives Beijing 80% of what it wants. Taiwan is a non entity so long as it’s followed as originally intended. Of course this changes if the One China policy is undermined or discarded but that would be an example of another actor provoking the military contingency in Beijing’s eyes. This is not hard.
China's "tolerance" for these provocations is without a doubt on a sliding scale that is inversely commensurate with its military strength vs that of Taiwan and the US in the region. An act by Taiwan in 2025 might not elicit the same response that it would in - say - 2045.
