PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

latenlazy

Brigadier
China's "tolerance" for these provocations is without a doubt on a sliding scale that is inversely commensurate with its military strength vs that of Taiwan and the US in the region. An act by Taiwan in 2025 might not elicit the same response that it would in - say - 2045.
The scale doesn’t have much more room to move. Where we’re at today Taiwan getting even one country to drop their One China policy, even if it’s only an informal abrogation like recognizing a Taiwanese ambassador, gets us over the line of kinetic escalation. A lot of people don’t seem to understand that China doesn’t need to commit an overt act of war to trigger an alibi for kinetic options. The next sufficient political provocation from Taiwan is just going to lead to PLA ships and planes sailing and flying into Taiwan’s formal territory with total disregard for the 12 nm line. After all as far as China’s concerned this territory is their right to enforce by international law anyways. If Taiwan wants to shoot the PLA will just say “thank you for starting the war”. If Taiwan doesn’t they lose de facto control of their own territorial boundaries, China gets to formally establish that One China means One China with the PLA in control of where the borders are, and this becomes the default “status quo” condition going forth.
 

Neurosmith

Junior Member
Registered Member
The scale doesn’t have much more room to move. Where we’re at today Taiwan getting even one country to drop their One China policy, even if it’s only an informal abrogation like recognizing a Taiwanese ambassador, gets us over the line of kinetic escalation. A lot of people don’t seem to understand that China doesn’t need to commit an overt act of war to trigger an alibi for kinetic options. The next sufficient political provocation from Taiwan is just going to lead to PLA ships and planes sailing and flying into Taiwan’s formal territory with total disregard for the 12 nm line. After all as far as China’s concerned this territory is their right to enforce by international law anyways. If Taiwan wants to shoot the PLA will just say “thank you for starting the war”. If Taiwan doesn’t they lose de facto control of their own territorial boundaries, China gets to formally establish that One China means One China with the PLA in control of where the borders are, and this becomes the default “status quo” condition going forth.
China's policy has been to cut diplomatic ties with countries that choose to recognize Taiwan, not to use that as a casus belli for kicking off a war with Taiwan. There are still countries today that choose to recognize Taiwan at the expense of being cut off from China.
 

latenlazy

Brigadier
China's policy has been to cut diplomatic ties with any country that chooses to recognize Taiwan, not to use that as a casus belli for kicking off a war with Taiwan. There are still countries today that choose to recognize Taiwan at the expense of being cut off from China.

You are confusing a One China policy in favor of recognizing the ROC with an independent recognition of Taiwan (aka either a One China One Taiwan or a two Chinas policy).

China’s *old* policy of cutting diplomatic ties with countries that choose to recognize the ROC over the PRC is contingent on the overtly expressed understanding that what they are recognizing is an ROC government that is still “China”. The moment a country recognizes a “Taiwan” or “ROC” ambassador who maintains a position implicitly or explicitly that Taiwan, even if they call it the ROC, is a separate “sovereign” state from the PRC (which has been every DPP administration’s *expressed* position btw) all bets are off. This kind of condition is also implicitly dependent on a Taiwanese administration’s recognition of the 92 Consensus.

China’s “policy” here isn’t set in stone either. The last two years of intensifying military “exercises” aren’t actually “excercises”. They’re active pre-deployment of forces, to essentially cut the military response time for a triggering political event to nothing. This is “consistent” with China’s policy because DPP administrations both overtly reject the 92 Consensus and *actively and regularly* uses language that overtly claims the “ROC” is a separate sovereign state, and that relations between the two sides should be treated as between two sovereign entities. We are not dealing with the old rules of the situation anymore because the conditions upholding those old rules haven’t been maintained. That old normal went out the window especially after the Pelosi visit.
 
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Neurosmith

Junior Member
Registered Member
You are confusing a One China policy in favor of recognizing the ROC with an independent recognition of Taiwan (aka either a One China One Taiwan or a two Chinas policy).

China’s *old* policy of cutting diplomatic ties with countries that choose to recognize the ROC over the PRC is contingent on the overtly expressed understanding that what they are recognizing is an ROC government that is still “China”. The moment a country recognizes a “Taiwan ambassador” who maintains a position implicitly or explicitly that Taiwan, even if they call it the ROC, is a separate “sovereign” state from the PRC (which has been every DPP administration’s *expressed* position btw) all bets are off. China’s “policy” here isn’t set in stone. The last two years of intensifying military “exercises” aren’t actually “excercises”. They’re active pre-deployment of forces, to essentially cut the military response time for a triggering political event to nothing. We are not dealing with the old rules of the situation anymore. That old normal went out with the Pelosi visit.
What are you basing your premise on, though? Is there an official PRC document outlining this new policy or is this more of a speculative extrapolation?
 

coolgod

Colonel
Registered Member
What are you basing your premise on, though? Is there an official PRC document outlining this new policy or is this more of a speculative extrapolation?
Why don't you state what you are basing your premise on? I provided first hand textual evidence from CPC insiders for the deadline on the return of Macau earlier and you just dismissed it cause it didn't fit with your views.
 

latenlazy

Brigadier
What are you basing your premise on, though? Is there an official PRC document outlining this new policy or is this more of a speculative extrapolation?

This “premise” is the PRC’s own fully articulated views on the One China policy and how it must work since it was first formulated, spanning decades, and reiterated *multiple* times after each incident with Taiwan. Read up on Jiang’s speech to the Taiwan Affair’s Office in 1997, the history behind Bill Clinton’s 3 Nos, and the 92 Consensus if you want to actually understand how the One China policy is supposed to work from China’s standpoint.
 

Neurosmith

Junior Member
Registered Member
Why don't you state what you are basing your premise on? I provided first hand textual evidence from CPC insiders for the deadline on the return of Macau and you just dismissed it cause it didn't fit with your views.
Because China has diplomatic relations with countries that recognize China and doesn't with countries that recognize Taiwan?

This “premise” is the PRC’s own fully articulated views on the One China policy and how it must work since it was first formulated, spanning decades, and reiterated *multiple* times after each incident with Taiwan. Read up on Jiang’s speech to the Taiwan Affair’s Office in 1997, the history behind Bill Clinton’s 3 Nos, and the 92 Consensus if you want to actually understand how the One China policy is supposed to work from China’s standpoint.
My (very) rough understanding is that China takes issue not with any particular nation recognizing the ROC over the PRC but rather treating Taiwan/ROC as a separate entity from China. An example would be Kiribati, which established ties with Taiwan in 2003 but was later cut off from China because of that. In that example, China did not deign to launch a military response.
 

tygyg1111

Captain
Registered Member
Because China has diplomatic relations with countries that recognize China and doesn't with countries that recognize Taiwan?


My (very) rough understanding is that China takes issue not with any particular nation recognizing the ROC over the PRC but rather treating Taiwan/ROC as a separate entity from China. An example would be Kiribati, which established ties with Taiwan in 2003 but was later cut off from China because of that. In that example, China did not deign to launch a military response.
You're ignoring the real underlying here: balance of power. When the balance of power is lopsided enough, if I say the sky is green, everyone else nods and agrees. So beyond 2025, when China decides to patrol the hell out of Taiwan island, the DPP / ROC government, whichever it is by then, and bystander countries can either nod and agree, or get their asses whooped
 

latenlazy

Brigadier
My (very) rough understanding is that China takes issue not with any particular nation recognizing the ROC over the PRC but rather treating Taiwan/ROC as a separate entity from China. An example would be Kiribati, which established ties with Taiwan in 2003 but was later cut off from China because of that. In that example, China did not deign to launch a military response.
2003 is not 2025, and in 2003 China actually was getting quite close to exercising some form of military action because the Chen administration was pushing for an independence referendum at the time (things only calmed down when Bush basically slapped Chen down and told him to shut up). The DPP invented the “we don’t need to declare independence we are already independent” line, which indicated that they would instead try to break the One China status quo by getting diplomatic recognition outside the confines of a “One China” condition, only after the Tsai administration. You may also want to ask why China chose to normalize regular military deployments around Taiwan after the Pelosi visit, despite that not being a situation in kind with Kiribati example.
 

Iron Man

Major
Registered Member
If China's biggest concern in a Taiwan contingency is US involvement, then it would focus on economic and military indicators vis-a-vis that of the US rather than which president is currently in charge. The current administration is by no means a guarantor of US non-involvement whereas overwhelming military superiority in the region could very well be.
This is my exact point. Overwhelming military superiority in the region may very well NOT be a guarantor of US non-involvement if local American politics compel an intervention. I can potentially see a self-sacrificial first term US president laying down a future second term to avoid a disastrous war with China over Taiwan, but this variety of American president is about as likely finding a unicorn. Far more likely is a delusional US president with an unwavering commitment to and belief in American Exceptionalism, good vs evil, freedom vs oppression, bla bla bla. "Oh we can't beat China you say? Well are you a coward or a real American patriot? Do you believe in God or in Satan?" This is only slight hyperbole. Slight.

The US does not need to militarily defeat China in a war to strengthen its position in the Pacific. All it needs is to let China expend her resources and money on a war of attrition while it uses the situation as a pretext to deploy even more military assets in the region.
China vs (only) Taiwan would not be a war of "attrition". Taiwan would fold like a lawn chair within a few weeks, couple months tops.
 
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