PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

coolgod

Colonel
Registered Member
A few thoughts on the China-Taiwan situation...

I'd like to take the contrarian view that China does not have a "deadline" by which Taiwan must be "reunified".
Strongly disagree with your points. Your points seem to reflect this notion that reunification is like a one time thing and not a long term event.

China absolutely have a history of setting fixed timelines for matters regarding reunification. These decisions are political in nature, not whether X GDP was reached or when X# of weapons are produced. Take a look at the history of the Chinese civil war and the return of Macau to PRC China, you don't think the date of 20 December 1999 was just random right?

Mainstream media and a lot of voices here seem to unilaterally adopt the overtone that a Taiwan unification must happen sooner or later, implying that China is slowly running out of patience and will eventually kick off a pre-planned invasion (if peaceful efforts are not fruitful). China seems to be satisfied with the current status-quo and overt military trends do not point towards significant preparations for a Taiwan contingency (even with the recent construction of amphibious landing barges). MSM tends to focus on the following justifications for an "expedited" Chinese invasion:
  • Economic growth slowdown
  • Unfavorable demographic trends
  • Xi wants to add Taiwan to his resume/legacy
Even if the above were enough to get the Chinese brass/leaders to panic (they are not), this argument does not take into account that Taiwan is much worse in those economic & demographic indicators than China is.

We need to analyze the Chinese reunification process in totality, not just when is it easier to land PLA troops on Taiwan. China has to govern the land for eternity, those costs are long term while the military action costs are one time. China understands full well the enormous costs over a long period of time needed to pacify a breakaway region with a history of separatism. Heck, just look at China XXX regions right now.

This isn't the old ROC era in Taiwan, where Mao and Deng could wait it out since both sides were Chinese and suppressed separatism. Analogous to the three kingdoms era where numerous political entities battle to see who is the better ruler of China. The post 2000 Taiwan is actively moving towards independence, akin to Vietnamese local warlords declaring independence during early Chinese dynasties.

According to you Taiwan is in worse shape demographically than China, that's why they are starting to mass import Indians (suspiciously similar to a lot of countries in the west). For those people who live in a country which have yet to be culturally enriched by Indians, let's just say the overall governance cost of a multicultural society increases more than you think.

As China's economic and military progress eclipses that of Taiwan and creeps up against that of the US, it is absolutely in China's favor to minimize the need for an armed conflict that could throw its long-term economic and developmental goals in jeopardy.

The younger generation in Taiwan are getting more and more brainwashed, they aren't taught basic Chinese history and have a very flawed understanding of their identity. The shifts in political spectrum is very pronouced and well documented in Taiwan. The results of having a generation of "we wuz dutch settlers" is evident from the chaos in HK in the previous 10 years, its effects can also be seen in the economy of today's Hong Kong.

Having a less brainwashed population is crucial to long-term economic and developmental goals in Taiwan. I don't want to assign blame, but let's just say there is a big reason why the Guangdong–Hong Kong–Macao Greater Bay Area project isn't progressing as fast as the central government wants to.

My third and final take draws on the premise that China understands that time is on its side and wishes to maximize the duration of relative peace in the Taiwan region

Delaying reunification might decrease the one time cost of the liberation of the island, but it also decreases the value of the island while simultaneously increases the future governance costs.
 
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Neurosmith

Junior Member
Registered Member
Strongly disagree with your points.

China absolutely have a history of setting fixed timelines for matters regarding reunification. These decisions are political in nature, not whether X GDP was reached or when X# of weapons are produced. Take a look at the history of the Chinese civil war and the return of Macau to PRC China.
A "political decision" must take into account the aforementioned economic/military/national indicators. Even if we assume that Xi wants to take Taiwan by year X solely for personal reasons, the success of said operation and the impacts on other parts of Chinese society will undoubtedly reverberate within his legacy. The decision to launch such a daunting operation would be made only after a careful consideration of potential impacts on China's society, economy, military, and long-term aspirations, even if "forced" by external factors such as a political crisis in Taiwan.

The return of Macau to PRC was an agreed-upon transition and the return date decided by both parties (Portugal and China).

We need to analyze the Chinese reunification process in totality, not just when is it easier to land PLA troops on Taiwan. China has to govern the land for eternity, those costs are long term while the military action costs are one time. China understands full well the enormous costs over a long period of time needed to pacify a breakaway region with a history of separatism. Heck, just look at China XXX regions right now.

According to you Taiwan is in worse shape demographically than China, that's why they are starting to mass importing Indians (suspiciously similar to a lot of countries in the west). For those people who live in a country which have yet to be culturally enriched by Indians, let's just say the overall governance cost of a multicultural society increases more than you think.
The costs of governance will remain regardless of when an operation is launched. Taiwan's youth is already several generations removed from the Chinese Civil War days; it is an exercise in futility to hope for an "easier reintegration" because a reunification campaign is to be launched sooner rather than later. One could almost argue that the best way to "pacify" a region is to reintegrate it via peaceful means - presumably when favorable economic and sociologic conditions win over the minds and hearts of the population.

As for Taiwan's immigration policy, I do not see how that relates to my earlier arguments regarding China's policies towards Taiwan.

The younger generation in Taiwan are getting more and more brainwashed, they aren't taught basic Chinese history and have a very flawed understanding of their identity. The shifts in political spectrum is very pronouced and well documented in Taiwan. The results of having a generation of "we wuz dutch settlers" is evident from the chaos in HK in the previous 10 years, its effects can also be seen in economy of today's Hong Kong.

Having a less brainwashed population is crucial to long-term economic and developmental goals in Taiwan. I don't want to assign blame, but let's just say there is a big reason why the Guangdong–Hong Kong–Macao Greater Bay Area project isn't progressing as fast as the central government wants to.
Again, changing the political discourse among the population is a matter for the ruling civilian government and is almost certainly not a factor in China's perception of a potential military scenario of the region. Considering that it has been 75+ years since Taiwan politically split from the rest of China, it does not make a difference whether or not China makes a move now or later and it certainly shouldn't affect any decision to launch or defer such a move.

Delaying reunification might decrease the one time cost of the liberation of the island, but it also decreases the value of the island while simultaneously increases the future governance costs.
What is the "value" of the island as you see it?
 

vincent

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Moderator - World Affairs
The only real value that Taiwan has is that it would break up the 1IC chains, and hugely improve China's power over S.Korea, Japan and improve power projection capabilities against the US
Chinese SSBN no longer get locked in by the first island chain. They can truly be free to roam the Pacific Ocean and achieve their purpose of being the mainstay of China’s retaliatory nuclear strike.
 

coolgod

Colonel
Registered Member
A "political decision" must take into account the aforementioned economic/military/national indicators. Even if we assume that Xi wants to take Taiwan by year X solely for personal reasons, the success of said operation and the impacts on other parts of Chinese society will undoubtedly reverberate within his legacy. The decision to launch such a daunting operation would be made only after a careful consideration of potential impacts on China's society, economy, military, and long-term aspirations, even if "forced" by external factors such as a political crisis in Taiwan.
I don't disagree with you that CPC needs to think hard about the timing of reunification, but your previous argument was that China was not in a rush, time was on PRC's side and China doesn't have deadlines for these things.

Superpowers focus more on domestic concerns, not foreign concerns, this applies to China, US and Russia. The timing and manner of the reunification of China will be dictated by the domestic political situation and not "global opinions". In that sense I agree with you that even if Lai declares independence, the CPC can sit still and do nothing if there is no domestic political expediency in doing something.

The return of Macau to PRC was an agreed-upon transition and the return date decided by both parties (Portugal and China).
China "suggested" the Portuguese to GTFO before 2000, and they did so begrudgingly hence the date. You don't think China has hard deadlines in mind for peaceful or less peaceful reunification?

The costs of governance will remain regardless of when an operation is launched. Taiwan's youth is already several generations removed from the Chinese Civil War days; it is an exercise in futility to hope for an "easier reintegration" because a reunification campaign is to be launched sooner rather than later.
That's absolutely not true, the integration of Taiwan in 1996 is totally different than the integration of Taiwan in 2025 which is also totally different than the integration of Taiwan in 2035.

One could almost argue that the best way to "pacify" a region is to reintegrate it via peaceful means - presumably when favorable economic and sociologic conditions win over the minds and hearts of the population.
Maybe the CPC shouldn't have liberated Shanghai then. The CPC should have stayed in their communist base in Yan'an and grow their economy, until their GDP per capita was higher than Shanghai and they had better weapons than those given to KMT by the west.

As for Taiwan's immigration policy, I do not see how that relates to my earlier arguments regarding China's policies towards Taiwan.
You don't see how changing the ethnic background of a separatist region increases the cost of reunification for China?

What is the "value" of the island as you see it?
My present day answer to that question is the value of the island is bait to end US hegemony in the west pacific. An additional 23 million reasonably educated Chinese speaking population has negligible impact to the PRC now.
 
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Neurosmith

Junior Member
Registered Member
I don't disagree with you that CPC needs to think hard about the timing of reunification, but your previous argument was that China was not in a rush, time was on PRC's side and China doesn't have deadlines for these things.

Superpowers focus more on domestic concerns, not foreign concerns, this applies to China, US and Russia. The timing and manner of the reunification of China will be dictated by domestic political situation and not "global opinions". In that sense I agree with you that even if Lai declares independence, the CPC can sit still and do nothing if there is no domestic political expediency in doing something.
My previous argument was that China does not have a set deadline for a Taiwan operation because it knows the success rate of such operations increases with time (in China's scenario). The disparity of Chinese vs Taiwanese forces increases and the Overton window of Taiwan or the US preventing such an operation to a significant degree closes with time.

The second part of your response actually dovetails quite nicely with my view that China assesses the Taiwan situation based on domestic developments and not what the island actually declares or says. I'm not saying that China has considered giving up on Taiwan entirely, but I also do not believe that Chinese military brass has a calendar with a date circled in red.

China "suggested" the Portuguese to GTFO before 2000, and they did so begrudgingly hence the date. You don't think China has hard deadlines in mind for peaceful or less peaceful reunification?
In all fairness, that is speculation. And even if China did have plans to militarily force Macau back to China, it would've been a fluid strategy rather one with a concrete D-Day (I think China even floated 2004 as a potential return date as part of negotiations).

That's absolutely not true, the integration of Taiwan in 1996 is totally different than the integration of Taiwan in 2025 which is also totally different than the integration of Taiwan in 2035.
You are going to get a hostile populace regardless of whether you move in by 2035 or 2025. That part will not change unless China offers a much better living situation vs Taiwan or the latter's population opens up to the possibility of being ruled by the CPC (snowball's chance in Hell). What will change is the chances of such a military operation being successful and - by extension - the risk of adverse impacts on China's military, economy, and society.

Maybe the CPC shouldn't have liberated Shanghai then. The CPC should have stayed in their communist base in Yan'an and grow their economy, until their GDP per capita was higher than Shanghai and they had better weapons than those given to KMT by the west.
A better analogy for your strategy would be the PLA attacking the KMT before it has had a chance to regroup and rearm because "pacifying Shanghai's population would be easier now than later".

You don't see how changing the ethnic background of a separatist region increases the cost of reunification for China?
You mean 3% of Taiwan's population of 23 million? No, I don't. Wasn't it you who made the argument that an additional 23 million would have negligible impact? So why would 810K do so?

My present day answer to that question is the value of the island is bait to end US hegemony in the west pacific. An additional 23 million Chinese speaking population has negligible impact to PRC.
Taiwan is positioned as a bait to contain China's development and military in the region, au contraire. A military invasion gone awry will serve to bleed China's military resources, strain its economy, cause its adversaries to arm, all the while solidifying US presence in the Asia-Pacific region...it would be like China's own Vietnam but worse.
 

coolgod

Colonel
Registered Member
My previous argument was that China does not have a set deadline for a Taiwan operation because it knows the success rate of such operations increases with time (in China's scenario). The disparity of Chinese vs Taiwanese forces increases and the Overton window of Taiwan or the US preventing such an operation to a significant degree closes with time.

The second part of your response actually dovetails quite nicely with my view that China assesses the Taiwan situation based on domestic developments and not what the island actually declares or says. I'm not saying that China has considered giving up on Taiwan entirely, but I also do not believe that Chinese military brass has a calendar with a date circled in red.


In all fairness, that is speculation. And even if China did have plans to militarily force Macau back to China, it would've been a fluid strategy rather one with a concrete D-Day (I think China even floated 2004 as a potential return date as part of negotiations).
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“中国政府的坚定立场是必须在本世纪内恢复对澳门行使主权,绝不能同意将澳门问题这个殖民主义的尾巴拖到下一个世纪去解决,中国政府不会在这样重大的原则问题上作任何让步”。[27]

[27] 宗道一,等.周南口述:遥想当年羽扇纶巾[M].济南:齐鲁书社,2007:314.
The 2000 deadline isn't speculation, don't make stuff up.

You are going to get a hostile populace regardless of whether you move in by 2035 or 2025. That part will not change unless China offers a much better living situation vs Taiwan or the latter's population opens up to the possibility of being ruled by the CPC (snowball's chance in Hell). What will change is the chances of such a military operation being successful and - by extension - the risk of adverse impacts on China's military, economy, and society.
Now you are just being dishonest, a lot has changed on Taiwan from 1996 to 2025, and a lot will change on Taiwan from 2025 to 2035. You really think the political stance of Taiwanese residents doesn't affect the population's attitude towards being ruled by the CPC?

A better analogy for your strategy would be the PLA attacking the KMT before it has had a chance to regroup and rearm because "pacifying Shanghai's population would be easier now than later".
No, don't setup a strawman. I gave an example to question your point about the best way to reintegrate a region.

You mean 3% of Taiwan's population of 23 million? No, I don't. Wasn't it you who made the argument that an additional 23 million would have negligible impact? So why would 810K do so?
Another strawman. I said 23 million reasonably educated Chinese speaking population has negligible impact to the PRC now. Which part of this imply that a population of Indian cheap labour would not affect the long term governance cost of Taiwan.

Taiwan is positioned as a bait to contain China's development and military in the region, au contraire. A military invasion gone awry will serve to bleed China's military resources, strain its economy, cause its adversaries to arm, all the while solidifying US presence in the Asia-Pacific region...it would be like China's own Vietnam but worse.
Yes, Vietnam is totally like Taiwan, both have trees, rice, bananas growing on that land, access to the pacific ocean, and communists in hiding. I can't think of any difference between the two territories and their respective situations. /S
 
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GOODTREE

Junior Member
Registered Member
I'd like to say a few words.
The gap between China and Taiwan's military strength will increase thus causing the window for Taiwan and the US to intervene in their military operations to disappear, but my concern with this is. The window for military intervention may disappear, but the process of its unification will still be thwarted. The reasons for this range from the DPP's efforts to thwart it, to the ideological divisions in Taiwan's population, and Taiwan's longstanding stereotypes of China. None of these issues will deter a real military intervention, but therein lies the problem. You may never really get unification without a real military intervention. The enemy can still build ideological or real military “ ramparts ” through all the control they have had over the areas they have ruled for years. At the moment, unfortunately, we can see that the effects are far-reaching. China will not give up on the Taiwan issue, but it must be brought to an end as soon as possible. Any degree of time delay will make the future governance of Taiwan very difficult.
As for the red circle date, I personally think it would be best to have it between the current teenage generation and before the next generation is born.
 

Temstar

Brigadier
Registered Member
Big Bun has already done some CGs in light of the recent news about the floating barge:
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For the landing fleet I think another piece of specialized equipment is necessary - a line of dedicated SHORAD ships to protect these artificial harbours from HIMARS and Thunderbolt 2000 attack. Imagine civilian grade hull filled from bow to stern with HHQ-10 and 1130, plus armament for dealing with USV (which might just be 1130 if it can be used in that capacity).
 

Biscuits

Colonel
Registered Member
I'd like to say a few words.
The gap between China and Taiwan's military strength will increase thus causing the window for Taiwan and the US to intervene in their military operations to disappear, but my concern with this is. The window for military intervention may disappear, but the process of its unification will still be thwarted. The reasons for this range from the DPP's efforts to thwart it, to the ideological divisions in Taiwan's population, and Taiwan's longstanding stereotypes of China. None of these issues will deter a real military intervention, but therein lies the problem. You may never really get unification without a real military intervention. The enemy can still build ideological or real military “ ramparts ” through all the control they have had over the areas they have ruled for years. At the moment, unfortunately, we can see that the effects are far-reaching. China will not give up on the Taiwan issue, but it must be brought to an end as soon as possible. Any degree of time delay will make the future governance of Taiwan very difficult.
I absolutely don't think so. People in general like to listen to 1. Those who provide good conditions and 2. Those with power. China has both in spades.

An actual failed state like Ukraine can still keep people in say Lyman or Zaporizhia under control somehow, people who proved with fighting actions extreme resentment to Ukraine and extreme desire to join Russia, far beyond any level we've seen from Taiwanese Chinese's desire to leave China and join US.

So since China can not only just threaten people a bit but actually deliver life improvements, governing is not gonna be difficult at all.

We just need to either defeat or make sure US never sends a full scale invasion, that's the only real threat to continued Chinese rule in Taiwan.
 
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