Even if China ends up bringing Taiwan back by force, the need to infiltrate Taiwan society is not precluded. Once reunification happens China must be able to govern the island effectively, it will need help from local political forces. Prior to repatriation of Hong Kong, China infiltrated the city through various means, including with help of the triad.
PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency
- Thread starter pugachev_diver
- Start date
what is the consensus on current timeline? 2026?
Timeline for what? For the US to provoke a war? China doesn’t intend to do anything in the current time frame since it is better off continuing their process of replacing older equipment with advanced/modern equipment
Maybe 2027 because the best stuff for the airforce and navy need to get ready first no?
I'm thinking China aims to weaken US a lot once Trump takes power, Iran is the obvious bait route. If it's a critical hit, China may quickly unfreeze just the civil conflict in 2025 or 2026 to get rid of the KMT threat before US can respond. Then wait for another future day to fry US' Asia colonies.
But if US isn't able to invade, the civil war will end with a whimper rather than any real air/land/sea conflict. The PLA would not need to level every building and use it's most advanced capabilities. Without US forces coming to support the Taipei junta, they'll fold faster than Assad to simply some saboteur action and a few supported PLA units landing.
solarz
Brigadier
Sorry if this has been brought up before, as I have not read through the previous pages.
What are the implications of the new sixth generation jets that have been unveiled, with regards to the balance of power with Taiwan? I think with the unveiling of these jets, the US military dominance of the world (not just of the region) has been put on a timer. They now face a stark choice: either initiate conflict over Taiwan within the next few years, or they must accept its loss and the dominance of China over the region.
Also, I'm curious whether @Blitzo has changed his analysis of an all-out war between China and the US in light of this revelation? Not just due to the fact that China has produced these jets, but the speed at which China has done so, and what that implies about the strength of the Chinese military industrial complex?
What are the implications of the new sixth generation jets that have been unveiled, with regards to the balance of power with Taiwan? I think with the unveiling of these jets, the US military dominance of the world (not just of the region) has been put on a timer. They now face a stark choice: either initiate conflict over Taiwan within the next few years, or they must accept its loss and the dominance of China over the region.
Also, I'm curious whether @Blitzo has changed his analysis of an all-out war between China and the US in light of this revelation? Not just due to the fact that China has produced these jets, but the speed at which China has done so, and what that implies about the strength of the Chinese military industrial complex?
Imo many US policymakers have already been guessing that they need to stop trying to take Taiwan, even during Zhuhai 2024.
I think very soon, US will officially give up on threatening Taiwan. Especially because China did some intel agency magic against warmongers in SK and Japan, softcouping them with new leaders that explicitly say they will never participate in a Taiwan invasion.
But this doesn't fix their fundamental problem of being a large empire that is falling behind in arms. By 2027, China will field at least Su-57 numbers of both 6th gen types, it will have the quality advantage in and under the water, with a fleet likely approaching 70% VLS count of 2024 US navy.
I would think that if 2027s China went to war with 2024s America, the result would not be an even struggle like the ww2 Soviet front, but a rather one sided rout like the first Sino Japanese war. And if China sees that the power balance is like that, they will absolutely initiate conflict with US just to steal colonies from the American empire.
Remember China too is an empire that needs to maintain high living standards and consistent growth, and Trump explicitly says he will close off the world's 2nd largest economy to China. By offering an unequal treaty to US and thereby opening up the Latin/south American nations, not to mention the 2nd largest world market, China will solve every single one of its potential economic woes for 50 years at least.
So my point is that US faces a challenge that in the 3 upcoming years, they need to reinvent/reform their armed forces into something that will deter China from knocking on the door.
As for Taiwan invasion plan, that's always be dead, the dead horse is beaten so much that it's not recognizable anymore. Even at China's nadir and US' apex in the 1990s, there was always a huge risk of China just nuking US if they successfully separated Taiwan by force.
It's a testament to extreme US hubris that they even talk about it up until 2024, but also a testament to the fact they're not total madmen, because they didn't attempt it.
No one can reasonably know if the CCP had discussions of a concrete timeline, but it is reasonable that at least in the mind of Xi Jinping, there is an intent to resolve the Taiwan question before the end of his reign. I think the timeline he is thinking is around 2030, but given that no plan survives first contact, and the mystic pattern of the 9s throughout PRC's history, it is possible that the final resolution could come about in 2029.
I believe that Xi has a timeline of 2030 in his head for two reasons. first, Xi's reforms required heavy-handed approach in their implementation, and thus are susceptible to being reversed at the end of his reign. One way to safeguard at least a part of his legacy is by elevating himself above past and future party gensecs. Taking Taiwan achieves this goal as it defines Xi's reign in a way that cannot be replicated by his successors. secondly, 2030 is when I believe China would be ready to take Taiwan, and to wait further makes little sense. 2027 is too early because some of the critical weapon systems that completes the PLA A2/AD strategy would not be fully functional just yet, including 093B/095, 003, J-35, KJ-700, 055 second batch, 076, Z-21, J-20S etc. all of these systems fill important gaps in PLA's capability but they would either not be fully operational, or not in service in sufficient numbers by 2027. All of them would, however, be combat ready and in sufficient numbers by 2030. Depending on how fast AVIC works, perhaps the 6th gen fighter would join PLA's tool box by 2030 as well.
as for the pattern of 9s, well most here have heard about that one so I won't waste time talking about it.
Some observations on this National Defense University (USA) article posted in the strategic news section by @Taiban and how it relates to PLA strategy.
First, a statement I found interesting.
So basically the US plan is to do what they said China was going to do (restrict shipping in the SCS for political gain) when they started raising concerns about PLA South China Sea outposts. Lol.
Now to the meat of the article. It starts by stating that no matter how advanced (or, on the other hand, unsophisticated) your combat forces and tactics are, if you have poor logistical forces you will fail. The Imperial German Army's 1918 offensive was tactically brilliant but logistically mediocre, resulting in its defeat. The French possessed massive technological superiority over the Viet Minh but lost at Dien Bien Phu on account of both choosing a place of battle that was difficult to logistically support, but also on account of the efficient logistical capability of the Viet Minh. It then examines the operational concepts developed by the USMC, US Army, and USAF, and their logistical weaknesses. It ends with ideas about steps that could be taken to alleviate the situation and resolve logistical issues.
Although the article's focus is on logistics, it raises excellent points on the redundant nature of the USMC and US Army concepts for participating in a war against China. More or less, both sides envision deploying anti-ship and anti-air assets to islands in the 1IC; in the case of the Marines, in the South China Sea and Ryukyu Islands; in the case of the Army, focus seems to be on the Philippines. The article raises an important point: these guys have needs for food and other stuff besides ammunition. So if you're sending ships and aircraft to resupply them anyways, why not use the ships and aircraft to conduct those strike missions? The article, perhaps without the author not noticing, makes a damning (IMO extremely, hence the emphasis) comparison with the redeployment of IJA troops to Guadalcanal after the US invasion. What was supposed to strengthen Japanese offense and defense ended up becoming such a liability, even requiring the commitment of destroyers to transport supplies and troop reinforcements, that it cost them the battle and created numerous opportunities for the US to destroy Japanese naval forces.
On the USAF proposal, which is to deploy small numbers of aircraft on small airports on various islands, the article raises a variety of questions. First is that existing Air Force logistics are not conducive to supporting this kind of force. For example, software updating, a vital aspect of modern aircraft maintenance, is generally conducted at a single base where an entire squadron (or squadrons) can be present. If the Air Force was to try to put this concept into practice in 2025, it would find itself not having the needed equipment to maintain aircraft at separate bases. Second, history shows that distributed operations need to generate high sortie/strike rates to be successful. During the invasion of Poland in 1939, the Polish Air Force operated from numerous auxiliary bases and fought well, but flew so few sorties, on account of losing supplies each time they evacuated a base and flew to one further in the rear, that they did not pose a major threat to the Luftwaffe. The article also notes that the Air Force concept is probably based on operations during WWII and Korea. Aircraft are extremely sophisticated now compared to then. Soviet aircraft, as well as some European aircraft, were designed in the Cold War with operations from austere locations in mind due to the threat of nuclear strikes, but American aircraft are not. It is important to ask if an F-35 can operate from a crummy civilian airport in the Ryukyus or Philippines.
As for implications about PLA strategy, the article essentially affirms a very basic observation: China is close to its main objective, Taiwan, and the US is not. The US has too far to go to keep its units supplied, not so much at all, but in order to keep up with Chinese offensive and defensive power (Example: it can't supply enough Tomahawks/JASSMs to break through the IADS for strikes on Chinese bases, and nor can it provide enough Patriots and SM-3s to stop Chinese ballistic missile salvoes).
I think this also says something about what performance can be expected from the Taiwanese Air Force: basically nothing (should be expected). Taiwan does practice highway airfield operations, but considering it is well known cuts have been made to the Taiwanese military's logistical forces as a whole, if they manage to evacuate in sizable numbers to these bases it wouldn't be surprising for them to be poorly supplied. Thus the Air Force is choosing to either be ineffective in the air (that is, if the highway airfields themselves aren't targeted in the first place) or be destroyed at their big, easily targeted bases.
If the US was to attempt its distributed operations concepts, it might become attractive for the PLA to seize these island bases. Doing so would come with considerable risks. Such operations would probably occur while Taiwan is still being blockaded/bombarded, leaving amphibious assets available for other operations. The PLA would have to make a choice as to whether it wants to risk these assets to capture these islands or save them for an eventual amhibious assault on Taiwan.
If the CPC's desire is to end the war as quickly as possible (in victory), it would be advantageous to seize these islands. I just cannot imagine China fighting the US and its allies and then letting 071s, 075s and 076s sail around in circles in the Bohai Sea or sit pierside so as to "save" them for Taiwan. If the US does decide not to approach Taiwan, seizing (prior to US deployment there) or assaulting (after US deployment there) the islands are good options to lure the US Navy into battle. It would be a good role for the PLANMC, which (IMO, please correct me if wrong!) is somewhat redundant due to the PLAGF having amphibious combined arms brigades. If it wished to transform these bases into outposts for long-range AD weapons and AShMs, China actually has the logistical capability to resupply these bases in the form of its merchant marine, and the bases could prove useful in keeping the SCS and ECS open after the breaking of an American blockade.
Because more or less all of these outposts would be in the Philippines and Japan, seizing them would also resolve China's territorial disputes with the former and act as a stepping stone to neutralizing the hostile attitude of the latter (either in the form of liberating the Ryukyus or a "drive hard into enemy territory and then pull back" strategy as used in the Sino-Vietnamese War).
First, a statement I found interesting.
So basically the US plan is to do what they said China was going to do (restrict shipping in the SCS for political gain) when they started raising concerns about PLA South China Sea outposts. Lol.
Now to the meat of the article. It starts by stating that no matter how advanced (or, on the other hand, unsophisticated) your combat forces and tactics are, if you have poor logistical forces you will fail. The Imperial German Army's 1918 offensive was tactically brilliant but logistically mediocre, resulting in its defeat. The French possessed massive technological superiority over the Viet Minh but lost at Dien Bien Phu on account of both choosing a place of battle that was difficult to logistically support, but also on account of the efficient logistical capability of the Viet Minh. It then examines the operational concepts developed by the USMC, US Army, and USAF, and their logistical weaknesses. It ends with ideas about steps that could be taken to alleviate the situation and resolve logistical issues.
Although the article's focus is on logistics, it raises excellent points on the redundant nature of the USMC and US Army concepts for participating in a war against China. More or less, both sides envision deploying anti-ship and anti-air assets to islands in the 1IC; in the case of the Marines, in the South China Sea and Ryukyu Islands; in the case of the Army, focus seems to be on the Philippines. The article raises an important point: these guys have needs for food and other stuff besides ammunition. So if you're sending ships and aircraft to resupply them anyways, why not use the ships and aircraft to conduct those strike missions? The article, perhaps without the author not noticing, makes a damning (IMO extremely, hence the emphasis) comparison with the redeployment of IJA troops to Guadalcanal after the US invasion. What was supposed to strengthen Japanese offense and defense ended up becoming such a liability, even requiring the commitment of destroyers to transport supplies and troop reinforcements, that it cost them the battle and created numerous opportunities for the US to destroy Japanese naval forces.
On the USAF proposal, which is to deploy small numbers of aircraft on small airports on various islands, the article raises a variety of questions. First is that existing Air Force logistics are not conducive to supporting this kind of force. For example, software updating, a vital aspect of modern aircraft maintenance, is generally conducted at a single base where an entire squadron (or squadrons) can be present. If the Air Force was to try to put this concept into practice in 2025, it would find itself not having the needed equipment to maintain aircraft at separate bases. Second, history shows that distributed operations need to generate high sortie/strike rates to be successful. During the invasion of Poland in 1939, the Polish Air Force operated from numerous auxiliary bases and fought well, but flew so few sorties, on account of losing supplies each time they evacuated a base and flew to one further in the rear, that they did not pose a major threat to the Luftwaffe. The article also notes that the Air Force concept is probably based on operations during WWII and Korea. Aircraft are extremely sophisticated now compared to then. Soviet aircraft, as well as some European aircraft, were designed in the Cold War with operations from austere locations in mind due to the threat of nuclear strikes, but American aircraft are not. It is important to ask if an F-35 can operate from a crummy civilian airport in the Ryukyus or Philippines.
As for implications about PLA strategy, the article essentially affirms a very basic observation: China is close to its main objective, Taiwan, and the US is not. The US has too far to go to keep its units supplied, not so much at all, but in order to keep up with Chinese offensive and defensive power (Example: it can't supply enough Tomahawks/JASSMs to break through the IADS for strikes on Chinese bases, and nor can it provide enough Patriots and SM-3s to stop Chinese ballistic missile salvoes).
I think this also says something about what performance can be expected from the Taiwanese Air Force: basically nothing (should be expected). Taiwan does practice highway airfield operations, but considering it is well known cuts have been made to the Taiwanese military's logistical forces as a whole, if they manage to evacuate in sizable numbers to these bases it wouldn't be surprising for them to be poorly supplied. Thus the Air Force is choosing to either be ineffective in the air (that is, if the highway airfields themselves aren't targeted in the first place) or be destroyed at their big, easily targeted bases.
If the US was to attempt its distributed operations concepts, it might become attractive for the PLA to seize these island bases. Doing so would come with considerable risks. Such operations would probably occur while Taiwan is still being blockaded/bombarded, leaving amphibious assets available for other operations. The PLA would have to make a choice as to whether it wants to risk these assets to capture these islands or save them for an eventual amhibious assault on Taiwan.
If the CPC's desire is to end the war as quickly as possible (in victory), it would be advantageous to seize these islands. I just cannot imagine China fighting the US and its allies and then letting 071s, 075s and 076s sail around in circles in the Bohai Sea or sit pierside so as to "save" them for Taiwan. If the US does decide not to approach Taiwan, seizing (prior to US deployment there) or assaulting (after US deployment there) the islands are good options to lure the US Navy into battle. It would be a good role for the PLANMC, which (IMO, please correct me if wrong!) is somewhat redundant due to the PLAGF having amphibious combined arms brigades. If it wished to transform these bases into outposts for long-range AD weapons and AShMs, China actually has the logistical capability to resupply these bases in the form of its merchant marine, and the bases could prove useful in keeping the SCS and ECS open after the breaking of an American blockade.
Because more or less all of these outposts would be in the Philippines and Japan, seizing them would also resolve China's territorial disputes with the former and act as a stepping stone to neutralizing the hostile attitude of the latter (either in the form of liberating the Ryukyus or a "drive hard into enemy territory and then pull back" strategy as used in the Sino-Vietnamese War).
How about a much simpler solution: litter those islands full of mines?
SCS is not distant to China by any means, they can swarm that area with assets and munitions with ease.
I don't think China is going to drive hard into enemy territory then pull back. Their military buildup means that they plan to stay wherever they go. At this point they have 50%+ USN in VLS count, and that's all focused in Asia. And China's greatest investment is likely in air/missile power, not ships.
Taiwan is just a convinient fig leaf for China to reshape Asia by force. It's a sort of canary. If your country is pro-annexing Taiwan from China, you proved that your country is an irredeemable remnant of ww2 anti-Chinese aggression. On the other hand, countries who help China defend itself will get preferential alliance treatment.
The real crux of the conflict boils down to that US is the setting sun and China is the rising sun. If a declining power has colonies that it can't realistically defend, a rising power will take them away. To best maintain economic supremacy, China will want preferential treaties with its neighbors, captive markets and resource extraction flows. And also if they can open the US market, it's a great boon that will solve all of China's problems for decades in the future.