PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

vincent said:

Nah, just find an excuse to bomb a radar station on the Yonaguni Island which should trigger the US-Japan defense treaty.

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No excuse even needed. Israel has normalized attacking neutral nations in support of wider war goals against another party, via their low-rate air campaign against Syria during 2019(?)-2023.

Not that Israel's tactics are to be admired or emulated, but from a legal POV, no "Iraqi WMDs" type excuse is needed.

drowingfish said:

Incorrect. If PLA's air dominance enables it to land on Taiwan's beaches, then it can defeat ROC counterattacks from the air.

Assuming the US does not intervene, PLA will dominate air space over Taiwan, any attempt at counterattacking occupied beach head will be destroyed by airpower. The only way to survive would be to hide under ground or in urban areas. measures as you suggested, such as artillery and drones, are a non-issue because without air cover, they would not even know where to fire or how to coordinate their fire.

Assuming the US does intervene after PLA landing, then the nature of the conflict will change and PLA will likely just give up trying to protect their beach head and focus on defeating the US. If the PLA can win that battle, then no further action would even be required against Taiwan, the latter will simply surrender. The loss of landed troops is an acceptable price for defeating the US on the pacific. If the PLA cannot defeat the US, then no amount of landed troops will change the outcome of complete defeat. I have alluded to this possibility in my earlier posts, where the PLA could conduct a landing operation early to force the US to choose between prematurely engaging the PLA and to avoid getting involved, which would precipitate a collapse of ROC defence.

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Taiwan could surrender strategic air dominance to decisively saturate the PLA in terms of tactical air dominance while in the landing operation and subsequent operations, ROCA could do so only with SHORADS mobility systems and other long-range systems to deny the PLAAF tactical air superiority and exploit the PLA’s vital weakness, joint air-ground integration. Therefore, the advantage for Taiwan lies not in its ability to compete for air superiority against the PLA, but rather in its ability to gradually deny air superiority and impose severe costs during one of the most complicated military operations, an amphibious landing. Furthermore, air power is not everything, even if Taiwan is still unable to deny the PLA tactical air superiority, there are still several ways to inflict casualties on Chinese amphibious units on the coast.

Sinnavuuty said:

Taiwan could surrender strategic air dominance to decisively saturate the PLA in terms of tactical air dominance while in the landing operation and subsequent operations, ROCA could do so only with SHORADS mobility systems and other long-range systems to deny the PLAAF tactical air superiority and exploit the PLA’s vital weakness, joint air-ground integration. Therefore, the advantage for Taiwan lies not in its ability to compete for air superiority against the PLA, but rather in its ability to gradually deny air superiority and impose severe costs during one of the most complicated military operations, an amphibious landing. Furthermore, air power is not everything, even if Taiwan is still unable to deny the PLA tactical air superiority, there are still several ways to inflict casualties on Chinese amphibious units on the coast.

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If Taiwan surrenders strategic air dominance as you put it, this inevitably means that China can saturate all of Taiwanese airspace with MALE drones and also smaller tactical drones.

Taiwanese SHORADs and other long-range systems won't survive for long.

Sinnavuuty said:

Taiwan could surrender strategic air dominance to decisively saturate the PLA in terms of tactical air dominance while in the landing operation and subsequent operations, ROCA could do so only with SHORADS mobility systems and other long-range systems to deny the PLAAF tactical air superiority and exploit the PLA’s vital weakness, joint air-ground integration. Therefore, the advantage for Taiwan lies not in its ability to compete for air superiority against the PLA, but rather in its ability to gradually deny air superiority and impose severe costs during one of the most complicated military operations, an amphibious landing. Furthermore, air power is not everything, even if Taiwan is still unable to deny the PLA tactical air superiority, there are still several ways to inflict casualties on Chinese amphibious units on the coast.

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There is no independent KMT combat capability. The idea they can do anything besides folding is like expecting 2022 LDPR to take on AFU alone. Direct, lone 1v1 PLA vs ROCA encounters will be like the Liman retreat at the very best.

The combat capability difference is way too large, that's without taking into the account that KMT operates on inherently contested ground (the interior security agencies of China has major compromises within Taiwan).

China opens with swams of LO missiles mixed with decoys and older CM. Upon an attempt to engage them with air defenses, hypersonic missiles and 5th/6th gen fighter/bombers sweep the air defense positions.

Anything above manpads is not survivable within China, the only way to survive them is to have a comparable strike/air-ground integration as the PLA and use them to block the PLA's strikes. I.e. Only an all in movement by US military can do it.

Without US air force cover and US air defenses, leaving hard cover is all but impossible and even hard cover might be destroyed en masse by bunker busters and swarm drones decided to navigate tunnels.

The type of operation you're asking from a KMT that has very generously speaking about the same combat capability as 1990s Iraq, is way more complicated than even the most advanced amphibious attacks ever executed. You're talking about how to gather armored and mechanized elements cohesively in an environment with omnipresent enemy air cover, massive EW + saboteur and near instant air-ground strike communication, not to mention ongoing decapitation strikes at every level.

Not only do the elements need to be gathered, but they must also cross many kms of extremely heavy enemy fire zones to reach and engage an amphibious force. And said amphibious force will likely severely outgun the formation as well.

AndrewS said:

If Taiwan surrenders strategic air dominance as you put it, this inevitably means that China can saturate all of Taiwanese airspace with MALE drones and also smaller tactical drones.

Taiwanese SHORADs and other long-range systems won't survive for long.

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It would depend on the survivability of SHORAD, in addition, smaller tactical drones will not survive in a denial environment, regardless of the level and intensity at which they are inserted in the theater of operations.

Biscuits said:

There is no independent KMT combat capability. The idea they can do anything besides folding is like expecting 2022 LDPR to take on AFU alone. Direct, lone 1v1 PLA vs ROCA encounters will be like the Liman retreat at the very best.

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This kind of comparison is not even remotely valid in any respect, especially since the LDPR was more like an armed militia than a conventional army, despite the AFU having suffered against them in 2014-2015. Even if you compare Ukraine and Russia by making an analogy between China and Taiwan, it would not be considered valid either, because Taiwan has more than 250 4th generation fighters, which means that the ROCAF is much more powerful than the Ukrainian Air Force, which had 100 4th generation fighters, Soviet fighters at that, although the PLAAF is more powerful than the VKS, the analogy is inappropriate and if we are to base ourselves on making such comparisons, the definitive statement is that Taiwan has a much better chance of gaining air superiority than Ukraine could ever achieve. Such analogies are useless...

Biscuits said:

The combat capability difference is way too large, that's without taking into the account that KMT operates on inherently contested ground (the interior security agencies of China has major compromises within Taiwan).

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No one denies that the difference in capabilities is very large, but this in no way means that the battle is lost or won depending on which side we are referring to, it would be like the saying that planning/plan does not survive the first contact with the enemy, this is still an unknown to be revealed when hostilities begin.

Biscuits said:

China opens with swams of LO missiles mixed with decoys and older CM. Upon an attempt to engage them with air defenses, hypersonic missiles and 5th/6th gen fighter/bombers sweep the air defense positions.

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What decoys? Does China have MALD?

Taiwan’s GBAD is based on seven Patriot batteries and seven Skybow II batteries that are supposedly similar to the PAC-2-equipped Patriots. In addition, there are 14 Skybow IIIs. All this on an island much smaller than the Kyiv Oblast makes SEAD missions very, very difficult even for well-trained air forces, and China has never had to conduct a real SEAD mission. The Russian VKS is an absolute farce in this field, but at least they have some experience flying in hostile skies over Syria. The same cannot be said for the PLAAF.

As I have already said, air denial can render an enemy air force, which has nominal superiority over its own air force, incapable of effecting its presence on the battlefield (through fire delivery) because ground assets like GBADs have made the environment too dangerous. Taiwan could certainly contest PLAAF tactical air superiority over Taiwan's skies, because that is what would inflict a force multiplier for amphibious forces landing on the beaches, but as I reiterated, that would depend on the circumstance of how China would execute the AR.

Biscuits said:

Anything above manpads is not survivable within China, the only way to survive them is to have a comparable strike/air-ground integration as the PLA and use them to block the PLA's strikes. I.e. Only an all in movement by US military can do it.

Without US air force cover and US air defenses, leaving hard cover is all but impossible and even hard cover might be destroyed en masse by bunker busters and swarm drones decided to navigate tunnels.

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Forget the US.

Biscuits said:

The type of operation you're asking from a KMT that has very generously speaking about the same combat capability as 1990s Iraq, is way more complicated than even the most advanced amphibious attacks ever executed. You're talking about how to gather armored and mechanized elements cohesively in an environment with omnipresent enemy air cover, massive EW + saboteur and near instant air-ground strike communication, not to mention ongoing decapitation strikes at every level.

Not only do the elements need to be gathered, but they must also cross many kms of extremely heavy enemy fire zones to reach and engage an amphibious force. And said amphibious force will likely severely outgun the formation as well.

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At no point did I talk about how to approach an assembly area to apply armored mass principles to execute armored counterattacks against Chinese amphibious units on the beach, I talked about that in a post that has nothing to do with your comment, which was in another context, your context is about Taiwan's air strategy and its implications on the operational approach to land operations on the coast. As I said, there are different ways for the ROCA to pursue the PLA's strategy of attrition of its units pressed against the coast, the ROCA could do this even if it had lost the ability to deny Taiwan airspace to the PLA.

Sinnavuuty said:

This kind of comparison is not even remotely valid in any respect, especially since the LDPR was more like an armed militia than a conventional army, despite the AFU having suffered against them in 2014-2015. Even if you compare Ukraine and Russia by making an analogy between China and Taiwan, it would not be considered valid either, because Taiwan has more than 250 4th generation fighters, which means that the ROCAF is much more powerful than the Ukrainian Air Force, which had 100 4th generation fighters, Soviet fighters at that, although the PLAAF is more powerful than the VKS, the analogy is inappropriate and if we are to base ourselves on making such comparisons, the definitive statement is that Taiwan has a much better chance of gaining air superiority than Ukraine could ever achieve. Such analogies are useless...

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Iraq had 900 aircraft at the start of the gulf war. There's no chance of a mere 250 fighters coming to signficant use when air defenses on the mainland can lock on them from the moment they lift and walls of PLAAF manned/unmanned alike patrol around the island.

Russia doesn't have near the same level of firepower within such a small area as China does. Just the Donbass oblasts are larger than Taiwan province.

Sinnavuuty said:

No one denies that the difference in capabilities is very large, but this in no way means that the battle is lost or won depending on which side we are referring to, it would be like the saying that planning/plan does not survive the first contact with the enemy, this is still an unknown to be revealed when hostilities begin.

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Sinnavuuty said:

What decoys? Does China have MALD?

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You should probably do more reading up on the PLAAF of the last 10-20 years. Why would you insultingly say China has some older western garbage? No they don't have MALD, they have better and more varied missiles in nearly every single category. Just look at Zhuhai for the past decade.

Sinnavuuty said:

Taiwan’s GBAD is based on seven Patriot batteries and seven Skybow II batteries that are supposedly similar to the PAC-2-equipped Patriots. In addition, there are 14 Skybow IIIs. All this on an island much smaller than the Kyiv Oblast makes SEAD missions very, very difficult even for well-trained air forces,

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None of those can intercept a DF16 to speak nothing of newer weapons. Neither is running possible because the reaction time is less than a minute from Fujian.

So it's single use consumables. And the PLAAF is an exceptionally well trained air force, their flight hours are about even with the USAF. They have access to the most powerful air defense network in the world to practice SEAD constantly.

The smallness of the province is not a pro but a vast con. It can be surveyed live in its entirety, unlike huge forested/mountain regions in East Europe.

Sinnavuuty said:

and China has never had to conduct a real SEAD mission.

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China is flying against a very rudimentary air defense that is maybe about as strong as the one over Kiev. (that is IF US doesn't immediately commit a full scale invasion and deploy DDGs with SM6 etc, in which case China's SEAD will be fully stretched to its skill limits)

Meanwhile US also have no experience flying against significant air defenses but face flying into China's insanely vast defenses.

Essentially the SEAD game is a question of who has done their drills homework better.

Sinnavuuty said:

The Russian VKS is an absolute farce in this field, but at least they have some experience flying in hostile skies over Syria. The same cannot be said for the PLAAF.

As I have already said, air denial can render an enemy air force, which has nominal superiority over its own air force, incapable of effecting its presence on the battlefield (through fire delivery) because ground assets like GBADs have made the environment too dangerous. Taiwan could certainly contest PLAAF tactical air superiority over Taiwan's skies, because that is what would inflict a force multiplier for amphibious forces landing on the beaches, but as I reiterated, that would depend on the circumstance of how China would execute the AR.

Forget the US.

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There will be no (normal) war without US full scale attack. It is mathematically impossible to guard beaches or even more unlikely contest skies with just the KMT's equipment.

At most they can fight a similar war as Hamas, waiting in tunnels and hoping the PLA will falter in prolonged urban combat.

To put this conflict into perspective, Taiwan has 20 million population, nearly all on the urbanized strip facing the mainland. That is 10x more people than Gaza. The PLAAF alone has well more than 20x the ability of all the IDF to deliver munitions on target. That is not counting the PLAGF with its artillery and missiles. The situation of ROCA at fighting alone is worst than the LDPR militia's.

Hence just as Russia needed a full scale invasion to protect the LDPR, there is no vision of a Taiwan conflict that does not have an equivalent superpower (US) require coming down with a full scale invasion to protect the ROC.

Only with those conditions can they meaningfully try and reverse the very unfavorable disparity in power.

Sinnavuuty said:

It would depend on the survivability of SHORAD, in addition, smaller tactical drones will not survive in a denial environment, regardless of the level and intensity at which they are inserted in the theater of operations.

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A SHORAD that fires is a SHORAD that gives its position away, especially if the aerial surveillance is by formation, which it will be given how many assets China can saturate Taiwan’s air space with. Furthermore, it’s not like SHORAD positions are that hidden. Like all limited assets they will need to be deployed in places where they bring the most value, which makes them very findable if the geography is small (and in Taiwan’s case it is). You can send multiples more tactical drones than there are SHORADs. And one is much easier to regenerate than the other. You can’t just assume one is invincible and the other is disposable because both are ultimately disposable. Gotta do some realistic math here.

EDIT: Not to mention pinning all your hopes on SHORAD itself is a pretty silly answer to air superiority when China also has plenty of higher altitude strike options that can just ignore them. Defending tiny circles while the support infrastructure around them gets eroded isn’t exactly nullifying the PLA’s ability to leverage air superiority.

Sinnavuuty said:

It would depend on the survivability of SHORAD, in addition, smaller tactical drones will not survive in a denial environment, regardless of the level and intensity at which they are inserted in the theater of operations.


This kind of comparison is not even remotely valid in any respect, especially since the LDPR was more like an armed militia than a conventional army, despite the AFU having suffered against them in 2014-2015. Even if you compare Ukraine and Russia by making an analogy between China and Taiwan, it would not be considered valid either, because Taiwan has more than 250 4th generation fighters, which means that the ROCAF is much more powerful than the Ukrainian Air Force, which had 100 4th generation fighters, Soviet fighters at that, although the PLAAF is more powerful than the VKS, the analogy is inappropriate and if we are to base ourselves on making such comparisons, the definitive statement is that Taiwan has a much better chance of gaining air superiority than Ukraine could ever achieve. Such analogies are useless...

No one denies that the difference in capabilities is very large, but this in no way means that the battle is lost or won depending on which side we are referring to, it would be like the saying that planning/plan does not survive the first contact with the enemy, this is still an unknown to be revealed when hostilities begin.

What decoys? Does China have MALD?

Taiwan’s GBAD is based on seven Patriot batteries and seven Skybow II batteries that are supposedly similar to the PAC-2-equipped Patriots. In addition, there are 14 Skybow IIIs. All this on an island much smaller than the Kyiv Oblast makes SEAD missions very, very difficult even for well-trained air forces, and China has never had to conduct a real SEAD mission. The Russian VKS is an absolute farce in this field, but at least they have some experience flying in hostile skies over Syria. The same cannot be said for the PLAAF.

As I have already said, air denial can render an enemy air force, which has nominal superiority over its own air force, incapable of effecting its presence on the battlefield (through fire delivery) because ground assets like GBADs have made the environment too dangerous. Taiwan could certainly contest PLAAF tactical air superiority over Taiwan's skies, because that is what would inflict a force multiplier for amphibious forces landing on the beaches, but as I reiterated, that would depend on the circumstance of how China would execute the AR.

Forget the US.

At no point did I talk about how to approach an assembly area to apply armored mass principles to execute armored counterattacks against Chinese amphibious units on the beach, I talked about that in a post that has nothing to do with your comment, which was in another context, your context is about Taiwan's air strategy and its implications on the operational approach to land operations on the coast. As I said, there are different ways for the ROCA to pursue the PLA's strategy of attrition of its units pressed against the coast, the ROCA could do this even if it had lost the ability to deny Taiwan airspace to the PLA.

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@Sinnavuuty

Look at how many missiles/drones/bombs China has versus Taiwanese SAMs, along with the relative costs. My guess is that within the first week, any SAMs larger than Manpads will either been destroyed or have run out of missiles. You also have to factor in that all of Taiwan's airbases will be out of commission and that Taiwan will be under blockade.

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Remember that over 80% of Taiwan's population lives on a thin narrow strip of land which is within 20km of the Eastern coastline, which is also where most of the Taiwanese military is located.

Then consider how low-cost glide bombs have a range of 70-120km. So Chinese aircraft can launch those glide bombs offshore, beyond the range of even medium-range SAM systems.

Taiwan itself is only 130km at its widest point. Then consider that HARM missiles are being listed with a range of 150km. Again, there is no need for manned Chinese aircraft to actually fly over the island of Taiwan to destroy SAM systems.

And the Taiwanese can't afford to keep SAM systems hidden in reserve, because otherwise Chinese MALE and smaller drones will be systematically dismantling Taiwan. And remember that China can afford to to lose a medium altitude drone (<$3 million) if it forces defending SAM systems to reveal themselves and be destroyed.

Sinnavuuty said:

Taiwan could surrender strategic air dominance to decisively saturate the PLA in terms of tactical air dominance while in the landing operation and subsequent operations, ROCA could do so only with SHORADS mobility systems and other long-range systems to deny the PLAAF tactical air superiority and exploit the PLA’s vital weakness, joint air-ground integration. Therefore, the advantage for Taiwan lies not in its ability to compete for air superiority against the PLA, but rather in its ability to gradually deny air superiority and impose severe costs during one of the most complicated military operations, an amphibious landing. Furthermore, air power is not everything, even if Taiwan is still unable to deny the PLA tactical air superiority, there are still several ways to inflict casualties on Chinese amphibious units on the coast.

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I can tell you are mechanically applying "lesson learned" from Ukraine onto Taiwan. Unfortunately you are learning the wrong lessons.

also shorads does not work the way as you described. Shorads are point air defence that still exists as a part of an integrated system. if all other components of the air defence system, such as long/medium range air defence and early warning are neutralized, then shorad is useless. for one their operators wouldnt even know when to turn on the system. a couple of dudes with manpad is not shorad as you seem to believe.

AndrewS said:

Taiwan itself is only 130km at its widest point. Then consider that HARM missiles are being listed with a range of 150km. Again, there is no need for manned Chinese aircraft to actually fly over the island of Taiwan to destroy SAM systems.

And the Taiwanese can't afford to keep SAM systems hidden in reserve, because otherwise Chinese MALE and smaller drones will be systematically dismantling Taiwan. And remember that China can afford to to lose a medium altitude drone (<$3 million) if it forces defending SAM systems to reveal themselves and be destroyed.

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Just flood the airspace over the Taiwan Island with Harpy-derivatives, 24/7