PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

LuzinskiJ

Junior Member
Registered Member
EDCA is certainly not insignificant, progress on its implementation has been modest so far
EDCA bases is a money grab that Marcos did right. He offered up some decrepit bases (or sometimes just a patch of jungle) to give the impression that he is on board with the US and puts China on notice. For that, the US is spending upwards of $100 million to refurbish them which I think is not enough. For example, one of EDCA bases is naval bases Narciso del Rosario on Balabac island across the Balabac strait from Borneo. And it is said to be one of the two bases, along with Antonio Bautista airbase, that checkmates the heavily fortified Spratly Island military base. It currently has an almost completed runway but no naval facilities, so it will be another couple of more years and many more millions of dollars for it to be proper naval station. Marcos wants to open up southern and eastern Philippines for development, and EDCA money is the way he goes about it. While EDCA is a good talking point for both USA and Philippines; their strategic significance vis-a-vis China is, IMHO, tenuous at best. I believe those bases are there so in case Taiwan is lost, there are still 9 US bases in the strategic Southern China Sea area to keep up the facade of US relevance in that part of the world.

(Note: this is probably the wrong thread for the above post)
 

vincent

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Moderator - World Affairs
EDCA bases is a money grab that Marcos did right. He offered up some decrepit bases (or sometimes just a patch of jungle) to give the impression that he is on board with the US and puts China on notice. For that, the US is spending upwards of $100 million to refurbish them which I think is not enough. For example, one of EDCA bases is naval bases Narciso del Rosario on Balabac island across the Balabac strait from Borneo. And it is said to be one of the two bases, along with Antonio Bautista airbase, that checkmates the heavily fortified Spratly Island military base. It currently has an almost completed runway but no naval facilities, so it will be another couple of more years and many more millions of dollars for it to be proper naval station. Marcos wants to open up southern and eastern Philippines for development, and EDCA money is the way he goes about it. While EDCA is a good talking point for both USA and Philippines; their strategic significance vis-a-vis China is, IMHO, tenuous at best. I believe those bases are there so in case Taiwan is lost, there are still 9 US bases in the strategic Southern China Sea area to keep up the facade of US relevance in that part of the world.

(Note: this is probably the wrong thread for the above post)
Those bases along with the surrounding infrastructures will be gone in a Sino-American war.
 

Index

Senior Member
Registered Member
I have it on good authority (Shilao) that in the simulations in the wake of 96 Crisis a non-trivial number of simulated run of reunification went down the path of using nuclear weapons on Taiwan to salvage unfavourable outcome. In these matters never say never.
This, China will never surrender populated territory.
NFU policy can be renounced prior to a nuclear attack. If decision has been made to go nuclear do you really think NFU would be a barrier?
NFU concerns attacks on foreign states.
 
Last edited by a moderator:

manqiangrexue

Brigadier
Taiwan seems prepare so well.
Really? Their training clips are usually comedic. I'd say they are an excellent example of not taking this fight seriously because they expect for the US to win for them or to just lose.
What happen if their preparation has reach the level above the limit of China mainland plan? I mean, a level where the PLA calculate that it is not worthed because it can take more casualty that PRC can take, and then they declare Independent to provoke China?
Then we use saturation missile strike to bring them far far lower than the limit before the invasion.
But look at their preparation.
We see. It's funny.
US and Japan have build some bases around Taiwan. This defensive web that they create can give a lot of trouble for PLA if they intend to invaded Taiwan. China can follow Sun Tzu advice by waiting for longer. But what happen if the Taiwan President become Zelinski by declare independent or joining NATO? Can China stay silent or just doing some kind of training parade like what they did until now?
1. The things they prepared are only trouble if you tried to launch an invasion without missile and artillery strikes to take these things out and soften the target firts. The is the purpose behind China developing the PLA Rocket Force and Second Artillery Corps to become the most active and likely the most formidable missile strike entities in the world.

2. The current trend is that the Chinese military is expanding its capabilities far faster than the US or any other possible combatant. Basically, the opposite of the trend you seem to fear.
 
Last edited by a moderator:

Sardaukar20

Captain
Registered Member
I have it on good authority (Shilao) that in the simulations in the wake of 96 Crisis a non-trivial number of simulated run of reunification went down the path of using nuclear weapons on Taiwan to salvage unfavourable outcome. In these matters never say never.
Nuclear war doesn't care on what authority you're on. Never say never? How about asking why first?

Talking about a post-1996 scenario for the Taiwan scenario of today is a moot point. We are fortunate that armed reunification didn't happen back then. In 1996, the power gap between the PLA and the US military was so vast, that nukes and extreme sacrifices were needed to create deterrence factors. The PLA of today is not gonna be using the same war plans as 1996. We are entering 2025 already, and you're gonna be bring up post-1996 simulations and mindsets?

NFU policy can be renounced prior to a nuclear attack. If decision has been made to go nuclear do you really think NFU would be a barrier?
That's a pointless argument. Don't be arguing just for argument's sake. Renouncing NFU at the last minute is still no justification to nuke China's own lands based on assumptions. If China were to renounce the NFU anyway, why not go ahead and nuke the US 7th fleet first? No? Afraid of US retaliation? Then will nuking Taiwan with US forces on it not trigger retaliation anyway?

Yeah, never say never. But talking about nuking Taiwan is cheap. Again, today is not 1996 or 2001. If the China of today wants to deny Taiwan from US occupation, there are so many more options to go for before even thinking about using nukes. Naval blockade, long range bombardment, mines, submarines, drone warfare, guerilla warfare, etc. I don't understand this obsession about justifying using Chinese nukes on Taiwan.
 
Last edited:

Temstar

Brigadier
Registered Member
Nuclear war doesn't care on what authority you're on. Never say never? How about asking why first?

Talking about a post-1996 scenario for the Taiwan scenario of today is a moot point. We are fortunate that armed reunification didn't happen back then. In 1996, the power gap between the PLA and the US military was so vast, that nukes and extreme sacrifices were needed to create deterrence factors. The PLA of today is not gonna be using the same war plans as 1996. We are entering 2025 already, and you're gonna be bring up post-1996 simulations and mindsets?


That's a pointless argument. Don't be arguing just for argument's sake. Renouncing NFU at the last minute is still no justification to nuke China's own lands based on assumptions. If China were to renounce the NFU anyway, why not go ahead and nuke the US 7th fleet first? No? Afraid of US retaliation? Then will nuking Taiwan with US forces on it not trigger retaliation anyway?

Yeah, never say never. But talking about nuking Taiwan is cheap. Again, today is not 1996 or 2001. If the China of today wants to deny Taiwan from US occupation, there are so many more options to go for before even thinking about using nukes. Naval blockade, long range bombardment, mines, submarines, drone warfare, guerilla warfare, etc. I don't understand this obsession about justifying using Chinese nukes on Taiwan.
Yes, I agree that PLA is in a much better position compared to 1996 for armed reunification and have much more conventional options available than 30 years ago. However that's not to say nuke is no longer available as an (last) option.

Proactively ruling out nukes is just inviting nuclear blackmail from the other side.
 

Sardaukar20

Captain
Registered Member
Yes, I agree that PLA is in a much better position compared to 1996 for armed reunification and have much more conventional options available than 30 years ago. However that's not to say nuke is no longer available as an (last) option.

Proactively ruling out nukes is just inviting nuclear blackmail from the other side.
I have never ruled out using nukes. If the enemy deserves to be nuked by China, then by all means, nuke them from coast to coast. If the US nukes the Shanghai shipyards, then China should nuke the 7th fleet.

What I will stand by is my point that Chinese nukes should be reserved for the enemy first and foremost. The enemy already has desires to nuke Chinese lands anyway, there is no need to add to the misery with China's own nukes.

As for nuclear blackmail. Well that's what China's nuclear deterrence force was meant to deal with. Me and a number of people are not satisfied with its current status. But it's good to see that the Chinese leadership is finally working on building it up for today's standard of adequate deterrence against the US and friends.
 
Last edited:

ACuriousPLAFan

Brigadier
Registered Member
What does J-35 and J-20 can do in an offensive military operation? Both J-35 and J-20 are fighter. They are defensive platforms to protect China sky, not to bring nightmare to the enemy land.

Who says that the J-20/As and J-35/As must carry A2G ordinances in order to be counted as offensive platforms?

Apart from what others have explained above - Having the J-20/As and/or J-35/As escorting the J-16s, JH-7As and H-6s (plus H-20 in the future) that are conducting strike missions against the enemy targets at extended/expeditionary distances from home is one such application.

Besides, thanks to their inherent LO characteristics, the J-20/As and J-35/As can stay relatively hidden and fly closer to the enemy targets while providing target illumination and standoff missile guidance for non-(V)LO, "missile-truck" warplanes (JH-7, J-16, H-6 etc) that are located further back (namely, A射B导 (A shoots, B guides)).

Don't forget that the J-20/As and J-35/As are also expected to come with MUMT capability, which essentially allows them to pilot and manage UCAVs (including the likes of GJ-11 and Jetank) to conduct similar strike missions without exhausting the PLAAF and PLANAF's H-6K/J/N fleet.

TL; DR - Cooperative engagement capability (CEC) across multiple platforms.

Can both J-35 and J-20 bring a bomb as big as FAB-3000? Or at least FAB-1500? The biggest bomb they can bring is FAB-500 or equivalent. And that is not enough in an offensive war in Taiwan. Because Taiwan is not Hamas in Gaza.

Nobody said that the J-20/As and J-35/As must be the only platforms across the entire PLAAF and PLANAF capable of carrying such ordinances.

In fact, neither the F-22s & F-35/A/B/Cs of the US, nor the Su-57s of Russia are capable of carrying those guided bombs that are in and above the FAB-1000 guided bomb category without chucking their respective LO capabilities into the drain, which basically nullifying the absolute advantages of 5th-gen fighters over the previous-gen counterparts.
 
Last edited:
Top