1. Russia does not want to open direct conflict with NATO. Firing at NATO ISR risks bringing NATO directly in the conflict and Russia is likely to draw at best and lose at worst. This is not true for China; it will win at best and draw at worse.Thank you very much for your explanations, I see the difference between the conflicts now.
Maybe can I ask why NATO ISR will not be applicable in Taiwan?
Cant AEW planes just fly in the ocean helped by tankers as they are doing currently in Poland and Romania?
Or it is assumed than in case of conflict China would shot them?
Chinese industrial production and military capabilities far outstrip Russia; they're not even close. For example, prior to the war, Russia basically had no PGM usage or training. That's why we had that comment from a Chinese pilot a while back after Sino-Russia joint training that the Chinese airforce expends more PGMs in a single training than the entire Russian airforce for that year.
Hence the relative cost for shooting down NATO ISR is much higher for Russia than China.
2. That there's no scenario where reunification starts and the US can sit out without consequences. If the US sits out, they risk losing control over every vassal in Asia. that means Japan, Korea, Philippines, Australia, etc. That's why any battle over Taiwan will always boil down to a US-China war. This is because of the sheer level of military dominance China has in Asia. Vassals are kept inline because of the idea that the US will commit fully. If the US shows its not going to commit in Asia, then the vassals will break ranks*. This isn't the case with Ukraine. Ukraine wasn't an ally/vassal, and Russia isn't that dominate in Europe. The China-Taiwan military balance is much closer to NATO vs Yugoslavia than Russia vs Ukraine. In fact a China-Japan war is still not quite at the proportional level of Russia vs Ukraine.
Hence US (NATO) is not going to be able to sit back and just let China fight Taiwan.
3. Ukraine is a huge continental country connected by border to NATO. Military resupply is easy and there is plenty of strategic depth to hide launchers. Taiwan is a tiny import-dependent island. There is no strategic depth and resupply is difficult if not impossible.
It is very difficult for Russia to strike the entirety of Ukraine (even with cruise missiles!) and deny resupply. Trucks are cheap, plentiful, and easy to hide. It is very easy for China to strike the entirety of Taiwan (even with just truck-mounted rocket artillery) and deny resupply. Ships are expensive, few in numbers, and easy to find (it's a single object against basically nothing in the background - like getting radar scanned in a totally flat plain with no trees).
The only strategic similarity between the two is they are both countries dependent on America which has been pushed forward to poke at America's adversaries. Media counts on strategic illiteracy to push forth the Taiwan = Ukraine nonsense. Even a cursory look at their strategic situations will inform you how vastly different they are.
* This is equivalent to if the USSR, at the height of its power, decided to invade Germany and the US response was to pull back and not defend Germany.
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