I don’t think any operarios of the Deserr Storm has validity to extract lessons when fighting against a decent adversary.
Dessert Storm is equivalent to a situation where Russia and China decides to attack Kazakhstan or Mongolia.
The discrepancy of forces was in that level. Iraq was sanctioned, has old weapons, no support from a high power, and US/NATO were all im (even paying iraquí officials). And Iraq was nowhere near to Ukriane in level of air defences.
Moreover they are totally different conflicts.
Russia could have suppressed all air defence of Ukraine, but it may have costed all their Su34, 80% of their Su35 and a substantial part of its Tu22M. Then what if NATO intervene.
Ukraine for US is just a mean to destroy Russian weapons.
Taiwan scenery would be the same. Taiwan would try to impose heavy casualties to the Chinese air force to put them in disadvantage against U.S.
They operate the radar in dark mode, only activate when they shoot, rest of file in passive mode. Also they would receive intel and so on from us
Flying below radar horizon like the first kick in Desert Storm stops detection unless 1 of 2 things happen:
1. Taiwan keeps AWAC patrol 24/7 indefinitely. They have 5 AWAC planes.
2. Taiwan discovers how to use radar to see through the earth.
Iraq in 1991 had about 1/12 the population of US and 1/30 the GDP.
Taiwan has 1/60 the population of China and 1/30 the GDP.
Ukraine has 1/3 the population of Russia and 1/10 the GDP.
A Taiwan conflict has a similar comprehensive power discrepancy as the destruction of Iraq, while the Russo-Ukrainian conflict is more like a conflict between China vs. Japan (Japan: 1/10 the population of China, 1/4 the GDP).
First strike prioritizing stealth, is particularly controversial? Is there any reason for this to be false?
I assume that a Taiwan conflict will begin with operational surprise belonging to mainland China. That is, I assume no strategic surprise (some sort of military conflict is coming 'soon') but only operational surprise (we don't know the scale or exact timing of any particular military maneuver). I don't think this is particularly controversial either. Constant freedom of navigation exercises around Taiwan, constant CBGs going out to sea, shooting a few missiles once in a while, etc. all normalize high PLA readiness.
That way, all that's needed is a short surge of readiness rather than a 'cold start'. In such a position, there will be a time where the PLA reaches maximum readiness while Taiwanese are still ramping up from a cold start, as has been seen in their own 2022 response exercises.
That is the time to strike with a stealthy strike. A few hours vs. a few minutes is not that important when talking about days of operational preparation.
Then the timeline after the first strike is condensed. And that is the phase where time sensitive high speed munitions are to be used.