I've always been curious about how Japan is planning to maintain such a powerful force. Increased automation can only go so far.
PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency
- Thread starter pugachev_diver
- Start date
To be fair @zhangjim is the master of finding the most insane Taiwanese/Japanese destroying China publications.
He posted that crazy Manhwa from Taiwan where the woman pilot shoots down like 6 J-20 single handedly with an F-16.
Something like 80% of Japanese have no interest in direct conflict with China
Here is an example (probably citing the same survey)
This is par for the course for any think tank/journalist/other publication writing on the geopolitical angle on China. China's government is basically insane bloodthirsty beasts that club each other to death to get to the top. Gordon Chang literally said they were sacrificing animals and drinking their blood last week. Crazy to think that Chinese leadership might be rational and logical... building up the economy instead of doing the Indian thing with military spending? Unfathomable! Truly a sign that the CCP are animals.
Who is this sneaking little Jap making "polls" like that?
Mother of all leading questions, might as well ask Russians in 2022 if they're ready to denazify malorossiya, or ask Germans in 1936 if they're ready to "defend" the slavs with Barbarossa.
The author thinks people doesn't notice? You make good on your threats to attack China, and the only thing you'll have to remember your whole family will be those shitty little low res framed pictures like the ones in Yasukuni.
Cowards want to steal land but don't have the balls to trespass.
Even if it that was the case, you'd expect the most brutal, ruthless and cunning warlord to rise to the top in China... Not the dumbest, most emotional one that also hesitates and gets scared of mere political consequences.
I'm going to bed soon.
They considered this issue, so they tried their best to promote China as an aggressive Expansionism country, and created an atmosphere of "Japan was attacked by China", and suppressed anti war thoughts to the maximum by entering the wartime mobilization state.
You will find that in their relatively "mild" scenario, Japan plans to use the tense atmosphere to lift restrictions on the military. For a country that is largely driven by political aristocratic family, those silent citizens never need to be taken into account.
Don't underestimate the Japanese's paranoia and pathological sense of crisis. Of course, in practical actions, they often make unrealistic and wishful thinking plans.
In fact, in the simulation of JFSS in 2023, due to the invitation of Taiwan representatives, the actual situation has changed compared to 2022. In the past two years of simulations, the Japanese have been playing the roles of Chinese and Americans, which inevitably leads to the script moving towards a more idealized direction.
Taiwan has shown an unusually low profile, largely because Taiwanese people have found that the actions of the Japanese do not meet their expectations - it is clear that the Japanese did not intend to save them at all costs.
Japanese people don't want war with China not because they like China (they don't) but because they know China can inflict massive damage on them. So creating an atmosphere of "Japan was attacked by China" might not have the effect they want.
FriedRiceNSpice
Captain
To say Germany lost very little during WW1 is a massive understatement. Of course, inarguably the French suffered a greater deal of devastation due to the action of the Western Front taking part primarily on French soil. To state that Germany only suffered humiliation is ignoring the massive economic consequences to Germany which ultimately enabled the creation of an environment within Germany that fostered radicalism and resulted in the Nazis taking power and plunging the world into another world war. An amended version of your assessment of the lesson to be drawn from WW1 should be: unless you can directly assert control / total influence over the defeated adversaries, you should seek to minimize the costs placed directly on the population of said adversaries.
As you mentioned, it would not be possible to completely resolve a world war to the favor of any one side due to MAD. It would be in everyone's best interests for the conflict to be resolved as quickly and within as limited of a scope as possible. Even in a limited conflict where there is minimal direct involvement of US forces, if Taiwan is taken in a conflict which is seen as sparked by the US, then the credibility of US power in the Western Pacific would collapse. Japan and Australia would remain as the only nations still aligned with the US, and US influence and power in the rest of region would recede into nothingness.
Hence, it is in the best interests of China to 1) avoid direct confrontation unless it can be viewed as being provoked by the separatists or the US (ie declaration of independence, basing of foreign military assets directly within the territory of Taiwan) and 2) limit the scope of the conflict as much as possible.
Why is so little emphasis placed on removing U. S. forces from the east-Asian continent, i. e., the Korean Peninsula, as a prelude/precursor/precondition to any further actions in the East China Sea/western Pacific? Before the Ryukus, before Taiwan, the U. S. military should be removed from the east Asian continent, by force, if necessary!
In my assessment, this should, absolutely, be the first step in the diminution of U. S. military presence and influence in the region. I believe that, with an unprecedented Sino/Russian diplomatic venture (comprising economic, industrial, agricultural, military, et c., incentives) North Korea could be persuaded to withdraw its massive artlillery emplacements and armored formations out of offensive range of the South. This, as well as other military accommodations to the South, could be used as inducements to convince the South that continued U. S. occupation/presence is (what it, actually, is) the true impediment to peace on the peninsula. The converse proposition would be the re-deployment of Sino/Russian forces (each matching the U. S. deployment) to North Korea and an increase in the potential for conflict, with China being fully prepared for either outcome.
Being that the U. S. certainly remembers its mauling at the hands of an undeveloped PLA, I’m certain that the prospect of fighting a land-war in Asia, against a modernized and well equipped PLA, would be a cause of serious consternation and a whole ‘nother round of war-gaming. My assessment is based on the belief that there is no conventional means by which the U. S., and all of it’s allies, can hope to win a land-war on the Korean Peninsula, or even to be competitive in such a conflict.
In my assessment, this should, absolutely, be the first step in the diminution of U. S. military presence and influence in the region. I believe that, with an unprecedented Sino/Russian diplomatic venture (comprising economic, industrial, agricultural, military, et c., incentives) North Korea could be persuaded to withdraw its massive artlillery emplacements and armored formations out of offensive range of the South. This, as well as other military accommodations to the South, could be used as inducements to convince the South that continued U. S. occupation/presence is (what it, actually, is) the true impediment to peace on the peninsula. The converse proposition would be the re-deployment of Sino/Russian forces (each matching the U. S. deployment) to North Korea and an increase in the potential for conflict, with China being fully prepared for either outcome.
Being that the U. S. certainly remembers its mauling at the hands of an undeveloped PLA, I’m certain that the prospect of fighting a land-war in Asia, against a modernized and well equipped PLA, would be a cause of serious consternation and a whole ‘nother round of war-gaming. My assessment is based on the belief that there is no conventional means by which the U. S., and all of it’s allies, can hope to win a land-war on the Korean Peninsula, or even to be competitive in such a conflict.
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NK suffered massively to keep their end of the security deal. They're at a dead end with only 1 way out. Take over the south by force.
In the event of an American invasion of Taiwan, I would assume SK neutrality because of NK threat. If SK attacks China, it will trigger the MDT and SKorean cities will get shelled. That's a direct existential threat. SK can also not help an invasion of Taiwan that much.
They have some ships, but their closeness to China means that there's nowhere safe to park them.
So by default, both Koreas would be neutral. China would presumably also not call the MDT against US, because NK cannot really do anything and having them there just creates a more escalatory situation.
However, if the north believes they can use a favorable situation as an excuse to unite the peninsula, there is a chance that they may themselves agitate and try to draw China into war with SK.
FriedRiceNSpice
Captain
In the event that the US actually provokes a conflict over Taiwan and is unable to prevent its fall, do you think South Korea would still place any faith in American provided security?