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PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency
- Thread starter pugachev_diver
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If you have to start a post with "if this is too provocative", then it probably is. You are receiving a warning here. Please think about this the next time you are ready to make another "if this is too provocative" post
Dully noted.
I have been thinking about how this complex war with AR would play out and the only thing possible that could stop China is the US.
China will overall broadly speaking have 4 objectives/fields of battle to engage within which are : Air bases, CVNs, destroyers/frigates/cruisers and Submarines/the undersea threat. If these threats are neutralised then the armed reunification will be successful. I will analyse what the balance of forces will look like in 2030.
1) Air Bases - Okinawa, Misawa, Yokota Air Base and Guam. These can hold around 300 aircraft.
Battle for Kadena - This is within 480 miles of China's coast. This means that KJ 500s and whatever upgraded variants exists by 2030 will be able to be a force multiplier under the safety of the Chinese coast that is littered with a very robust, redundant IADS. An initial strike will likely be salvos of bm + cm missiles. Due to the short distance this will at *minimum* cause some level saturation within defences of Kadena exhausting its supply and likely defang a lot of its C4ISTAR capabilities. Then dozens of J20s and perhaps J35s in conjunction with H20s can come within 150 miles of Okinawa with support from KJ 500 AWACS giving it a much better situational awareness environment than US OPFOR and under the SAM umbrella nearby China's coast. They can also use destroyers for AD. When the H20s and J20s are within 150 miles they can spam long range pgms till not a single aircraft remains within Kadena.
What the US can do to defend Kadena : If China has AWACS support, a destroyer screening force for AD as well as Chinese SAMs there will be a lot of disadvantages for US airframes operating within that environment. They will have worse situational awareness as well as much less fires and more defences to get through. If the US uses Burkes for AD then they will get lit up by land based Chinese ASBM + ASCM.
In short its almost certain in 2030 that Kadena will be finished within 2 weeks of a conflict beginning. Often US analysts miss a lot by just counting the missile threat and saturation packages as if its 2014. J20s, H20s, AWACS and destroyers are being made for a reason.
Battle for Misawa, Battle of Yokota- These 2 bases are within 1000 miles of the Chinese coast. Seeing as they are further away than Kadena they will be dealt with after Kadena and hey will take longer to be able to assist Taiwan. Due to the short distance they can also be peppered with missiles to crack it open and then be dealt with in a similar manner as Kadena once there are gaps in its defence and ISR. There will with certainty be Chinese superiority in numbers. China can generate many more sorties here along with H20 munitions loads. These bases will also be gone.
Battle for Guam- The most survivable base to distance. Initially China will mainly focus its bm & cms here. Due to distance and the fact that aircraft leading here will need to be refuelled it takes second priority compared to Kadena and Japan. It will likely be wayyy over saturated with missiles.
In short air bases will either be to far away to be able to have any meaningful sortie capacity over the wider war in westpac or be neutralised rapidly with local Chinese supremacy. The US won't be able to have similar effects on Chinese bases as China is many times more distributed with not all of its eggs being in so few baskets and lack of land based fire generation in west pac.
2) CVN- This is the second portion of the air threat and the most dangerous one. Very generously assuming they can surge 7 CVNs and have around 45 combat aircraft per ship. Also the marine (look up marine totally not cvns). Total number of sorties will be able to generate : from CVNs is 45*7*2 = 630 this is me being extremely generous to the US and assuming a similar ratio as desert storm (very low chance irl) with 2 sorties per air frame per day . Assuming they can also surge 5 WASP amphib assault ships with 20 planes on them with 2 sorties a day this would equal = 730 sorties. The closer they get to China the much less survivable they will be for obvious reasons.
Assuming China has around 1k J20s and 200 J35s and a small sorties ratio per airframe of 1.4 per day this would = 1680 sorties. This means its pretty much certain that China will be able to generate more sorties per day than surged US forces will be forced to refuel. This is also assuming that Chinese ASBMs take out 0 CVN airframes. To be effective however and generate 2 sorties a day due to how far away China is they will have to come closer meaning they will be able to generate less sorties more likely less than 1 per air frame as the distances are much larger than desert storm and if they come close they will say hello to an ASBM with their name on it. This means the US will only be able to generate 300 sorties a day. A 5x advantage for China in the air. When we take into account airframe losses from CVNs due to long range ASBMs and assume a conservative 15% loss rate this will go into a very bad for for the "the most powerful and second powerful air forces in the world".
3) Warships -These are destroyers/frigates/cruisers the US can bring to battle vs China. Due to maintenance and how much they beat up their ships only 70% of US warships are available at any time, for China its more like 90%. Assuming US projections (which have traditionally been underestimates) hold by 2030 China will have around 80% of US tonnage and a similar story for VLS tubes. Due to distance, supply the US will only at max be able to bring maybe 75% of the force that is not being maintained. This means that 75% of 70 is around 50% so the US will only be able to bring half its fleet. This means the PLAN will be able to outnumber than nearly 1.5 to 1 in terms of tonnage. When you take into account that US bases will mostly be inoperable and only maybe 300 sorties from CVNs they will have to deal with many more fires than China will. Furthermore, they will also have to deal with land bases ASBMs that the US doesn't have equiv to in west pac due to distance. There will also be more H20s than B21s so US warships also have that to live through.
In short the US navy in surface combatants and air combatants will be massively outnumbered.
4) Submarine/ Undersea -This is the PLA's biggest problem. If the Type 095 is procured and current ASW systems carry on being expanded the they will have supremacy in the first island chain and parity/near parity in the second. This is where the PLA is weakest.
China will overall broadly speaking have 4 objectives/fields of battle to engage within which are : Air bases, CVNs, destroyers/frigates/cruisers and Submarines/the undersea threat. If these threats are neutralised then the armed reunification will be successful. I will analyse what the balance of forces will look like in 2030.
1) Air Bases - Okinawa, Misawa, Yokota Air Base and Guam. These can hold around 300 aircraft.
Battle for Kadena - This is within 480 miles of China's coast. This means that KJ 500s and whatever upgraded variants exists by 2030 will be able to be a force multiplier under the safety of the Chinese coast that is littered with a very robust, redundant IADS. An initial strike will likely be salvos of bm + cm missiles. Due to the short distance this will at *minimum* cause some level saturation within defences of Kadena exhausting its supply and likely defang a lot of its C4ISTAR capabilities. Then dozens of J20s and perhaps J35s in conjunction with H20s can come within 150 miles of Okinawa with support from KJ 500 AWACS giving it a much better situational awareness environment than US OPFOR and under the SAM umbrella nearby China's coast. They can also use destroyers for AD. When the H20s and J20s are within 150 miles they can spam long range pgms till not a single aircraft remains within Kadena.
What the US can do to defend Kadena : If China has AWACS support, a destroyer screening force for AD as well as Chinese SAMs there will be a lot of disadvantages for US airframes operating within that environment. They will have worse situational awareness as well as much less fires and more defences to get through. If the US uses Burkes for AD then they will get lit up by land based Chinese ASBM + ASCM.
In short its almost certain in 2030 that Kadena will be finished within 2 weeks of a conflict beginning. Often US analysts miss a lot by just counting the missile threat and saturation packages as if its 2014. J20s, H20s, AWACS and destroyers are being made for a reason.
Battle for Misawa, Battle of Yokota- These 2 bases are within 1000 miles of the Chinese coast. Seeing as they are further away than Kadena they will be dealt with after Kadena and hey will take longer to be able to assist Taiwan. Due to the short distance they can also be peppered with missiles to crack it open and then be dealt with in a similar manner as Kadena once there are gaps in its defence and ISR. There will with certainty be Chinese superiority in numbers. China can generate many more sorties here along with H20 munitions loads. These bases will also be gone.
Battle for Guam- The most survivable base to distance. Initially China will mainly focus its bm & cms here. Due to distance and the fact that aircraft leading here will need to be refuelled it takes second priority compared to Kadena and Japan. It will likely be wayyy over saturated with missiles.
In short air bases will either be to far away to be able to have any meaningful sortie capacity over the wider war in westpac or be neutralised rapidly with local Chinese supremacy. The US won't be able to have similar effects on Chinese bases as China is many times more distributed with not all of its eggs being in so few baskets and lack of land based fire generation in west pac.
2) CVN- This is the second portion of the air threat and the most dangerous one. Very generously assuming they can surge 7 CVNs and have around 45 combat aircraft per ship. Also the marine (look up marine totally not cvns). Total number of sorties will be able to generate : from CVNs is 45*7*2 = 630 this is me being extremely generous to the US and assuming a similar ratio as desert storm (very low chance irl) with 2 sorties per air frame per day . Assuming they can also surge 5 WASP amphib assault ships with 20 planes on them with 2 sorties a day this would equal = 730 sorties. The closer they get to China the much less survivable they will be for obvious reasons.
Assuming China has around 1k J20s and 200 J35s and a small sorties ratio per airframe of 1.4 per day this would = 1680 sorties. This means its pretty much certain that China will be able to generate more sorties per day than surged US forces will be forced to refuel. This is also assuming that Chinese ASBMs take out 0 CVN airframes. To be effective however and generate 2 sorties a day due to how far away China is they will have to come closer meaning they will be able to generate less sorties more likely less than 1 per air frame as the distances are much larger than desert storm and if they come close they will say hello to an ASBM with their name on it. This means the US will only be able to generate 300 sorties a day. A 5x advantage for China in the air. When we take into account airframe losses from CVNs due to long range ASBMs and assume a conservative 15% loss rate this will go into a very bad for for the "the most powerful and second powerful air forces in the world".
3) Warships -These are destroyers/frigates/cruisers the US can bring to battle vs China. Due to maintenance and how much they beat up their ships only 70% of US warships are available at any time, for China its more like 90%. Assuming US projections (which have traditionally been underestimates) hold by 2030 China will have around 80% of US tonnage and a similar story for VLS tubes. Due to distance, supply the US will only at max be able to bring maybe 75% of the force that is not being maintained. This means that 75% of 70 is around 50% so the US will only be able to bring half its fleet. This means the PLAN will be able to outnumber than nearly 1.5 to 1 in terms of tonnage. When you take into account that US bases will mostly be inoperable and only maybe 300 sorties from CVNs they will have to deal with many more fires than China will. Furthermore, they will also have to deal with land bases ASBMs that the US doesn't have equiv to in west pac due to distance. There will also be more H20s than B21s so US warships also have that to live through.
In short the US navy in surface combatants and air combatants will be massively outnumbered.
4) Submarine/ Undersea -This is the PLA's biggest problem. If the Type 095 is procured and current ASW systems carry on being expanded the they will have supremacy in the first island chain and parity/near parity in the second. This is where the PLA is weakest.
Taiwan is going to be a massive factor... simply by the virtue of its existence. I don't know much about Taiwan's military, but if they don't have data-sharing with US forces already, they most likely will by 2030s if trends stay the same. They will most likely keep upgrading their air defense network and radars.
It's not just about sorties though. Air defense is a multi-platform mission and I question the relevancy of Chinese sorties anyway. The first salvo would probably include a massive PLARF barrage, to help saturate air defense. I think you also neglected H-6s and J-16s in this first wave.
The first wave would also have to account for naval assets on the way. It is highly likely, that any salvo or activity would be detected by either the Japanese or US Navy, giving time to scramble aircraft and AWACS. If tensions are already high, the entire region might be on high alert already anyway, so the element of surprise could be minimized.
I also don't necessarily think that Kadena would be the first target. It might make much more sense to neutralize Taiwan first.
It's not just about sorties though. Air defense is a multi-platform mission and I question the relevancy of Chinese sorties anyway. The first salvo would probably include a massive PLARF barrage, to help saturate air defense. I think you also neglected H-6s and J-16s in this first wave.
The first wave would also have to account for naval assets on the way. It is highly likely, that any salvo or activity would be detected by either the Japanese or US Navy, giving time to scramble aircraft and AWACS. If tensions are already high, the entire region might be on high alert already anyway, so the element of surprise could be minimized.
I also don't necessarily think that Kadena would be the first target. It might make much more sense to neutralize Taiwan first.
Taiwan for sure will be attacked first. Majority of targets on the Taiwan Island can be attacked with cheaper precision munitions after the initial wave. The good stuffs are reserved for the Hegemon and its vassals.
The timing of PLA attacks against Japanese and American bases depends on their participations in the Chinese civil war.
Thoughts anyone?
They still have a fundamental problem: their ground based TELs are on small islands with no room to maneuver, while China's are in a massive mountainous, forested and urbanized country.
Their TELs will be subject to constant surveillance and either preemptive elimination or counterbattery fire. China's won't be.