PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

FriedRiceNSpice

FriedRiceNSpice

Captain
Even by 2030, China will lack the power projection and amphibious capability to go on any island hopping campaign beyond SCS and at furthest Okinawa. Beyond the 2nd island chain the balance of power will begin to rapidly shift away from China's favor. Furthermore, there are simply no strategic benefits to attempting to exert any control beyond the 2nd island chain. Neutralizing opposing assets within the 2nd island chain and preventing opposing forces from operating freely within the 2nd island chain would already be a total strategic victory and completely flip the geopolitical reality in the Western Pacific to China's favor. Sending a naval surface group to within striking distance of Hawaii is completely out of the question.
 
FairAndUnbiased

FairAndUnbiased

Brigadier
Registered Member
FriedRiceNSpice said:
Even by 2030, China will lack the power projection and amphibious capability to go on any island hopping campaign beyond SCS and at furthest Okinawa. Beyond the 2nd island chain the balance of power will begin to rapidly shift away from China's favor. Furthermore, there are simply no strategic benefits to attempting to exert any control beyond the 2nd island chain. Neutralizing opposing assets within the 2nd island chain and preventing opposing forces from operating freely within the 2nd island chain would already be a total strategic victory and completely flip the geopolitical reality in the Western Pacific to China's favor. Sending a naval surface group to within striking distance of Hawaii is completely out of the question.
Click to expand...
I wouldn't count long range strikes out. Assets such as a hypothetical 333 drone as an upgrade of the Shahed (3000 km range, 30 kg payload, 30 hour endurance) would be both cheap and devastating against adversary military logistics fixed sites.

The adversary also has a shell type deployment. The outside is hard, the inside is soft. Once the shell is broken, there's not much stopping further penetration through the albumen and yolk.
 
tankphobia

tankphobia

Senior Member
Registered Member
Doesn't whatever happen heavily depend on Chinese nuclear submarines deployment? If the underwater battle is not won any action China attempt at surface warfare past FIC will face heavy attrition.

If China cannot sufficiently contest the underwater domain, I'd imagine the US navy will target in/out bound Chinese shipping from the safety of the pacific even if Taiwan is lost.
 
TK3600

TK3600

Major
Registered Member
FairAndUnbiased said:
I wouldn't count long range strikes out. Assets such as a hypothetical 333 drone as an upgrade of the Shahed (3000 km range, 30 kg payload, 30 hour endurance) would be both cheap and devastating against adversary military logistics fixed sites.

The adversary also has a shell type deployment. The outside is hard, the inside is soft. Once the shell is broken, there's not much stopping further penetration through the albumen and yolk.
Click to expand...
Except there is nothing on the inside. It is a whole Pacific Ocean and some island base in between. Unlike on land where penetrate deep into enemy territory has disruptive effect on enemy to wage war. There will be nothing valuable until you hit west coast. Even Hawaii is of questionable value.
tankphobia said:
Doesn't whatever happen heavily depend on Chinese nuclear submarines deployment? If the underwater battle is not won any action China attempt at surface warfare past FIC will face heavy attrition.

If China cannot sufficiently contest the underwater domain, I'd imagine the US navy will target in/out bound Chinese shipping from the safety of the pacific even if Taiwan is lost.
Click to expand...
It kind of goes both ways. US is heavily reliant on import for its economy. China can cut off Pacific trade toward US, and keep continental trade. US has the benefit of Atlantic being safe. I would say both sides are equal.
 
Last edited:
FairAndUnbiased

FairAndUnbiased

Brigadier
Registered Member
tankphobia said:
Doesn't whatever happen heavily depend on Chinese nuclear submarines deployment? If the underwater battle is not won any action China attempt at surface warfare past FIC will face heavy attrition.

If China cannot sufficiently contest the underwater domain, I'd imagine the US navy will target in/out bound Chinese shipping from the safety of the pacific even if Taiwan is lost.
Click to expand...
if the adversary loses air and surface control, then Chinese ASW planes and helicopters have free reign.
 
B

Biscuits

Major
Registered Member
tankphobia said:
Doesn't whatever happen heavily depend on Chinese nuclear submarines deployment? If the underwater battle is not won any action China attempt at surface warfare past FIC will face heavy attrition.

If China cannot sufficiently contest the underwater domain, I'd imagine the US navy will target in/out bound Chinese shipping from the safety of the pacific even if Taiwan is lost.
Click to expand...
All the materials China needs for war production is available continentally or inside the country itself.

US needs a succesful Taiwan invasion in order to have a chance of winning by bringing China to negotiation. That means, boots on the ground inside China, decisive battle wins against the PLAN. If the invasion fails, there's nothing US can do that will not result in being overrun in the long term.
 
M

montyp165

Senior Member
FriedRiceNSpice said:
Even by 2030, China will lack the power projection and amphibious capability to go on any island hopping campaign beyond SCS and at furthest Okinawa. Beyond the 2nd island chain the balance of power will begin to rapidly shift away from China's favor. Furthermore, there are simply no strategic benefits to attempting to exert any control beyond the 2nd island chain. Neutralizing opposing assets within the 2nd island chain and preventing opposing forces from operating freely within the 2nd island chain would already be a total strategic victory and completely flip the geopolitical reality in the Western Pacific to China's favor. Sending a naval surface group to within striking distance of Hawaii is completely out of the question.
Click to expand...
I'd actually argue the opposite, by 2030 the PLA would be more than sufficiently strong enough to advance all the way to San Francisco even if the entirety of the US military and their vassals (AUKUS + SK and Japan) were arrayed against them. The PRC's ratio of strength to all of those opponents is closer to the WW2 US vs the entire Axis than anybody amongst them would dare to admit, even before considering Russia, NK and Iran being added to the equation.
 
FriedRiceNSpice

FriedRiceNSpice

Captain
FairAndUnbiased said:
I wouldn't count long range strikes out. Assets such as a hypothetical 333 drone as an upgrade of the Shahed (3000 km range, 30 kg payload, 30 hour endurance) would be both cheap and devastating against adversary military logistics fixed sites.
Click to expand...
There are several platforms, primarily aerial and subsurface that will be coming online this decade that would enable strikes at military targets in Hawaii. Strikes will definitely happen. However, I don't think conventional surface assets will move close enogh to launch sustained strikes at Hawaii, let alone supporting an amphibious landing.
 
FriedRiceNSpice

FriedRiceNSpice

Captain
montyp165 said:
I'd actually argue the opposite, by 2030 the PLA would be more than sufficiently strong enough to advance all the way to San Francisco even if the entirety of the US military and their vassals (AUKUS + SK and Japan) were arrayed against them. The PRC's ratio of strength to all of those opponents is closer to the WW2 US vs the entire Axis than anybody amongst them would dare to admit, even before considering Russia, NK and Iran being added to the equation.
Click to expand...
How are you computing this ratio of strength?
 
You must log in or register to reply here.
Top