The US forces of the 7th fleet and US Air Force assets in the area would be enough, IMHO, to blunt an attack by China against Taiwan. Certainly not enough to defeat China and all of her military...but that is not what they would have to do.
The PLA, PLAN and PLAAF will not and cannot commit all of their forces to that one fight. There are too many other borders to protect and other potential threats and interests that cannot be ignored.
All of China's other potential threats are land based, and the PLA is strong enough to hold their own long enough for air power to be diverted if another threat presents itself.
If Beijing commits to using force to re-take Taiwan, then all other consideration would come a distinct second.
In terms of the air force and navy, you can expect pretty much all of their remotely competitive modern assets to be made available if necessary.
I think you still do not understand just how important Taiwan is to China. Just as the US people would never stand another power to launch a sneak attack against them and get away with it, the Chinese people will never stand another piece of Chinese territory to be broken away by a foreign power using military force.
As far as America would be prepared to go if China launched a Japanese style sneak attack, expect the Chinese people to be willing to go further over Taiwan.
The US would simply have to keep China from gaining air superiority over Taiwan until more and more US forces arrive in theater from the 3rd fleet, and from the US mainland...and I believe, short of a massive pre-emptive attack which disabled Guam and the carrier force of the 7th fleet all at once, that the US would be able to do so.
What you would end up with is a lot of US aircraft from Guam and other bases...even from the US with B-1s and B-2s, several carrier groups (3-4 once the US got its forces arrayed), and a lot of submarines ensuring that the Island was not invaded.
These forces would prevent air superiority being achieved by the PRC and then would engage in a war of attrition against Chinese airbases in the vicinity of Taiwan that were launching strikes against Taiwan. I do not believe however that the US would venture at all onto Chinese soil with personnel...and would only go so deep into the PRC with air attacks, and principally against air bases and launch sites for ballistic missiles.
What you do not seem to be taking account is how the PLA would respond to such direct military intervention by the US, especially at such an early stage.
If the US got involved with the forces as deployed without making a significant build up first, then the entire emphasis of the PLA operation will instantly change from 'take Taiwan ASAP' to 'cause as much damage to US forces as possible'.
I have no idea why you are so fixated with the idea that the PLA would only be able to land heavy blows against Guam and USN assets if they launched a surprise pre-emptive attack.
Firstly, as I have already pointed out in my last post, in this day and age, it would simply be impossible for anyone, even the USAF, to launch an operation on the scale of what would be needed to devastate Guam in secret, across the distances involved without giving the game away.
Secondly, the PLA never plan for the best case scenario. They always plan for the worst and then make it a little worse for good measure.
When they are drawing up attack plans against Guam or USN CSGs, they would draw those plans and allocate resources based on the assumption that those bases and fleets are fully expecting the attack.
There would be significant loss on each side.
How it went from there is anybody's guess. Would the US have the will to mantian such a posture for very long? Depends on how the conflict started, the US losses, and the percieved intentions of the PRC by the US public. All of those would play on US staying power and what politicians were willing to keep on with.
Indeed, but my point has always been that if the US got directly involved pre-maturely, it would present the PLA with to opportunity to do the one thing proven time and time again to be the most effective means to turning the US public and politician against a war of choice - massive US casualties.
Remember that the whole rationale for the PLA to have to rush and take the island ASAP is so that they can fully control Taiwan before the US gets involved.
But if the US is already involved, then the emphasis would shift correspondingly to knocking the US out of the fight by causing far more casualties for the US than their public can stomach.
All of the other things would be influencing factors, but all of the others combined does not come close to how important US losses would influence US willingness to continue a war of choice.
Even if massive initial losses does not prompt the US to re-think their involvement, it should at the very least make them re-think their strategy and be far more cautious, which would give the PLA much more time and opportunity to take Taiwan than if they tried to weather US attacks.
Similiar, and probably other circumstances and conditions would play to...
No my friend, it would be a colossal mistake for the US to think that China would view Taiwan as a war of choice as the US does. For China, Taiwan is a matter of principle, of the very survival of the CCP itself, as if there is one thing that is almost guaranteed to cause the people and military of China to turn against the CCP, is if they 'lost' Taiwan.
Once committed, the Chinese will not back down until they have taken Taiwan no matter the cost. The sooner the US realises this simple fact, the fewer lives might be lost.
I for one hope it never happens, and short of something pushing it to that brink, do not believe it will.
You are far from along there mate.
It is a strong blocking force. Much, much more capable than a picket,and with a much different role.
It is not a trip wire, it is not a early warning system. It is a force designed to be strong enough to prevent an opposing force from projecting sufficent strength beyond its borders to win the fighte before more US or allied forces arrive in theater.
Well we will just have to disagree on that one.
I do not think the US forces in the western pacific are strong enough to carry out the blocking role you envisaged. It is probably strong enough to block the PLAN from pushing past the second or third island chains, but then the PLAN has never had much interest in going that far.
In terms of a 1st island chain conflict like Taiwan, that force is ill placed (Guam and the vast majority of bases in Japan are much further from Taiwan than it is to the mainland) and too few in numbers to withstand the full might of the PLA, as it would be brought to bare if the US was foolish enough to gift wrap such a golden opportunity for the PLA to have the best realistic chance of inflicting the kind of losses that would give the US serious pause to re-consider their continued involvement in such a conflict.
