Explain it before I go to bed. This approach is based on a ridiculous logic: since we found that the PLA is gathering at the port, we can judge that this is a precursor to an attack, so we are actually fighting back.
(Chinese after English) (中文会在英文之后)
Actually, I plan to use my previous points for further elaboration. But since you have already responded, hence I would just use my elaboration points as part of my response.
You see, with the coastal regions of Fujian being located
directly opposite of Taiwan across the Taiwan Strait, by logical sense, those locations would obviously become the staging area for the PLAGF to gather their troops and equipment, board amphibious assault ships of the PLAN before sailing directly for Taiwan. Therefore, those
staging areas on Fujian's coastline would
become the very first strike targets for any attempts by the ROC military at the very first sign of war in order to
thwart any attempts by the PLA to march on Taiwan.
Therefore, my thoughts is for the PLAGF to gather near those coastal regions, but
make it not so obvious enough that people living along the Fujian coastline could figure out what is going to happen right away. Span the gathering of troops over multiple months, and disperse them wide enough so as to not raise clear warnings for the Taiwanese government.
Rather than loading PLAGF troops and equipment onto PLAN amphibious assault ships before the start of the war, the process of boarding PLAGF troops and equipment onto PLAN amphibious assault ships should not begin until
at least three days after the start of the war. But of course, the process must be
quick.
If that's the case, then what should be done during the first few days of the war?
That period of time should be for the PLARF, PLAAF and PLAN to conduct
round-clock, non-stop, intense, and accurate missile, aerial and naval-based bombardment against Taiwan for
sufficient durations of time before the
PLAGF could be sent over to land on the beaches of Taiwan and initiate ground combat over there. The key objective for the PLARF, PLAAF and PLAN would be to
wipe out as many ROC military command centers, radar stations, communication facilities, anti-air and anti-sea defenses, warehouses, oil depots, bases and airfields as quickly as possible, so as to reduce the threats and pressure facing the amphibious assault forces of the PLAN and the PLAGF to land on Taiwan's beaches later on.
Remember that the US-led Coalition
bombed Iraq for
MORE THAN 40 DAYS before even sending their ground troops into Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War. The long bombing runs pretty much decimated much of the Iraqi command and control, infrastructure, air defenses, depots and bases, making short work for the US-led Coalition ground forces to sweep through the Iraqi Republican Army, ending Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the war itself in just 2-3 weeks afterwards.
At the same time, the places that the PLA
should actually take over from the
very first day of the war are the
Kinmen and
Matsu Islands, as they are practically right at mainland China's doorstep. There is no way to bypass those islands and go straight for Taiwan if those ROC military forces on Kinmen and Matsu are still posing danger against the Chinese mainland.
Based on how close Kinmen and Matsu are to mainland China, I guess that even the residents on those islands would know what to do when China finally makes her move against Taiwan.
In fact, the furthest that the PLA could ever reliably advance towards in the first few days of the war, in my opinion, would be the
Penghu Islands. In particular, the larger east island (Husi and Magong). Kindly refer to the map below.
Choosing to take Husi and Magong is because they have:
1.
An airport and
a small airstrip, which would be very useful for the PLAAF to base their fighters, bombers, drones and support planes there to reduce the jumping distance from mainland China to Taiwan, plus providing a closer runway for any battle-damaged PLAAF planes operating in the southern half of Taiwan to conduct emergency landings on.
2.
A sizeable port, which would be useful for unloading PLAGF forces to rule the island under Chinese authorities without having to resort to Mulberry Harbour-style.
Mulberry Harbor used during the liberation of France in July 1944.
Meanwhile, due to its hilly terrain, the smaller islands to the north (Baisha) and west (Siyu) can be isolated and left to their own demise once ROC military installations on them are wiped out, assuming stubborn resistance from the people on those islands who refused to surrender. The Wangan and Cimei islands located further south can also be bypassed as well.
(中文翻译)
其实我打算用我之前的观点来进一步阐述。但由于你已经做出了回应，因此我只想把我的阐述作为我的回应的一部分。
福建沿海地区
位于台湾海峡的对岸，从逻辑上讲，这些地方显然会成为解放军陆军集结部队和装备、登上解放军海军的两栖攻击舰，然后直接驶向台湾的集结地。因此，福建海岸线上的这些
集结区就将成为台湾军方在战争一开始就
试图挫败解放军进军台湾的任何企图的
首要打击目标。
所以，我的想法是让解放军在这些沿海地区附近集结，但
不要太明显，以至于居住在福建海岸线上的人们可以马上知道将要发生什么。将部队的集结时间延长到数个月，并将其分散到足够大的范围，以便不引起台湾政府的警戒。
与其在开战前将解放军陆军部队和装备装上解放军海军的两栖攻击舰，不如在
开战后至少三天才开始让解放军陆军部队和装备登上解放军海军两栖攻击舰的过程。当然，这个过程必须
迅速。
如果是这样的话，那么在战争的头几天应该做什么？
那段时间应该是解放军火箭军、解放军空军和解放军海军对台湾进行
昼夜不停、密集、精确的导弹、空中和海上轰炸，
持续足够长的时间，然后
再派解放军陆军登陆台湾，在那里发起地面作战。解放军火箭军、解放军空军和解放军海军的关键目标是
尽快消灭尽可能多的台湾军方军事指挥中心、雷达站、通讯设施、防空和防海设施、仓库、油库、基地和机场，以减少解放军海军和解放军陆军的两栖攻击部队以后登陆台湾所面临的威胁和压力。
记得在1991年的海湾战争中，以美国为首的联军在向伊拉克派遣地面部队之前，
对伊拉克进行了
长达40多天的
轰炸。长时间的联军轰炸几乎摧毁了伊拉克军队的大部分指挥和控制、基础设施、防空设施、仓库和基地，使以美国为首的联军地面部队在短时间内扫荡了伊拉克共和国军队，在随后的2-3周内结束了伊拉克对科威特的占领和战争本身。
同时，解放军在
战争的第一天起就应该
实际管控的地方是
金门和马祖群岛，因为它们实际上就在中国大陆的门口。如果台湾当局在金门和马祖的军事力量仍然对中国大陆构成威胁，那么就没有办法绕过这些岛屿而直接攻打台湾。
基于金门和马祖离中国大陆多近也是必想而知得，所以这些岛上的居民也会知道当中国最终对台湾采取军事行动得时候应该怎么做。
事实上，在我看来，在战争的最初几天，解放军能够可靠地推进的最远的地方是
澎湖群岛。特别是较大的东岛（湖西和马公）。请参考下面的地图。
选择拿湖西和马公，是因为他们有：
1.
一个机场和一个
小型简易跑道，这对解放军空军来说非常有用。解放军空军可以让他们的战斗机、轰炸机、无人机和支援飞机驻扎在那里，以减少从中国大陆到台湾的跳跃距离。另外，那个机场还可以为在台湾南半部作战时任何战损的解放军飞机提供一个较近的跑道，以进行紧急降落。
2.
一个体积相当的港口，这将有助于解放军海军卸货，以便于中国当局管辖该岛，而不必采用桑树港式的方法。
1944年7月解放法国时使用的桑树港。
同时，由于其丘陵地形，北岛（白沙）和西岛（西屿）的小岛屿可以被孤立，一旦台湾军方在这些岛屿上的势力被消灭，就可以任其自生自灭，前提是这些岛屿上拒绝投降的人民的顽强抵抗。位于更南边的望安岛和七美岛同样也可以被绕过。
