"Please elaborate on this"
"Give me some numbers"
So, do you want to me literally give you the entire way in which I would expect the PLAAF and PLAN and PLARF to be deployed during a western pacific conflict arising from a PLA invasion of Taiwan, as well as the way in which USAF and USN forces would be deployed, and the forces PLAAF and PLARF forces the PLA would have to support a Korean War operation?
Do you also expect me to come up with the variety of plausible timings in which the various main players would conduct offensive and defensive actions, in addition to the above, and to justify all of them?
I can't do so to that level of detail, I don't have the time and I don't have the patience to do so (unless someone wants to pay me to do it, I suppose, and I'll be charging competitive rates).
But sure, I'll give you the cliffnotes version.
- I expect 3/4s of the PLAs tactical fighter force and their corresponding force multipliers (AEW&C, EW/ECM, ELINT/SIGINT) to be deployed to the Eastern and Southern Theater Commands and 80% of the PLA's bomber force deployed/operating in support of missions in those respective theaters and areas of responsibility. That leaves 1/3rd (at most) of the PLA's remaining tactical fighter force to complete the rest of its missions, including but not limited to -- supporting this idiotic Korean ground offensive, but also to keep a sufficient force in play to deter India on the western approach and conducting an air defense mission in central China.
- I expect 3/4s of the PLARF's SRBM force to have been deployed in support of a Taiwan contingency/invasion (that would have already occurred at this point), and virtually all of the PLARF's IRBM force deployed in support of strikes against US positions in the western pacific (Guam, but also air bases in Japan, and of course most importantly the AShBMs against US carriers).
- I expect the vast majority of the PLAN to be deployed in the Eastern and Southern Theaters in support of the overall western pacific conflict. A token force would remain in the North.
- I expect PLA IADS forces to be redeployed and frontloaded to areas in the Eastern and Southern Theaters as well as to protect Beijing.
- I expect a significant of portion of PLA amphibious capable units to have been redeployed at readiness to the Eastern Theater Command at inland staging locations to be in site for a potential Taiwan amphibious crossing that might occur at any time over the following months or year, pending the outcome of the initial stages of a western pacific conflict with the US.
So, based on all that, the remaining forces that the PLA have left in terms of PLAAF, PLARF, PLAN, IADS are the ones that they will have to support any sort of PLA ground force that they deploy to conduct an attack on the Korean peninsula, and this is keeping in mind that all of the above redeployments to the Eastern and Western Theater Commands will have taken up substantial capacity for China's internal transport network (even before we talk about any potential US strikes against China's transport infrastructure).
Of course, the PLA could certainly try to deploy more of the PLAAF and PLARF and IADS in support of a Korea operation -- but that means substantially weakening their ability to carry out operations in the much more important theater of the western pacific air-naval-missile conflict.
Frankly I am in awe that you are asking me to even elaborate on this.
Perhaps you should first state your position to let me know if I should even spend time on this -- with the PLA's current overall forces, how well do you think they would fare against the US in a western pacific air-naval-missile conflict to begin with, and based on that, how many air and missile forces do you think they would have to spare to support an offensive into Korea at the same time?
Look, if you are genuinely interested, let me give you my distilled position on this suggestion of "carrying out an offensive against Korea simultaneously as a western pacific conflict against the US is occurring for the purposes of trying to start a new front and carry out a war of attrition":
It is stupid, and would cause China to lose the war faster.
If my arguments and logic is worth anything to people who read my writing, then they would be able to take that conclusion and start to do some legwork and use some effort to understand how that conclusion is reached (it isn't difficult, and I've basically already explained the principles out to people repeatedly).
This entire discussion about a war of attrition can be settled if people just recognize that in general, the idea of the PLA waging a war of attrition against the US arising from a Taiwan invasion, with the forces the PLA has at its disposal, is complete and utter fantasy.
