These are all major assumptions and it doesn't take 30-40 years to build 8 CATOBAR CVs either.
US built 4x Forrestal and 4x Kitty Hawk class in 15 years during the Cold War with far lower share of global shipbuilding.
First Forrestal class launched 1952, followed by 3x more by 1958.
First Kitty Hawk class launched in 1961, followed by 3x more by 1967.
Neither were these disposable or temporary. Each of them lasted 40 years and the last Kitty Hawk class was only decommissioned in 2009.
If 003 proves successful in sea trials then we'll likely see 5x more 003s by 2035 if built 1 at a time (begin construction 2024, launches in 2026, 2028, 2030, 2032, 2034) and by 2030 if built 2 at a time (2x construction in 2024, launches in 2026-2027, 2x construction 2026, launches 2028-2029, 1x construction 2028, launches 2030).
Construction will likely be faster due to modular fabrication and less costly due to economies of scale with civilian shipping.
Again note how I used historical facts to support my argument rather than just toss out numbers.
Historical comparisons and examples are useful if correct assumptions are applied.
If questionable assumptions are applied, then historical comparisons and examples are dubious at best, and misleading at worst.
In this case, if the question is one of "how long will it take for the PLAN to have 8 CATOBAR carriers" -- well I certainly agree it probably won't take the PLAN 30-40 years to build that many carriers.
However, that doesn't mean we will necessarily see 5x more 003s by 2035 even if the first unit is successful, even if we use US construction schedules for Forrestal and Kitty Hawk class as examples.
Let's look at the assumptions:
1. Will the PLAN seek to build that many more 003s by 2035 even if the sea trials of the first unit are successful? Well, frankly at the moment we do not know what the PLAN's intentions for 003 are. At this stage, we know that they are pursuing nuclear powered super carriers as the "final form" of the carrier that they desire, and the nuclear carrier at the moment isn't expected to begin construction after the mid 2020s, if at that. So the question is would the PLAN buy more 003s after the first unit? Or will they consider that the nuclear powered carrier will end up being more capable and have more longevity and be willing to wait some years for their second CATOBAR carrier to be their first nuclear carrier instead, with no additional 003 hulls. At the moment the rumours are in flux.
2. The Forrestal and Kitty Hawk classes were built between two shipyards -- of course, it is reasonable to believe that both JN and DL will eventually be involved in carrier production at the same time, but the year in which both shipyards would start that is unknown.
Personally, I think there is a possibility of the PLAN having 8 CATOBAR carriers by 2035, but I don't think the likelihood is very high, unless we get clearer indications that the PLAN are intent on actually procuring additional 003 hulls.
However, I do think there is a very high possibility of having 8 CATOBAR carriers by the late 2030s (allowing for the PLAN pursuing additional 003 hulls, or the PLAN simply waiting for the nuclear carrier as the first mass produced CATOBAR carrier type), with the possibility of even having 10 CATOBAR carriers by the late 2030s being present.
Putting it another way, I can see the PLAN taking 20 oddd years to build 8-10 CATOBAR carriers in a reasonable manner.
I'm not sure how Blitzo arrives at a conclusion that the USA wins a conventional war of attrition when even the US war planners in multiple supercomputer simulations indicate them losing badly in all realistic scenarios and the one simulation where they gave themselves futuretech and stacked the odds in their favour the result was the PLA still taking half of Taiwan.
I'm aware of US simulations and the reporting that has gone on for them.
Those simulations tend to be different from the assumptions I make for a US war of attrition against China, namely:
1. US resolve is high and intact (i.e.: US resolve isn't simply melted away by the PLA sinking a couple of carriers and striking US airbases like Guam -- instead, I assume that US resolve massively hardens against China, and a rally around the flag effect occurs because China dared to have the audacity to sink US carriers and strike Guam, resulting in massive and enduring population hatred of China, from the grassroots level to the presidential level).
2. During the course of a multi-year war against China, the US is capable of shifting virtually all of its major military capabilities to the China theater (though not at the same time of course), by virtue of enlisting its major allies (mostly in Europe) to take up certain deterrence missions in Europe and the Middle East, and/or by simply accepting that the loss of military capability in certain regions is an acceptable loss for the westpac conflict against China.
My belief is that the only safe and reasonable manner in which future procurement planning should be conducted, is to assume that is the sort of threat/situation that the PLA would face, and to prepare accordingly.
If the balloon does one day go up and the US does not have that much resolve or that geopolitical ability to redeploy its global forces to the western pacific, then sure, the PLA will be able to roflstomp the conflict.
But if the balloon goes up and the US does indeed have that much resolve and the geopolitical ability to redeploy its global forces to westpac, then you'd be counting your lucky stars that you had the foresight to prepare for it.