PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

FriedButter

Colonel
Registered Member
I've said it before and I'll say it again. This is one of the most strategic technologies under development:
Off Topic but affordable plant based “meats” would be nice. Sadly, idk how many years it will take until they are competitive with regular meat. Especially in this type of inflation.
 

9dashline

Captain
Registered Member
Off Topic but affordable plant based “meats” would be nice. Sadly, idk how many years it will take until they are competitive with regular meat. Especially in this type of inflation.
Green barley is the solution...

At least its better than Soylent Green lol
 
  • Like
Reactions: SAC

OppositeDay

Senior Member
Registered Member
I think modern military industry supply chain is too complex thus too suspensible to kinetic/cyber disruption. What China enters the war with are probably all that will be available. For this reason I just don't buy the 2017-2018 timeline floated by so many supposed insiders. It's stupid to enter a potential great power war without first increasing one's military spending to above 3% for at least a decade. As long as China continues to only spend 1.7% or so of its GDP on military, the military option is not on the horizon.
 

FairAndUnbiased

Brigadier
Registered Member
Whoa, let's hold up there for a moment.

At the point of the war of attrition, in which the US would consider putting any substantial US personnel onto Taiwan, all of the below would have happened:
- 2-3 years of a generalized war of attrition between China and the US would have occurred, whereupon China would have essentially lost the capability to project any air and sea power to project over Taiwan in general
- PLA forces on Taiwan (which I generously and optimistically describe as a PLA group army that the PLA have managed to land before the US made its intervention into the conflict), would have had their sealift resupply crippled and most of their airlift resupply greatly hindered for the last year and a half, making their forces poorly supplied at best by the time a US invasion of Taiwan occurred.
- The US would have conducted at least 1 year of bombing of the PLA forces on Taiwan, which would reduce the PLA on Taiwan to essentially a force of light infantry without any meaningful AFV, artillery or air defenses, and with manpower significantly depleted as well.
- The US would have conducted airdrops of materiel to ROC insurgents and coordinated with them throughout all this, to enable them to designate PLA formations for airstrikes over the prior past year and also conducted harrassing attacks against the PLA, all of this in an island territory where the civilian population is at best distasteful of the PLA, and at worst actively hostile to the PLA.


Of a 40,000 strong Group Army that the PLA was able to deliver, I would be pleasantly surprised if half of the PLA's manpower and one fifth of the heavy equipment remained, by the time the US considered deploying boots on the ground onto Taiwan island.


To robustly defeat such a force, I imagine the US might require the equivalent of a US Marine Expeditionary Force if they were forced to fight the remaining PLA forces head on, unsupported.
However, the US would of course have air and sea control around the whole of Taiwan and able to provide air support with a handful of CSGs and a handful of LHD/LHAs (the latter as part of the amphibious assault fleet), and PLA forces on the island would be struck by ROC insurgents to coincide with any US military landings, and the PLA forces would essentially by now have been reduced to some 20,000+ light infantry lacking heavy fires support (and obviously no air cover at all).

Given that, I would be surprised if the US would need more than a US Marine Expeditionary Brigade in terms of landed manpower, which requires 5 LHD/As, 5 LPDs and 5 LSDs to deliver. With support of Afloat Forward Staging Bases and a couple of CSGs (and the regional air bases that the US has), I absolutely expect the US to be capable of defeating a moribund, harried, mostly light infantry force of some 20,000+ PLA light infantry on Taiwan.
I mentioned Iraq because it's a direct example of what the US can actually use after 6 months of buildup. It turns out it was essentially the entire US military's power projection capabilities in 1991.

We can look at Iraq in 2003 to see what it takes to beat an army with little heavy equipment or air power after 12 years of attrition against a country with zero ability to fight back... the answer is 300k in an invasion where they literally just drove through the border.

The US does not have the ability to inflict the equivalent losses to 12 years of attrition on Iraq, against the PLA.

Speaking of CBGs, here's a historical analysis of availability. Conclusion: only 7x will be available in the best of cases. This agrees with the 1/3 availability rule (1/3 deployed, 1/3 training or underway, 1/3 unavailable). See below.

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
: 5x Nimitz class (N), 1x Enterprise class (E), 4x Forrestal class (F), 4x Kitty Hawk class (K), 1x Midway class (M)

Between 1990 and 1991, all Essex class, 1x Midway class were decommissioned

It used 6 CBGs in 1991 against Iraq:

CVs: Midway (M), Saratoga (F), Ranger (F), America (K), JFK (K)
CVN: Theodore Roosevelt (N)

2 were pulled off prior to the Gulf War but were present for Desert Shield and on station for ~120 days

CV: Independence (F)
CVN: Dwight D Eisenhower (N)

6 others did not participate in the Gulf War:

CV: Kitty Hawk (K), Forrestal (F), Constellation (K)
CVN: Carl Vinson (N), Abraham Lincoln (N), Nimitz (N), Enterprise (E)

Of the CVs,
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
and was in pre-deployment training,
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
and only deployed 3 months afters conclusion of hostilitie.

Of the CVNs,
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
where the ship was cut open,
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
,
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
, and
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
.

So from this, we can see that at maximum, in a war of choice with all the time in the world to prepare, ~1/3 of all aircraft carriers are available. If you stretch it to an emergency, you'd have 9/15 (60%) available.

Today there are 10x Nimitz class and 2x Gerald Ford class.
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
. Of the Nimitz class,
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
at any one time. Another 2x are on restricted availability or short term (18 month) overhauls (Bush, Roosevelt)

In reality there are currently 6x Nimitz carriers available for deployment simultaneously (as of today: Nimitz, Lincoln, Truman, Reagan, Vinson, Eisenhower).

In a war of choice, with all the time in the world to gather forces and nobody shooting back for 6 months, you might get to concentrate 7x at once in a single theater.

In a sudden outbreak of a war, you might only have 4x in a single theater (Pacific fleet: Reagan, Vinson, Lincoln, Nimitz) with 3x in other theaters (Atlantic fleet: Truman, Eisenhower, Bush).

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
Conclusion: ~1.4x numerical advantage for 1:1 in quality wipes the numerically inferior force 100% while taking less than 30% losses.
 

Overbom

Brigadier
Registered Member
In a war of choice, with all the time in the world to gather forces and nobody shooting back for 6 months, you might get to concentrate 7x at once in a single theater.
I doubt the PLA would even allow the US to gather and concentrate its forces near China. The moment a certain threshold is passed I expect the PLA to make a preemptive first strike against the US military.

Why allow the enemy to gather forces and reach the peak of its military capability/capacity when you can cripple it halfway through.
 

FairAndUnbiased

Brigadier
Registered Member
seems to me @FairAndUnbiased is arguing for the fact that no war of attrition can occur which means no possibility of US Marines making landfall on TW to battle it out with a "well supplied" PLA force that's already occupying the island. @Bltizo is saying that in the case of US intervention a war of attrition MIGHT occur, and if it does, PLA with its current capabilities will be soundly defeated and thus the idea of somehow holding on to the island under this pretense is impossible.
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
The critical aspect is that one side has ASBMs and so can strike first when enemy ships are still concentrating towards (and have not yet concentrated at) a theater of operations. ASBMs can be moved under the dead of night and even if spotted during the day, can otherwise look like civilian trucking.

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
, the end result is that with a mere 200x missiles and even an abysmal 1% success rate against a CBG in general, you can sink 2x CBGs.

Now it was shown that none of the missiles missed out of 2 trials. What do you think the probability is that the actual success rate is just 1%?
 

FairAndUnbiased

Brigadier
Registered Member
I doubt the PLA would even allow the US to gather and concentrate its forces near China. The moment a certain threshold is passed I expect the PLA to make a preemptive first strike against the US military.

Why allow the enemy to gather forces and reach the peak of its military capability/capacity when you can cripple it halfway through.
Exactly this. If there was an enemy concentration of force occuring and an attack is imminent, the only acceptable strategy would be to defensively strike first to achieve initial concentration of force and establish momentum per Lanchester's Laws.
 

Phead128

Captain
Staff member
Moderator - World Affairs
US has learned from Afghanistan that you need a clear goal and exit strategy.

The only clear goal of US intervention to defend Taiwan is either a) defeat PLA and force PRC to sign an Unequal treaty relinquishing Taiwan a la Treaty of Shimonoseki, or b) conquest of China mainland by Taiwan-US combined forces.

Those two are virtually impossible, so it's better for US to not get involved in a quagmire which it will not win in long-term. China will eventually re-invade again and again at a time of it's own choosing, US can't park a zillion CATOBAR outside Taiwan until the end of time. So US will likely call Taiwan as a loss and crank out the 'China Bad' propaganda high, and blame Taiwan for its own cowardice and low-morale just like the Syrian Kurds, Afghanistan, and South Vietnamese.

Source: Chinese-American who can smell American bullshit from a mile away.
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
I mentioned Iraq because it's a direct example of what the US can actually use after 6 months of buildup. It turns out it was essentially the entire US military's power projection capabilities in 1991.

We can look at Iraq in 2003 to see what it takes to beat an army with little heavy equipment or air power after 12 years of attrition against a country with zero ability to fight back... the answer is 300k in an invasion where they literally just drove through the border.

The US does not have the ability to inflict the equivalent losses to 12 years of attrition on Iraq, against the PLA.

Speaking of CBGs, here's a historical analysis of availability. Conclusion: only 7x will be available in the best of cases. This agrees with the 1/3 availability rule (1/3 deployed, 1/3 training or underway, 1/3 unavailable). See below.



In a war of choice, with all the time in the world to gather forces and nobody shooting back for 6 months, you might get to concentrate 7x at once in a single theater.

In a sudden outbreak of a war, you might only have 4x in a single theater (Pacific fleet: Reagan, Vinson, Lincoln, Nimitz) with 3x in other theaters (Atlantic fleet: Truman, Eisenhower, Bush).

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
Conclusion: ~1.4x numerical advantage for 1:1 in quality wipes the numerically inferior force 100% while taking less than 30% losses.

Nowhere in my vision for how a war of attrition would go, does the US ever concentrate all of its carrier battlegroups or all of its naval or air forces in the western pacific at the same time.

I'm well aware of carrier deployment and availability cycles, thanks.
 
Top