PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

ZeEa5KPul said:

I've said it before and I'll say it again. This is one of the most strategic technologies under development:

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Just have the people drink green barley, its nutrient balanced, scalable, and much better for health than even fake meat...

For every ounce of Japanese A5 Wagyu beef that someone eats its the ecological and energy equalivent of many pounds of green barley powder...

Calorie per calorie the lower on the food topical pyramid the more effecient and less wasteful it is...

The world doesnt have a food supply problem it has a food composition problem. Everyone wants lobsters, steak, olysters, caviar, etc...

Just stop eating meat. Problem solved

Sub-thread:

The underlying assumption of this part of the larger discussion is that, with the exception of Taiwan, which may launch strikes against the Chinese mainland, combatants, except will not launch attacks within national territorial spaces, either land, air, or sea, but will constrain their combat actions to contested land, air, and sea spaces in a war of limited objectives. This assumption is based in two probabilities, i, e.:

1) that once national territorial spaces, anywhere, are violated, in any manner, that national territorial spaces, everywhere, are violable, in every manner.

2) that no nations involved, with the exception of Taiwan, are sufficiently invested in Taiwanese independence as to risk their economic sustainability, or even survival on a conflict conducted in order to achieve that outcome.

So, this being given, which weapon platforms and weapons systems, which procurement schedules, which deployment and employment strategies and tactics, which political, economic, and diplomatic overtures, and which timing of initiation, would you suggest that the PLA adopt in order to achieve success/victory in such a contingency?

I suspect that the key to this particular lock from a PLA perspective is large numbers of Type 095. With them the PLAN can blockade Japan and South Korea, and interdict any extra-regional US forces coming into theatre. They can also launch LACM strikes against CONUS. The mere threat of this may very well stop any US intervention.

There is a reason behind the vast new submarine factory at Huladao.

Maikeru said:

I suspect that the key to this particular lock from a PLA perspective is large numbers of Type 095. With them the PLAN can blockade Japan and South Korea, and interdict any extra-regional US forces coming into theatre. They can also launch LACM strikes against CONUS. The mere threat of this may very well stop any US intervention.

There is a reason behind the vast new submarine factory at Huladao.

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Also discusses Taiwan contingency.

james smith esq said:

Sub-thread:

Plan Strategy In A Taiwan Contingency Of A War Of Limited Objectives
​

The underlying assumption of this part of the larger discussion is that, with the exception of Taiwan, which may launch strikes against the Chinese mainland, combatants, except will not launch attacks within national territorial spaces, either land, air, or sea, but will constrain their combat actions to contested land, air, and sea spaces in a war of limited objectives. This assumption is based in two probabilities, i, e.:

1) that once national territorial spaces, anywhere, are violated, in any manner, that national territorial spaces, everywhere, are violable, in every manner.

2) that no nations involved, with the exception of Taiwan, are sufficiently invested in Taiwanese independence as to risk their economic sustainability, or even survival on a conflict conducted in order to achieve that outcome.

So, this being given, which weapon platforms and weapons systems, which procurement schedules, which deployment and employment strategies and tactics, which political, economic, and diplomatic overtures, and which timing of initiation, would you suggest that the PLA adopt in order to achieve success/victory in such a contingency?

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Agree with some of the points you raise here, and will cover these issues in a forthcoming briefing. China does have the ability to "strike" mainland U.S. in very damaging ways.

supersnoop said:

I still find this to be a weak point in the scenario which is why I bring up Afghanistan and Vietnam.

By your own calculation, the majority of the industrial infrastructure of PRC would remain (as you mentioned, it would only be likely to hit "key" facilities due to the difficulty of penetrating coastal air defense), so it would likely be able to rebuild certain capabilities at the end of this time frame (MLRS, drones, some missile forces).

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The "majority" of China's infrastructure would remain, but China's ability to produce complete weapons systems that are advanced in nature (warships, fighter jets, AEW&Cs, advanced UAVs, advanced missiles and air defenses) would be crippled because of the destruction of those key suppliers throughout the war of attrition.

They would only be able to continue producing some relatively simple weapons, maybe MLRS, simple drones, some SRBMs perhaps, and even those would be in reduced capacity.

supersnoop said:

US retaliation would grow increasingly difficult because over these years the low hanging fruits would have been picked clean.

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Not quite -- China's ability to defend itself at this point would be basically crippled. US retaliation could involve strikes against the remaining PLA military facilities, or against the remaining lower technology Chinese military factories still in operation.
Or they could start targeting Chinese civilian infrastructure in a punitive manner.

supersnoop said:

My own assumption as stated before is the number of proxies/allies/vassals involved (whatever label people prefer) will be limited for either economic self-interest (European countries, Australia, Canada) or self-preservation (South Korea, Japan)

This would leave the bulk of occupation duties to the US. If making Taiwan a nice place to live is not a priority, then you will not find locals to help. Again, look to Afghanistan, despite some efforts to improve the country, it was still hard to find willing recruits. When you layer the fatigue of 5 years of war on top of economic hardship, additional threats to safety, and the fact that many Taiwanese have the means to decamp to the US or elsewhere (even mainland China, lol), it makes this even more difficult. If the PRC offers favourable terms (self-government, own military, no US bases), and the US refuses based on its strategic prism, how could the US sustain (or want to shoulder the cost of) putting down widespread protests?

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Alternatively, what if China is able to inflict sufficient casualties to the US during this conflict to cause the US populace to demand blood and near complete capitulation from China, and cause US resolve to be significant enough to demand immensely geopolitically and geoeconomically crippling terms of surrender on China?

Do we really want to bet PLA strategy and future procurement on the hopes that the population and government of the US and its allies would have a resolve that gives the PLA breathing room, or do we want to base PLA strategy and future procurement on the assumption that opfor resolve remains robust and intact and that destruction of opfor material capability to wage war is the only reliable basis for planning?

FairAndUnbiased said:

so I'd just like to provide some facts, again backed with citations.

the nearest base to Taiwan is Okinawa, 600 km from Taipei. The next closest US base is Osan AFB and Kunsan AFB in South Korea, about 1400 km from Taipei. There are no other major airbases within 1500 km (about the maximum unrefueled distance for heavy US tactical air i.e. F15s and F22s).

There has never, ever been an amphibious invasion carried out across such a long distance, and in such a situation even a few remaining diesel-electric subs can cripple the fleet, especially given the high noise levels of a large amphib group.

They'll need air cover. Operating radius of typical tactical air platforms capable of ground support (F-16, F-35) is ~700 km. They won't have battlefield persistance.

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with 2x F-15C/D fighter squadrons (44th and 67th) which is roughly 20x combat planes each + their supporting E-3s, tankers and recon. In a surge scenario maybe it can support 50% extra planes. So 60x combat planes total in a surge scenario.

That's not that much. Compared to Desert Storm:

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Everything is within 1000 km.

USN contribution was 5x carriers (CVs: Midway, Saratoga, Ranger, America, JFK) (CVN: Theodore Roosevelt).

This represented almost all entire available carriers in early 1991. CV Independence and CVN Dwight D Eisenhower were cycled out due to crew fatigue and repair requirements.

and how many troops can USN land at once? total inventory right now is

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and

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. They can retake Taiwan with 18k troops in the best of cases?

In comparison, for Desert Storm the US had 700k troops against an enemy that was utterly outclassed in every way and had their air defense collapse day 1, and was in a flat desert.

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I'm just providing a comparison of what forces were actually available to fight Iraq in Desert Storm and how they were distributed across airbases and carrier groups.

Note that the buildup for Desert Storm took 6 months (August 1990-January 1991). Also note that Iraq had no offensive capability whatsoever, had a GDP 1/50th that of the US, a population 1/15th that of the US, had technology 30 years behind, etc and that's what it took.

This was at the peak of US power.

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Whoa, let's hold up there for a moment.

At the point of the war of attrition, in which the US would consider putting any substantial US personnel onto Taiwan, all of the below would have happened:
- 2-3 years of a generalized war of attrition between China and the US would have occurred, whereupon China would have essentially lost the capability to project any air and sea power to project over Taiwan in general
- PLA forces on Taiwan (which I generously and optimistically describe as a PLA group army that the PLA have managed to land before the US made its intervention into the conflict), would have had their sealift resupply crippled and most of their airlift resupply greatly hindered for the last year and a half, making their forces poorly supplied at best by the time a US invasion of Taiwan occurred.
- The US would have conducted at least 1 year of bombing of the PLA forces on Taiwan, which would reduce the PLA on Taiwan to essentially a force of light infantry without any meaningful AFV, artillery or air defenses, and with manpower significantly depleted as well.
- The US would have conducted airdrops of materiel to ROC insurgents and coordinated with them throughout all this, to enable them to designate PLA formations for airstrikes over the prior past year and also conducted harrassing attacks against the PLA, all of this in an island territory where the civilian population is at best distasteful of the PLA, and at worst actively hostile to the PLA.


Of a 40,000 strong Group Army that the PLA was able to deliver, I would be pleasantly surprised if half of the PLA's manpower and one fifth of the heavy equipment remained, by the time the US considered deploying boots on the ground onto Taiwan island.


To robustly defeat such a force, I imagine the US might require the equivalent of a US Marine Expeditionary Force if they were forced to fight the remaining PLA forces head on, unsupported.
However, the US would of course have air and sea control around the whole of Taiwan and able to provide air support with a handful of CSGs and a handful of LHD/LHAs (the latter as part of the amphibious assault fleet), and PLA forces on the island would be struck by ROC insurgents to coincide with any US military landings, and the PLA forces would essentially by now have been reduced to some 20,000+ light infantry lacking heavy fires support (and obviously no air cover at all).

Given that, I would be surprised if the US would need more than a US Marine Expeditionary Brigade in terms of landed manpower, which requires 5 LHD/As, 5 LPDs and 5 LSDs to deliver. With support of Afloat Forward Staging Bases and a couple of CSGs (and the regional air bases that the US has), I absolutely expect the US to be capable of defeating a moribund, harried, mostly light infantry force of some 20,000+ PLA light infantry on Taiwan.

james smith esq said:

Sub-thread:

Plan Strategy In A Taiwan Contingency Of A War Of Limited Objectives
​

The underlying assumption of this part of the larger discussion is that, with the exception of Taiwan, which may launch strikes against the Chinese mainland, combatants, except will not launch attacks within national territorial spaces, either land, air, or sea, but will constrain their combat actions to contested land, air, and sea spaces in a war of limited objectives. This assumption is based in two probabilities, i, e.:

1) that once national territorial spaces, anywhere, are violated, in any manner, that national territorial spaces, everywhere, are violable, in every manner.

2) that no nations involved, with the exception of Taiwan, are sufficiently invested in Taiwanese independence as to risk their economic sustainability, or even survival on a conflict conducted in order to achieve that outcome.

So, this being given, which weapon platforms and weapons systems, which procurement schedules, which deployment and employment strategies and tactics, which political, economic, and diplomatic overtures, and which timing of initiation, would you suggest that the PLA adopt in order to achieve success/victory in such a contingency?

Click to expand...

So I'm not against the conclusion about the war of attrition, but I don't think it could happen. The Americans can delay the rebuilding of this island by implementing a scorched earth policy on Taiwan, because in their opinion the ownership of the island is still in dispute, but is almost impossible to attack mainland, and any attack on each other could be considered a nuclear attack.

seems to me @FairAndUnbiased is arguing for the fact that no war of attrition can occur which means no possibility of US Marines making landfall on TW to battle it out with a "well supplied" PLA force that's already occupying the island. @Bltizo is saying that in the case of US intervention a war of attrition MIGHT occur, and if it does, PLA with its current capabilities will be soundly defeated and thus the idea of somehow holding on to the island under this pretense is impossible.

uinahime.chifune said:

So I'm not against the conclusion about the war of attrition, but I don't think it could happen. The Americans can delay the rebuilding of this island by implementing a scorched earth policy on Taiwan, because in their opinion the ownership of the island is still in dispute, but is almost impossible to attack mainland, and any attack on each other could be considered a nuclear attack.

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well, if the US intervenes too late, meaning PLA has already established a permanent presence on the island with continuous uninterrupted supply and support from the mainland, then attacking the island without first getting rid of the active PLAN and PLAAF forces in the entire westpac region would be very difficult i believe.

and once the CCP decides TW's reunification has been "successful", wouldn't any attack on the island itself be treated the same as an attack directly towards the mainland, or PRC as a whole? the US opinion of dispute wouldn't matter since CCP will treat any bombing of a unified TW as a direct attack on homeland soil, and this could escalate to nuclear exchange.