PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

Phead128 · Feb 13, 2022

I don't think US will intervene in Taiwan.

One point is that US refuses to sell Taiwan any 5th gen F-35s jets like it does with NATO/Israel/Korea/Japan/Aus/NZ because:

Taiwan is infested with Chinese espionage and spies, therefore untrustworthy or unreliable.
High risk of defection of F-35s to mainland China, therefore untrustworthy or unreliable.
High risk of F-35's falling into PLAAF hands after inevitable Taiwan Conquest, therefore a lost cause.

Either way, it doesn't seem like US really cares about defense of Taiwan, much less desire to sacrifice American servicemen blood for Taiwan, if it treats Taiwan like some ugly child (e.g. not a "real" ally)

US politicians may pay lip service to democracy, but their actions (refusal to sell 5th gen F-35s) speaks louder than words, esp. as China has not only J-20s but soon J-35s, and balance of airpower is overwhelming. The F-16V new/upgrade is only after China demonstrated AESA tech, so there is no "lost tech" there for Chinese to spy/acquire after conquest. So Taiwan only gets old tech, never newest.

Blitzo · Feb 13, 2022

supersnoop said:
lol, ok, I’m not trying to goad you here, so please excuse me. You know I left the attrition scenario alone once we fully fleshed out the assumptions.

A few posts (pages?) ago you mentioned that due to the strategic importance of Taiwan that the US would likely be compelled to “liberate” the island even if the government capitulated (and abandoned) and defence forces collapsed within weeks. I agree that such an impetus would exist, but how would it be accomplished?

To me, if most active resistance on the island has been neutralized, the problems that the PLA would have had in air and sea control now fall onto US forces.

Even if supply lines from the mainland to the island are not totally secure, how do you dislodge them? I imagine a US amphibious landing is a bigger ask than a PLA one.

Again, one of the assumptions is Taiwan declared independence unilaterally. Also, there exists enough security forces (either from PRC or collaborators) to maintain overall control.

I'm not sure I fully understand your question.

Active organized ROC military resistance would have been neutralized, and the PLA have successfully landed, let's say, a group army's worth of forces on the island to carry out continuous pacification/peacekeeping operations against sporadic resistance.

In a war of attrition, the PLA would naturally have its air and sea power destroyed in a gradual manner -- but sealift and airlift between the mainland and Taiwan island would be much more vulnerable than the rest of the PLA's combat forces, and those would be significantly crippled in relatively short order such that only a small line of resupply would exist before being wholly cut off later on.

In terms of US strategy, I expect the US to be capable of dislodging the PLA from Taiwan by a seizing air and sea control around the island (as part of a natural path of a war of attrition that we've described) while simultaneously crippling PLA capability to resupply their landed forces on the island.
That, in turn means PLA forces on the island would be subject to US bombing campaigns over the course of multiple months (due to the lack of any PLA air cover over the island to defend them, compounded and worsened by a barebones logistics resupply from the mainland).
After about a year or so of such bombardment of PLA forces on Taiwan, combined with the massively attrited/degraded PLA air and naval forces unable to project air and sea power around Taiwan, the US would either call for PLA forces on the island to surrender, or supply ROC insurgency groups on Taiwan with weapons to fight PLA forces, or land a small amount of their own troops onto Taiwan to fully defeat any remaining PLA forces, or a combination thereof, all without the PLAAF and PLAN able to bring up any resistance to prevent that from happening.

Keep in mind this is all in context of a multi-year long war of attrition, perhaps lasting a total of 4-5 years, beginning with the current forces that each side has today.
2-3 years into such a war of attrition, I think it would be very optimistic if the PLA were capable of projecting air and sea power around Taiwan, which is when any prospective US counter-landing would occur (after a year or so of bombing of PLA positions on Taiwan).

The principles of the US dislodging of the PLA is basically simplicity in itself:
- Seizing air and sea control around the island to allow them to have capability to conduct strikes against the PLA on the island, and also choking PLA logistics lines
- After sufficient degradation of PLA forces, support local proxies/insurgency groups and/or land elements of their own forces (which again, the PLA at this point would be unable to deny due to exhausted air force, navy and missile forces from the preceding massive war of attrition), or simply outright call for PLA surrender on the island

emblem21 · Feb 14, 2022

Bltizo said:
I'm not sure I fully understand your question.

Active organized ROC military resistance would have been neutralized, and the PLA have successfully landed, let's say, a group army's worth of forces on the island to carry out continuous pacification/peacekeeping operations against sporadic resistance.

In a war of attrition, the PLA would naturally have its air and sea power destroyed in a gradual manner -- but sealift and airlift between the mainland and Taiwan island would be much more vulnerable than the rest of the PLA's combat forces, and those would be significantly crippled in relatively short order such that only a small line of resupply would exist before being wholly cut off later on.

In terms of US strategy, I expect the US to be capable of dislodging the PLA from Taiwan by a seizing air and sea control around the island (as part of a natural path of a war of attrition that we've described) while simultaneously crippling PLA capability to resupply their landed forces on the island.
That, in turn means PLA forces on the island would be subject to US bombing campaigns over the course of multiple months (due to the lack of any PLA air cover over the island to defend them, compounded and worsened by a barebones logistics resupply from the mainland).
After about a year or so of such bombardment of PLA forces on Taiwan, combined with the massively attrited/degraded PLA air and naval forces unable to project air and sea power around Taiwan, the US would either call for PLA forces on the island to surrender, or supply ROC insurgency groups on Taiwan with weapons to fight PLA forces, or land a small amount of their own troops onto Taiwan to fully defeat any remaining PLA forces, or a combination thereof, all without the PLAAF and PLAN able to bring up any resistance to prevent that from happening.

Keep in mind this is all in context of a multi-year long war of attrition, perhaps lasting a total of 4-5 years, beginning with the current forces that each side has today.
2-3 years into such a war of attrition, I think it would be very optimistic if the PLA were capable of projecting air and sea power around Taiwan, which is when any prospective US counter-landing would occur (after a year or so of bombing of PLA positions on Taiwan).

The principles of the US dislodging of the PLA is basically simplicity in itself:
- Seizing air and sea control around the island to allow them to have capability to conduct strikes against the PLA on the island, and also choking PLA logistics lines
- After sufficient degradation of PLA forces, support local proxies/insurgency groups and/or land elements of their own forces (which again, the PLA at this point would be unable to deny due to exhausted air force, navy and missile forces from the preceding massive war of attrition), or simply outright call for PLA surrender on the island

This advantage you speak of is if the USA can use its full capabilities against China and not be hampered by all the issues the nation currently has to deal with right now.

supersnoop · Feb 14, 2022

Bltizo said:
I'm not sure I fully understand your question.

Active organized ROC military resistance would have been neutralized, and the PLA have successfully landed, let's say, a group army's worth of forces on the island to carry out continuous pacification/peacekeeping operations against sporadic resistance.

In a war of attrition, the PLA would naturally have its air and sea power destroyed in a gradual manner -- but sealift and airlift between the mainland and Taiwan island would be much more vulnerable than the rest of the PLA's combat forces, and those would be significantly crippled in relatively short order such that only a small line of resupply would exist before being wholly cut off later on.

In terms of US strategy, I expect the US to be capable of dislodging the PLA from Taiwan by a seizing air and sea control around the island (as part of a natural path of a war of attrition that we've described) while simultaneously crippling PLA capability to resupply their landed forces on the island.
That, in turn means PLA forces on the island would be subject to US bombing campaigns over the course of multiple months (due to the lack of any PLA air cover over the island to defend them, compounded and worsened by a barebones logistics resupply from the mainland).
After about a year or so of such bombardment of PLA forces on Taiwan, combined with the massively attrited/degraded PLA air and naval forces unable to project air and sea power around Taiwan, the US would either call for PLA forces on the island to surrender, or supply ROC insurgency groups on Taiwan with weapons to fight PLA forces, or land a small amount of their own troops onto Taiwan to fully defeat any remaining PLA forces, or a combination thereof, all without the PLAAF and PLAN able to bring up any resistance to prevent that from happening.

Keep in mind this is all in context of a multi-year long war of attrition, perhaps lasting a total of 4-5 years, beginning with the current forces that each side has today.
2-3 years into such a war of attrition, I think it would be very optimistic if the PLA were capable of projecting air and sea power around Taiwan, which is when any prospective US counter-landing would occur (after a year or so of bombing of PLA positions on Taiwan).

The principles of the US dislodging of the PLA is basically simplicity in itself:
- Seizing air and sea control around the island to allow them to have capability to conduct strikes against the PLA on the island, and also choking PLA logistics lines
- After sufficient degradation of PLA forces, support local proxies/insurgency groups and/or land elements of their own forces (which again, the PLA at this point would be unable to deny due to exhausted air force, navy and missile forces from the preceding massive war of attrition), or simply outright call for PLA surrender on the island

You answered it just fine even if you didn’t fully understand.

I think there is one major hole in your calculation though. Even assuming that the conflict managed to stay limited (not drawing in North Korea, Russia, etc.), such a war of attrition would have also devastated US pacific forces manpower. Even if PLA retreats, how would you hold on to Taiwan? It would be an economic shell, US itself would have a recession, and US forces would constantly be in danger.

In a best case scenario for the US in this case is a return to some kind of detente like Korea, but the force disparity would be more like Afghanistan or South Vietnam.

Blitzo · Feb 14, 2022

supersnoop said:
You answered it just fine even if you didn’t fully understand.

I think there is one major hole in your calculation though. Even assuming that the conflict managed to stay limited (not drawing in North Korea, Russia, etc.), such a war of attrition would have also devastated US pacific forces manpower. Even if PLA retreats, how would you hold on to Taiwan? It would be an economic shell, US itself would have a recession, and US forces would constantly be in danger.

In a best case scenario for the US in this case is a return to some kind of detente like Korea, but the force disparity would be more like Afghanistan or South Vietnam.

The ability of the US to "hold onto" Taiwan would be achieved simply because China wouldn't have sufficient air and sea power left to try to retake Taiwan again (especially given US would have based forces on Taiwan itself by this point). The US won't need an "occupation force" on the ground on Taiwan (as the remnants of the ROC military would be recruited for that cause, led by US supported proxies), just a few supportive air bases to continue to ensure US air and sea control around Taiwan (of course supported by US carriers and air bases in the region).
The only way China could plausibly respond it by launching mainland based missile strikes on US positions on Taiwan would of course result in retaliatory US strikes against the Chinese mainland, (on top of the US strikes against Chinese bases, C4I centers, IADS, and the strikes against key elements of China's military production ecosystem, which would've already occurred at this point).

US forces would of course be attrited down and exhausted, but the PLA's air, naval and missile forces would be near a state of collapse (i.e.: tying back to the "China would be the losing side in a war of attrition" thing that forms the first premise of my argument).

Also, frankly, from the pov of the US, the importance of making Taiwan a nice place to live probably wouldn't be very high on its priority, and instead would merely be one one of the objectives as part of its war of attrition against China.

emblem21 · Feb 14, 2022

Bltizo said:
US forces would of course be attrited down and exhausted, but the PLA's air, naval and missile forces would be near a state of collapse (i.e.: tying back to the "China would be the losing side in a war of attrition" thing that forms the first premise of my argument).

Bltizo said:
Also, frankly, from the pov of the US, the importance of making Taiwan a nice place to live probably wouldn't be very high on its priority, and instead would merely be one one of the objectives as part of its war of attrition against China.

you are making an assumption that the USA has limitless resources to be able to guard Taiwan without any difficulty since you are assuming that the USA has enough resources to be able to hold Taiwan when they already have Russia and Iran and soon other nations that has no wish to remain under the York of the USA forever. If Biden fails to cowe Putin into submission, you can kiss whatever fantasies of the USA being able to defeat China on their own doorstep goodbye forever because how can the the USA, a so called super power fail to defeat China twice before have the hopes of doing so now when China not only has an ally in Russia and their weapons are much more up to par then before but also that the US economy is on the verge of collapse and the supply chains are falling apart. If the infrastructure of the USA breaks down and the citizens are left without the daily necessities to survive, Biden will be in the very same situation as the Canadian president and then we will see if Biden has what it takes to handle two-three wars externally and another on internally
The next 2 months will be critical to see if the situation in Ukraine is going to improve or go from bad to worse.

Blitzo · Feb 14, 2022

emblem21 said:
you are making an assumption that the USA has limitless resources to be able to guard Taiwan without any difficulty since you are assuming that the USA has enough resources to be able to hold Taiwan when they already have Russia and Iran and soon other nations that has no wish to remain under the York of the USA forever. If Biden fails to cowe Putin into submission, you can kiss whatever fantasies of the USA being able to defeat China on their own doorstep goodbye forever because how can the the USA, a so called super power fail to defeat China twice before have the hopes of doing so now when China not only has an ally in Russia and their weapons are much more up to par then before but also that the US economy is on the verge of collapse and the supply chains are falling apart. If the infrastructure of the USA breaks down and the citizens are left without the daily necessities to survive, Biden will be in the very same situation as the Canadian president and then we will see if Biden has what it takes to handle two-three wars externally and another on internally
The next 2 months will be critical to see if the situation in Ukraine is going to improve or go from bad to worse.

This does indeed rest on the assumption that during a war of attrition against China the US (over the course of the conflict) is able to dedicate its entire global military to the western pacific (obviously not all at the same time).
This in turn will have the expectation that its allies in Europe will rally around the flag, and either be capable of deterring Russia from making any excessive moves against NATO, or that any such moves which Russia is able to make in Europe will be deemed more than fair exchanges for the chance to cripple China's capability to compete with the US in a geopolitical manner, for multiple decades after such a conflict.

However, I think that is a very reasonable assumption -- if not a prudent and necessary assumption -- to make if you are trying to plan this out from the perspective of national leaders to try and consider what scale of procurement is needed, to achieve future geopolitical goals.

I believe that the likelihood of the US finding a geopolitical method to (over time) redeploy all of its forces to the western pacific in event of a high intensity war of attrition against China, is sufficiently high, such that any responsible procurement and strategic planning that is envisioned, must require the PLA to have either the material capability or the strategic plans, to be capable of meeting such a force at every rung in the ladder of escalation.
The alternative means that the validity and success of one's own procurement and strategic planning is dependent on the opponent being incompetent or making an unforced error.

FairAndUnbiased · Feb 14, 2022

Bltizo said:
In terms of US strategy, I expect the US to be capable of dislodging the PLA from Taiwan by a seizing air and sea control around the island (as part of a natural path of a war of attrition that we've described) while simultaneously crippling PLA capability to resupply their landed forces on the island.
That, in turn means PLA forces on the island would be subject to US bombing campaigns over the course of multiple months (due to the lack of any PLA air cover over the island to defend them, compounded and worsened by a barebones logistics resupply from the mainland).
After about a year or so of such bombardment of PLA forces on Taiwan, combined with the massively attrited/degraded PLA air and naval forces unable to project air and sea power around Taiwan, the US would either call for PLA forces on the island to surrender, or supply ROC insurgency groups on Taiwan with weapons to fight PLA forces, or land a small amount of their own troops onto Taiwan to fully defeat any remaining PLA forces, or a combination thereof, all without the PLAAF and PLAN able to bring up any resistance to prevent that from happening.

Keep in mind this is all in context of a multi-year long war of attrition, perhaps lasting a total of 4-5 years, beginning with the current forces that each side has today.
2-3 years into such a war of attrition, I think it would be very optimistic if the PLA were capable of projecting air and sea power around Taiwan, which is when any prospective US counter-landing would occur (after a year or so of bombing of PLA positions on Taiwan).

so I'd just like to provide some facts, again backed with citations.

the nearest base to Taiwan is Okinawa, 600 km from Taipei. The next closest US base is Osan AFB and Kunsan AFB in South Korea, about 1400 km from Taipei. There are no other major airbases within 1500 km (about the maximum unrefueled distance for heavy US tactical air i.e. F15s and F22s).

There has never, ever been an amphibious invasion carried out across such a long distance, and in such a situation even a few remaining diesel-electric subs can cripple the fleet, especially given the high noise levels of a large amphib group.

They'll need air cover. Operating radius of typical tactical air platforms capable of ground support (F-16, F-35) is ~700 km. They won't have battlefield persistance.

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with 2x F-15C/D fighter squadrons (44th and 67th) which is roughly 20x combat planes each + their supporting E-3s, tankers and recon. In a surge scenario maybe it can support 50% extra planes. So 60x combat planes total in a surge scenario.

That's not that much. Compared to Desert Storm:

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Everything is within 1000 km.

USN contribution was 5x carriers (CVs: Midway, Saratoga, Ranger, America, JFK) (CVN: Theodore Roosevelt).

This represented almost all entire available carriers in early 1991. CV Independence and CVN Dwight D Eisenhower were cycled out due to crew fatigue and repair requirements.

and how many troops can USN land at once? total inventory right now is

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and

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. They can retake Taiwan with 18k troops in the best of cases?

In comparison, for Desert Storm the US had 700k troops against an enemy that was utterly outclassed in every way and had their air defense collapse day 1, and was in a flat desert.

-------------------

I'm just providing a comparison of what forces were actually available to fight Iraq in Desert Storm and how they were distributed across airbases and carrier groups.

Note that the buildup for Desert Storm took 6 months (August 1990-January 1991). Also note that Iraq had no offensive capability whatsoever, had a GDP 1/50th that of the US, a population 1/15th that of the US, had technology 30 years behind, etc and that's what it took.

This was at the peak of US power.

FairAndUnbiased · Feb 14, 2022

delete

kkwan18 · Feb 14, 2022

FairAndUnbiased said:
so I'd just like to provide some facts, again backed with citations.

the nearest base to Taiwan is Okinawa, 600 km from Taipei. The next closest US base is Osan AFB and Kunsan AFB in South Korea, about 1400 km from Taipei. There are no other major airbases within 1500 km (about the maximum unrefueled distance for heavy US tactical air i.e. F15s and F22s).

There has never, ever been an amphibious invasion carried out across such a long distance, and in such a situation even a few remaining diesel-electric subs can cripple the fleet, especially given the high noise levels of a large amphib group.

They'll need air cover. Operating radius of typical tactical air platforms capable of ground support (F-16, F-35) is ~700 km. They won't have battlefield persistance.
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
,
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
with 2x F-15C/D fighter squadrons (44th and 67th) which is roughly 20x combat planes each + their supporting E-3s, tankers and recon. In a surge scenario maybe it can support 50% extra planes. So 60x combat planes total in a surge scenario.

That's not that much. Compared to Desert Storm:
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
Everything is within 1000 km.

USN contribution was 5x carriers (CVs: Midway, Saratoga, Ranger, America, JFK) (CVN: Theodore Roosevelt).

This represented almost all entire available carriers in early 1991. CV Independence and CVN Dwight D Eisenhower were cycled out due to crew fatigue and repair requirements.

and how many troops can USN land at once? total inventory right now is
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
,
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
and
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
. They can retake Taiwan with 18k troops in the best of cases?

In comparison, for Desert Storm the US had 700k troops against an enemy that was utterly outclassed in every way and had their air defense collapse day 1, and was in a flat desert.

-------------------

I'm just providing a comparison of what forces were actually available to fight Iraq in Desert Storm and how they were distributed across airbases and carrier groups.

Note that the buildup for Desert Storm took 6 months (August 1990-January 1991). Also note that Iraq had no offensive capability whatsoever, had a GDP 1/50th that of the US, a population 1/15th that of the US, had technology 30 years behind, etc and that's what it took.

This was at the peak of US power.

That is only against Iraq.

PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

Phead128

Captain

Blitzo

Lieutenant General

emblem21

Major

supersnoop

Major

Blitzo

Lieutenant General

emblem21

Major

Blitzo

Lieutenant General

FairAndUnbiased

Brigadier

FairAndUnbiased

Brigadier

kkwan18

New Member