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I believe there is an inconsistency in his interpretation of the PLA. China, in 2004, informed in its document that the Air, Naval and Missile Forces would receive greater attention and priority compared to the Land Force, which is historically more powerful. The same document, in the edition published in 2015, insisted on changing the focus from land, giving greater prominence to the maritime domain. He also highlighted the predominance of information and the importance of winning computerized local wars, with precise attacks and joint operations.
In the Science of Chinese Military Strategy, released in 2013, the most prominent themes were integration of space, cyberspace and electronic warfare. Wars would be small, low-intensity and irregular. In 2020, during the Plenary of the Chinese Communist Party, China announced new milestones for modernization. The first of them, in 2027, when it is expected to be operating in a network, in a system of intelligible wars. To this end, the aim is, until then, to accelerate the integration of mechanization with computerization and intelligence, while at the same time seeking to boost the modernization of doctrine, organizations and war equipment. By 2035, the aim is to complete the modernization of doctrine, organizational structure, military personnel, weapons and equipment; this is “basically” completing the modernization. The final milestone, in 2049, is when the transformation will be complete and the People's Liberation Army will have become a world-class force.
Strategic Planning and Project Power Models. In the last decade, Chinese force designs included joint structures. In China, in 2015, the Joint Logistics Support Force was created, with the purpose of promoting better integration of logistical support and the Strategic Support Force, which fulfills the tasks of early warning, satellite management and Defense in electromagnetic and cybernetic domains. In China, the system of military regions was replaced by five theaters of operation. The theaters were spatially delimited based on threat perceptions.
In China, the importance attributed to centralizing bodies in its reform process is shared, albeit in different ways. In China, with the main purpose of preventing cases of corruption and reinforcing discipline and values, the Central Military Commission is responsible for operating the theaters, gathering information from departments, commissions and offices and, fundamentally, being at the forefront of the processes of supervision, audit and inspection.
The concern with being at the forefront of the technological race and, at the same time, encouraging the production of the national defense industry is shared by China. In China, in 2016, a rethinking of military education was announced with a focus on areas such as: computer science; information Technology; and aerospace studies, with emphasis on this new organization being the National Defense University and the National Defense Technology University. Furthermore, the Science and Technology Commission was established, responsible for military coordination with civilian specialists trained in critical technological areas. The Equipment Development Department was also created, responsible for inspecting the development of tools and boosting research. Regarding the technologies to be used in the war of the future, there is a greater effort to develop capabilities in the space and air domains.
Here we will form a summary table of the reforms and thoughts:
Background: White Paper 2004/2015.
Force planning methodology: Network Centered Warfare 2027, Basic Modernization 2035 and Complete Transformation 2049.
Organization: Joint Logistics Support Force, Rocket Force, Strategic Support Force (now broken up into three separate branches), and Five Command Theaters.
Innovation: Technological Education, Department of Equipment Development, Cybernetics and Missiles.
The first aspect that can be inferred from the in-depth study of China concerns the importance, both domestically and internationally, of adopting good practices in Defense management and planning. Therefore, carry out a clear identification of objectives, vulnerabilities, risks, threats and potential; synergistically align objectives, strategy and doctrine, also weighing the technologies and organizations necessary to achieve the intended objectives; maintain a periodicity in the publication of documents and the periodization of planning, with the establishment of goals, indicators and the presentation of the budget; create auditing mechanisms and make efforts towards fruitful accountability; and adhere to transparency practices in order to avoid corruption. These aspects are essential for fruitful Defense planning and the definition of the country's strategic interests. In this sense, it is specifically suggested to add subjects to the curriculum of military schools that focus on good practices in governance and defense management.
The second aspect revealed through the study of the cases concerns the role of innovative thinking in the future planning of the Force. Innovation in the Defense sector has as some of its objectives the search for greater efficiency, the creation of specific competencies and the achievement of advantages over opponents. Innovation is a driver of change, whether in combat weapons, in the way of fighting or in operational concepts. In this sense, an organizational culture permeable to innovation, with values that encourage learning, experimentation and an entrepreneurial spirit drive new products and processes. In view of this, it is recommended the creation of innovation environments, that is, favorable spaces in which joint and multifunctional teams come together to deal with innovation dilemmas, facilitating a fruitful dialogue between researchers, technologists and officials, in which solutions are presented. technologically viable and operationally effective and that, ultimately, seek to achieve the objectives outlined in defense policy.
The third point that appears in the analysis is related to the joint action of the Forces. The integration of the combat skills of each of the Forces is essential for operating in the future war environment. To this end, a top-down orientation, whose decisions are taken by the high level of the Ministry of Defense, in line with the Joint General Staff of the Armed Forces, and followed by the other members of the Forces, is a prerequisite for doctrinal standardization, providing greater operational efficiency. Therefore, it is suggested that these bodies prepare a document in which the future strategic conception of the Forces is articulated.
In this process, it is important that possible divergences between the armed branches are resolved and singular perspectives are transcended, in favor of sharing common values and objectives. Strengthening a strategic culture that prioritizes interoperability requires effective measures in the areas of education and training, in order to create a true “joint spirit” and harmony between all members of the Forces. From this perspective, simulations help to improve planning and coordination at the strategic and operational levels, in the same way that the provision of training and programs qualifies military personnel to operate together.
Finally, the key element for the success of a modernization/transformation process with a view to adopting a new force model consists of effective and continuous strategic communication, in which both civil society and military institutions are aware of the phases to be covered, objectives to be achieved and resources to be committed. So that the sharing of information and data, at appropriate times, provides the credibility and trust necessary for the continuity of actions.
If I had to define in a few words the PLA's future strength is a centralized but very specialized force and all the PLA's reforms lead me to believe in this strategic approach to future strength planning for the PLA. Since 2015, China has experienced the biggest reform in its history in its Armed Forces and, among the changes that have occurred, the most evident refers to the replacement of the former Military Regions with Theaters of Operation, which enable the joint action of the Army, Navy and Air Force, both in times of peace and war. Added to this are considerable advances in personnel qualifications, following a significant reduction in personnel, as well as a significant increase in the budget dedicated to Defense, which has enabled the country to be at the technological forefront.
In 2004, along the same lines, the Chinese White Paper drew attention to the need to prioritize naval, air and missile forces and emphasized the need to increase the budget of other forces. In 2013, the Science of Military Strategy issue, China's leading doctrinal publication, recommended that the PLA integrate space, cyberspace and electronic warfare into its operations against enemies. He also identified the predominance of land force officers in command posts as an obstacle to joint action by the forces, whose perspectives would be underrepresented. The sum of these understandings culminates in the project of an integrated Force capable of fighting and winning “local computerized wars”5, according to the 2015 edition of the White Paper, which reiterated the need to break with traditional thinking and change the focus of the land to the sea. The same document also identified regional threats that China would likely face, including potential land conflicts, such as on the Korean Peninsula, to the East; Afghanistan and Central Asia, to the West; and Kashmir, to the south. The independence of Tibet and Xinjiang were also cited as challenges to security within Chinese land borders.
Therefore, the current Chinese military strategy aims to prepare the PLA for the most complex and difficult scenarios, in a way that understands that the ability to control crises and win wars is fundamental to an Armed Force. To this end, it reaffirms the importance of a nuclear force for deterrence and defense of the country, as well as the relevance of strengthening cyber power for information control and national security.
Added to the above situation is the accelerated pace of the global revolution in military affairs and the development of new technologies, side by side, with the desire to improve the ability to conduct joint operations. In 2014, a group was established with the purposes of: identifying the PLA's points of weakness; think about a new organizational structure for the PLA; and propose military reform. Among the problems listed, the deficit in control and supervision stood out, from the leaders responsible for executing them, as well as the bodies created for these functions. The control mechanisms were corrupt, senior officials were unresponsive to the Party, as well as the rules were inefficient. Improving the integration of civil-military relations was yet another point on which they would need to focus, especially in the area of defense research and development. The search for greater synergy and integration between the industrial and commercial base, the incorporation of dual-use technologies and the improvement of innovation systems were topics that would demand attention. Reforms should therefore correct these and other problems.
The initial phase of the reform focused directly on the three organizational pillars of the PLA – the services, the Central Military Commission (CMC) and the system of military regions. First, in December 2015, the creation of three new forces was announced. With the aim of correcting the observed logistical decentralization and providing command, control, communication, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance for commanders in the informational domain (including space and cyberspace), the Strategic Support Force was established, with the purpose of carrying out tasks such as warning advance, satellite management and defense in the electromagnetic and cyber domains, in addition to integrating electronic warfare forces, which were, until then, dispersed across different arms.
In turn, with the aim of assisting units in theaters of operation and promoting better integration of logistical support in joint operations, the Joint Logistics Support Force was established. From the former Second Artillery Force, a new Force emerged, the Rocket Force, which is seen as capital for the country's power status, for Chinese strategic deterrence and an important milestone in national security. Second, in January 2016, Xi Jinping announced the disabling and replacement of the four General Departments with fifteen functional departments, commissions and offices, which must report directly to the CMC.
The new departments are responsible for general supervision of the PLA, the commissions supervise specific issues and the offices carry out the planning and administration of core activities. In this remodeling, the biggest impact occurred on the former General Personnel Department, which had its tasks redistributed and staff reduced. The former General Personnel Department was renamed the Joint Personnel Department, with direct control from the Central Military Commission (CMC), the highest National Defense organization in the country, strengthening control ties. The new department was in charge of activities related to operations and intelligence analysis. In turn, the Training Management Department and the Strategic Planning Office are responsible for training, mobilization and strategic planning.
Third, the previous system of military regions, essentially linked to land forces, was replaced by five theaters of operation7, focusing on joint, training and war operations. The theaters were spatially delimited, based on threat perceptions, being arranged as: Eastern Theater (Taiwan Strait and East China Sea), Southern Theater (South China Sea), Western Theater (terrorism in Central Asia, border Sino-Indian Theater and protection of armaments and equipment in the region), North Theater (Korean peninsula) and Central Theater (support for other theaters).
In theaters, PLAGF, PLAAF and PLAN now respond to two chains of command: operationally, they are under the direction of theater commanders, that is, there is supervision by combined units of the three branches - a joint command - in each Theater. Administratively, they report to their direct command. In short, there was a bifurcation of authority, in the administrative chain, authority goes from the Central Military Commission to the Forces and troops, while, in the operational chain, the direction is from the CMC to the Theaters and troops.
The creation of this mechanism aims to allow forces to quickly switch between peace and war operations, without the need to establish a temporary command for this. In peacetime, the theaters will focus on joint training, including system testing and enhancement. It is noteworthy that theater commanders will be responsible for war planning and joint training, relegating the role of force providers to force commands.
Following a CMC working meeting on military reform pathways in December 2016, the PLA began the second phase of changes, which would affect size, composition and personnel. Still in 2016, a rethinking of military education was announced. Curriculum changes were adopted to focus on practical skills, in areas such as Computer Science, Information Technology and Aerospace Studies. As a result, the departments related to land forces reduced the number of new members, as had the logistics and support departments. On the other hand, the number of students admitted to aviation, naval and technology courses increased. A similar increase occurred in departments related to space technologies, radars and drones.
With the aim of better qualifying commanders and troops, preparing them to judge situations, make operational decisions and deal with unexpected situations, the 77 military training institutes were reduced to 43, when many were integrated into the National Defense University ( DNU) and the National University of Defense Technology. DNU designed a new course for joint training of mid-level officers and inaugurated a line of specialization in joint operations for commanders.
The reforms also sought to reduce disproportionality between forces. To this end, even if the PLAGF remains predominant, the proportion in relation to personnel from other forces must decrease, that is, there will be more personnel from the PLAN, PLAAF and PLARF, especially in command posts. As Chinese sources claim, the PLAGF portion has declined to less than 50%. This represents the biggest step ever taken toward achieving the goal of balancing the Force.
In this sense, in 2017, an increase in the PLAN contingent was announced, with a view to maritime protection of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. And, with regard to aviation, the Airbone Corps was created. Some regiments were reclassified as brigades, while special forces and transports were organized into separate brigades.
Furthermore, the implementation of the military classification system for career advancement was announced. It is also discussed the implementation of a rotational system, through which officers move between different theaters and departments, as opposed to the current practice, in which the majority of their career remains in a specific military region. In this area, the main challenge was to confront the organizational culture that, for decades, prioritized the interests of land forces.
In December 2016, another stage of the reform began with the announcement of new rules and laws for auditing. In parallel, the power of auditors to investigate and penalize infractions was strengthened. The central aim of the action is to prevent cases of abuse of power, promote better management, reinforce Party discipline and emphasize ideological values.
Xi Jinping recognized that corruption in official bodies was a problem that had occurred since the 1980s. To solve it, he moved the supervision, audit and inspection mechanisms to the CMC level, thereby achieving greater independence and effectiveness . An example is the Discipline Inspection Commission, which will report directly to the CMC.
Finally, to meet the need to improve civil-military integration, especially in the science and technology sector, the supervision of the Science and Technology Commission was established by the CMC. This commission is responsible for military coordination with external civilian experts in critical technological areas. Also, the Equipment Development Department (EDD) was created, responsible for inspecting the development of tools and boosting research. The EDD aims to coordinate action with services and theaters in determining priorities, being subject to greater auditing and inspection, which may help to reduce corruption.
To improve the management and supervision of the process, in January 2017, the government formed a new Central Commission for the Development of Civil-Military Integration, with a view to reforms that, on the one hand, will be able to better integrate the areas of high-quality research and development. technology, benefiting both the PLA and the industrial and commercial defense sector. On the other, the demobilization of at least 300,000 members and the dismantling of military regions, which have existed for decades.
The modernization of the PLA has made great strides in the last decade and achieved advances in key areas, especially technology. Personnel are better trained and qualified for complex operations, the doctrine has been updated and currently emphasizes modern, technology-intensive, joint wars. The new Command and Control structure gives theater commanders, both in war and peace, control over the Army, Navy, Air and Rocket Forces within their areas of responsibility, which corresponds to a significant increase in authority, in relation to the commanders of the former military regions. At the same time, the elimination of general departments and the transfer of most of their functions to the CMC reduced the authority of their commanders and made them accountable directly to the CMC leader. The action was reflected in increased supervision and improved information flow towards the top of the organization.
The good progress of the reforms is largely related to the centralizing role of Xi Jinping, who not only participated in the entire change process, but also took all the major decisions. His ability to press for the implementation of reforms expressed greater authority over the Forces, which his predecessors clearly did not possess. Even in the face of protests from members of the Land Force, due to the reduction of positions and flaws in the remuneration and reallocation program in the job market, he managed to continue his initial intentions. One of the resources used was the protection of high-ranking officers, maintaining their posts and ranks within the new structure. Protecting one's career was an important means of defusing opposition to reforms, as was making formal speeches to military audiences when launching key reforms.
Thus, on the one hand, it tried to recruit support from those who benefited from the reforms and, on the other, it sought to compensate the losers, especially the members of the Land Forces, who saw their numerical and budgetary dominance suffer contingencies. With greater authority and control over the PLA, Xi Jinping used strategies such as: threat of investigation, in cases of corruption, to punish opponents and career promotions, to reward allies.
Although the PLA continues to describe itself as partially mechanized and partially computerized, China has demonstrated that its defense industry is capable of producing, internally (or through reverse engineering or replication), weapons, systems, components and technologies that give the Force greater reach , puncture, and situational awareness than at any time in the past.
In the cyber arena, while China poses a significant cyber espionage threat to its adversaries' critical infrastructures, the PLA still feels vulnerable to attacks and works intensely to accelerate its defense capabilities. As part of this effort, it focuses on improving the ability to detect and contain cyber intrusions, safeguard military networks and systems, and defend the national cyber border. This time, throughout 2020, the PLA continued to pursue its modernization ambitions, refined organizational reforms and improved its battle line. This includes: developing the ability to conduct sophisticated joint operations in space, cyber capabilities and the expansion of its nuclear forces. The 2024 reforms to the PLASSF only further reinforce this PLA commitment.
In 2020, CCP announced a new milestone for modernization. It is expected that, in 2027, the country will act as a network, in a system of intelligible wars, in order to, in 2035, “basically” complete its modernization and, then, in 2049, transform the PLA into a world-class force. This strategy is intrinsically integrated with the ambitions of rejuvenating the Chinese nation, until 2049, and projecting power beyond the border. Therefore, by 2020 the objective was to achieve mechanization. By 2027, it is intended to accelerate the integrated development of mechanization, computerization, intelligence and, at the same time, boost modernization in military theories, organizations, personnel and war equipment. By 2035, the aim is to complete the modernization of doctrine, organizational structure, military personnel, weapons and equipment. Thus, by 2049, we intend to completely transform the PLA.
The PLA remains an essentially Leninist organization, that is, with the central purpose of fulfilling the Party's decisions. In this sense, the Central Military Commission is still the highest decision-making body, along with the Party's control infrastructure. Military leaders continue to belong, for the most part, to the Land Force, especially in the new departments and theaters. It is also observed, based on the historical resumption, that much of the focus of the current round of reforms – strengthening the capacity to conduct joint operations and balancing the composition of the force – had already been intended in the previous decades, 1980 and 1990.
Thus, what is unique about Xi Jinping's reform is not the agenda itself, but rather his ability to overcome bureaucratic resistance. With personal charisma and political tactics, which ousted opponents and brought loyalists closer together, he achieved his security objectives. In addition to strengthening the Party-Force relationship, the PLA will emerge from this reform cycle more prepared to conduct joint operations. It is worth noting, however, that this entire analysis presented here was carried out using sources available for consultation, both primary and secondary, with access, in fact, to the PLA being a weakness of this research. We know that the Chinese State does not guarantee the transparency expected from a military transformation process, government procedures and practices, as well as the lack of checks and balances and clear accountability, provide a pretext for questioning.
Finally, as a reflection for future essays, the Chinese case sheds light on some aspects of national defense. The first of these is the prestige that the Central Military Commission has in the design of the Force. The centrality of the decision-making process, in this body, allowed the joint command to be strengthened, something essential for action in multiple domains. Then, understand the organization of theaters of operation with a view to threats. Clarity in the delimitation of threats allows for: greater assertiveness in the preparation and employment of troops; more objective spatial distribution; and a more transparent allocation of resources.
To conclude, curricular changes stand out, focusing on technological areas, and the creation of defense universities, to provide greater training for high command and troops. Today, we value a lean and fully specialized Force.
This statement was exactly the opposite of what I read on this forum.
China's Space Program Thread II
Interesting meanwhile highly unusual launch today. On October 29th, 2022, a Long March 2D successfully placed the Experiment-20C (试验二十号C) satellite into orbit. This was the 445th launch of the Long March series of rockets.
www.sinodefenceforum.com
It is particularly interesting that for some people the PLA is still seen as an organizational model to be followed when in fact this has never been true, the PLA follows the trend exercised by the USA as it has always been since at least the 90s.
It's great that the PLA created its own "USSF", this just shows that the PLA is clearly aware of the notional advantages and disadvantages of creating a separate branch for the cyber, information and especially space areas. Other countries that have the means should follow this same trend started by the USA and followed by the PLA.
Imo Chinese interaction with Belarus should be purely economical, it is already competing with Russia influence in central Asia, there is no need to further test this relationship by also running security exercises with Belarus. At the moment European attitude towards China is weary but not hostile, why give them ammunition to change that?
Why didn't PLA bring their own rifles?