This is the very reason why I pointed it out in this discussion because there is a very clear geographic rationale for developing an intermediate fighter-bomber.
Let's do a fun thought experiment. Let's measure things in Chiles!
This is combat radius of approximately three Chiles of B-21 flying a sortie from central US to the edge of Chinese airspace:
These are combat radii of approximately three Chiles of B-21 flying a sortie from central US to eastern Europe and southern Africa as well as two Chiles from central US to the northern tip of Ural mountains/Kara sea.
This is combat radius of one Chile overlayed on the WestPac theater:
This is combat radius of one Chile displayed all around China's territory:
This last map shows how China is separated by one Chile from key strategic locations which are instrumental in securing its economic interest against American incursion. It covers both straits of the Red Sea, the Black Sea, the entire Russian northern coast, Bering strait, the WestPac 2IC, the straits between Indonesia and Australia and the entirety of Indian coast.
It covers all te main maritime routes, including Sevmorput as well as all the main land corridors of Eurasia - all of that with a medium bomber.
I don't think more needs to be said at this point. What is necessary is a table with even approximate calculations for the relationship between MTOW, thrust and range. If someone can provide this information the conclusions should be fairly obvious.
These maps also show why the US needs a B-21 while China doesn't. This is exactly the same rationale as the necessity for aircraft carriers for USN vs lack of it for PLAN.
An intelligent person would read the paper first before expressing an opinion on its applicability. Fragmentary data taken out of context can be misleading in a number of ways. But that's not someting that you ever worry about, is it?
I cited these illustrations only to prove a point about an old paper from a major think-tank proposing a bomber-sized aircraft in air-to-air role.
The paper produces several very general conclusions that can be best summed by this graph:
Note that "relative warning time" and listed speeds (here capped at 2.5Ma) apply to missiles as well. This means that a missile will have even greater advantage in reduced warning time against all aircraft while consuming less fuel. BVR has transformed air to air due to the inevitable asymmetry of fligt parameters between missiles and aircraft. Consequently the paper also notes that during the Gulf War in air to air combat no US aircraft exceeded 650knots (1,03Ma at 12000 ft.) even against targets moving 700kts or more while using primarily AIM-7M. That calculus would look even worse for modern ARH missiles with ranges in excess of 150-200km or VLRAAM with 300-400km range.
As for probability of detection between two peer VLO systems - it only increases the importance of ability to engage at extreme ranges and the ability to deflect enemy sensors with EW. This is exactly the trend that we're seeing right now.
This paper was written almost ten years ago. Since then it was confirmed in almost every air-to-air engagement including during the Russo-Ukraine war.
I sincerely hope that China does exactly that. It's the best scenario for Poland. The scenario which I was describing is the actual worst case that the experts fear most.
