asif iqbal
Lieutenant General
heres comes the long useless copy and paste jobs from Hendrik , just what I was waiting on
PLA Navy news, pics and videos
- Thread starter Jeff Head
- Start date
foxmulder_ms
Junior Member
How do you even know "defiantly no". AEGIS is basically a computer system where radars and weapons are integrated. We know very little about this integration level for Chinese ships. Rest of what you wrote is not about AEGIS anyway...
But I agree that this report intentionally understates Japanese Navy and overstates PLAN.
Hendrik_2000
Lieutenant General
It is the best that you can say because you have nothing to say other than your usual Fan boy opinion worth toilet paper
Consider JMSDF's poor CEC capability, someone has to be a fanboy for flaunting like that.
@Hendrik_2000
I've just gone through the report on Japanese Seapower you mentioned before
But the recommendations he makes at the end are pretty futile, because he recommends a military buildup, so as to inflict "crippling naval losses" on the Chinese Navy.
The problem with this is that China already has the economic capacity to militarily outspend the combination of the US and Japan, when measured by GDP PPP. And this disparity is only going to widen in the future.
Plus geography favours Chinese military forces in any potential conflict over China's core objectives in the ECS, SCS and Taiwan.
So in all likelihood, it's not possible for the US/Japan to inflict "crippling naval losses" on the Chinese Navy.
It is more likely that a future Chinese military would come out on top.
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What you've written is irrelevant.
BMD is inherently a losing competition for the Japanese military.
Given the ranges involved for Japan, offensive missiles are so much cheaper than defensive SAM systems
Hendrik_2000
Lieutenant General
Yup all those China basher keep raising the specter of socalled "China defeat in war of Yalu river 1895" But that was different time and place. China was in throe of death. Qing China government was inept,corrupt, agrarian society with little industrial capacity.
Though the Chinese navy was larger but they were short of ammunition and didn't have coherent strategy or good leadership. The beiyang navy practically alone in fighting the Japanese navy, The eastern fleet and the southern fleet do nothing led by coward.
Here is another BS from Toshi friend and frequent coauthor James Holmes. This guy not too long ago pooh pooh Chinese navy achievement Not anymore
Country overall strength derive from the economy. As long as Chinese economy still growing and the Japanese stagnating eventually Japan and US dominance will be eclipsed.
Japanese navy is not six feet tall they have weakness too as shown in this article They are good at antisubmarine warfare but basically un balance force
Excerpt
Has China's Navy Caught Up (and Surpassed) Japan?
While the world focuses on the Coronavirus crisis, a new report lays out the rise of Chinese seapower and how it could impact Japan and the entire Indo-Pacific region.
by
Toshi Yoshihara, a long-time coauthor and friend, has put out detailing how strategic thinkers and practitioners in Communist China size up Japanese sea power. The outlook is dour. China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy) has overtaken Japan’s navy, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), by many measures over the past decade. Tokyo must play catch-up. And Washington must help.
Yoshihara entitles his report Dragon Against the Sun in apparent homage to Ronald Spector’s , a standard history of World War II in the Pacific. The simile invites posterity to juxtapose Japan’s plight vis-à-vis an increasingly domineering China today with its plight vis-à-vis the United States eight decades ago. Then, imperial Japan confronted a foe from the far side of the Pacific with a vastly larger economy and a forward outpost in Japan’s extended environs, namely the Philippine Islands. Today, democratic Japan confronts a nearby potential foe with an economy that surpassed its own a decade ago. The two contenders occupy cramped quarters in this incipient age of long-range precision weaponry.
Marine geography drives the contenders into contact at sea at the same time weapons technology makes it easier to strike.
Comparing the PLA Navy to the JMSDF solely on a fleet-to-fleet basis misleads under prevailing circumstances. In 1941 the Imperial Japanese Navy’s , or carrier striking force, had to steam across thousands of miles of storm-beaten ocean to smite Pearl Harbor. Nor could the Kidō Butai—short on fuel and supplies after its epic voyage—sustain its attacks for long. China’s equivalents to “Pearl Harbor”—fleet hubs such as Yokosuka or Sasebo—lie within easy reach in 2020. After all, land-based armaments can reach out hundreds of miles to sea from Fortress China. PLA rocketeers could pummel Japanese bases or fleets with the push of a button, lofting the JMSDF’s way.
It matters little where the firing platform resides so long as firepower arrives on the scene of battle at the time when the battle is fought. Any meaningful tally between Japanese and Chinese sea power must factor shore-based missiles and aircraft into the balance along with the seagoing component. The portents are discouraging taken on those terms.
Yoshihara sketches the portrait of a PLA Navy that has surged to eminence with impressive velocity. Two decades ago Western specialists on Chinese sea power commonly ridiculed the PLA Navy, forecasting that it would take China decade upon decade to construct an oceangoing fleet. Some doubted such a feat was possible at all. Once it became undeniable that China could build a navy—it did, therefore it could—skeptics took to denying that the PLA could build this piece of hardware or that, whether it was anti-ship ballistic missiles, state-of-the-art guided-missile destroyers, or aircraft carriers.
Chinese engineers belied their claims one by one.
Surveying rising maritime challengers of the past that it takes about fifteen years from a cold start to construct a serious regional navy, another fifteen after that to construct an oceangoing navy of consequence. That’s three decades in total. Communist China’s leadership resolved to make the PLA Navy a global force around a quarter-century ago. It is on pace by historical standards if not ahead.
I like how it said it takes 3 decades to build an oceangoing navy of consequence. Incidentally it was on 22 May 1980, 30 years ago, that Adm. Liu Huaqing visited the Kitty Hawk which affirmed his belief that China should have its own carrier and blue water navy.