PLA Navy news, pics and videos

7th and 8th Type 815
5th and 6th Type 071
29th Type 054A

Average yearly rates

8-9 Type 056
2-3 Type 054A
2-3 Type 052D
2 Type 055

Around 15-16 new warship units per year

Add in miscellaneous warships like Type 815, Type 926, Type 071, Type 901, Type 903/4 and large Ocean tugs we are close to 18-20 units per year

Since 2012 close to 100 new warships launched for Chinese navy

PLAN fleet is ballooning by 2025

And here I remember the first 2 x Type 054 and 2 x Type 052C back in 2006

What a transformation in a decade

Iron Man said:

I struggle to think of an example where this is actually the case in this day and age. Perhaps the Zumwalt? Here we have a ship that was meant to be the successor to the Arleigh Burke (to be built in conjunction with the CG(X) which was to be the Tico replacement), not an addition to the fleet structure. It was canceled because of cost, sure, but also because of changing threat and mission environments, and had it been successful it would have gone on to replace the ABs as they retired from the fleet.

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It is difficult to point to any specific project as proof, but I think it would be untenable to claim that the end of the Cold War and the combination of funding cuts and a lack of clear role has played no role in the consolidation of warship designs over the past generation.

To put it another way, I think it is a mistake to attribute recent naval trends to inexorable laws of technology and refinement/optimisation when then there a clear political/economic context in which those developments have occurred -- a context in which budgets were cut, the threat was unclear, and so, correspondingly, were the requirements.

An extreme example of what I'm talking about is the Virginia, which started production in 2000 and will not be replaced by another SSN design until the mid 2040s. That's 40+ years of a single SSN design, dramatically different from the Cold War years.

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See, and I think that's rather suspicious. It makes me think less that the US has arrived at the ultimate platform to meet its requirements, and designed the perfect program more than a generation ahead to fulfil them, and more that we are looking at a kind of institutional complacency and employment protection program.

But have you asked yourself what is the need for ships of these tonnages? For example a 6,000t "frigate" is meant to do what that a (presumably lighter) "054B" isn't? If you only bifurcate roles in the blue water portion of a navy (i.e. excluding corvettes), you will be assigning the smaller of the duo to ASW and medium range air defense, and the larger of the duo to command, long range air defense, and possibly ballistic missile defense. Why do you need a 6,000t frigate to perform the role of ASW and local air defense? A 32-cell UVLS with quad-packing MRSAMs would give you a useful load of 32 MRSAMs, 8 ASW missiles, and 8 ASCMs, with 8 cells left over to play with.

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Distinct from my previous conception whereby a 6000-ton frigate replaced the 054-series in production, I think a 6000-ton frigate could have a role in a future PLAN as a multirole vessel designed to operate independently on long range or extended deployments -- think the Med or Atlantic. Such a vessel would lack the APARs of the 052 series while offering significantly better aviation facilities and endurance. In comparison to the 054 series it would have better aviation facilities, endurance, land attack capabilities and special operations support. One could almost think of it as a non-stupid F125.

Similarly for the corvette class, why a 2,500t ship that is meant for coastal patrol? What additional duties do you envision for your 2,500t vessel that the 1,500t 056A does not currently fulfill and why does it need to take on these extra duties in first place? A hangar, maybe? Sure, but a hangar can demonstrably be had for a few hundred extra tons of steel, the 1,800t P18 being the perfect example.

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A 2500-ton corvette would be designed primarily as an affordable, first-rate ASW combatant to asymmetrically counter the most formidable undersea force in existence (US SSNs + Japanese SSKs) where they pose the greatest threat, i.e. within the first island-chain. The 056 has several limitations holding it back from assuming this role:

- no hanger
- low speed
- limited munitions
- no Type 87 or next-generation equivalent for short-range target prosecution or anti-torpedo defense.

Possibly, but just because it's new or different doesn't mean it's better. Evolution has its dead ends, as does naval ship design. Ships like Moskva, Kiev, and Zumwalt (and perhaps even LCS) certainly fit into these dead end designs. The Moskva and Kiev are failures IMO because they attempted to combine cruiser and carrier and failed at both because they were good at neither.

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I am thinking of things like arsenal ships, fire support ships (MRL and rail guns), ASW aviation destroyers/cruisers, whether along the lines of proposed Spruance DDH variants, or something more like Hyuga. But more to the point, I am thinking of concepts that have yet to be conceived (or enabled by new technologies).

I can see the 052X and 055X production overlapping for a while. I don't think the PLAN is that fully committed to risk everything on an untried ship like the 055, which at this moment and for some years to come, is going to have maturity issues. The 052X is already and currently right now, a tried and tested platform.

Then in in the future, the 052X platform will tailor off, as the 055X production peaks up and the 055 platform has demonstrated operational maturity, increasing the confidence of the PLAN to rely more and more on the ship.

As for helo hangers, it isn't just having a hanger is enough. It has to big enough for an ASW helicopter with better range, equipment and payload over a Z-9C. Maybe China can either license the Ka-28 Helix or create its equivalent.

I would think resurrecting a modernized 053 won't be a bad idea for an ASW vessel. You already have a 2200-2500 ton platform (export frigate C28 is a 2800 ton ship). It already has a helicopter hanger, and it can defend itself with a 24 cell HQ-10 with two Type 730B CIWS. Instead of the HQ-10, you can equip it with an 8 cell VLS, as the Thailand Navy has done with their export 053, aka F25T, or the Nanshuan class that is fitted with an 8 cell Mk. 41, and SAAB Sea Vixen radar. Operationally, the 053 does have reach, as the 053H3 has been used in Aden escort missions, and the Pakistan Navy has used their 053 variant F22P to rescue their nationals during the crisis in Yemen in 2015.

Not sure if this has been posted before.
A very informative lecture&analysis of Chinese navy's general strategy by Dr. Christopher Yung.
(Long Video 1:11:33)

Lethe said:

It is difficult to point to any specific project as proof, but I think it would be untenable to claim that the end of the Cold War and the combination of funding cuts and a lack of clear role has played no role in the consolidation of warship designs over the past generation.

To put it another way, I think it is a mistake to attribute recent naval trends to inexorable laws of technology and refinement/optimisation when then there a clear political/economic context in which those developments have occurred -- a context in which budgets were cut, the threat was unclear, and so, correspondingly, were the requirements.

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Certainly funding has a lot to do with less ships and less classes overall, but I don't know what you mean by "lack of clear role". Regardless, the trend towards more ships in less classes is abundantly clear, especially for the mature navies of the world, a club into which the PLAN has assuredly entered at this point.

Lethe said:

See, and I think that's rather suspicious. It makes me think less that the US has arrived at the ultimate platform to meet its requirements, and designed the perfect program more than a generation ahead to fulfil them, and more that we are looking at a kind of institutional complacency and employment protection program.

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LOL I see an obvious sign of an obvious trend and you want to infer something suspicious. I guess we'll just have to disagree. I could point to more projects, like the 054A, 056, 052D, almost certainly 055, Arleigh Burke, Type 45, Virginia, Columbia, etc., but which projects can you point to to help your case out? If you have to say none, then you are admitting you have no support for your claims at all.

Lethe said:

Distinct from my previous conception whereby a 6000-ton frigate replaced the 054-series in production, I think a 6000-ton frigate could have a role in a future PLAN as a multirole vessel designed to operate independently on long range or extended deployments -- think the Med or Atlantic. Such a vessel would lack the APARs of the 052 series while offering significantly better aviation facilities and endurance. In comparison to the 054 series it would have better aviation facilities, endurance, land attack capabilities and special operations support. One could almost think of it as a non-stupid F125.

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It sounds like you are trying to impose a Western European "frigate" concept onto an actual PLAN frigate design. Western European frigates are more like destroyers, designed to act like small (or not so small) destroyers because that class is the upper tier of their surface combatants. Meanwhile a frigate is certainly not the upper tier of PLAN surface combatants. Also, you have still failed to show what a 6,000t PLAN would accomplish that a 054B frigate would not. Your theoretical vessel lacking any AESA would actually not at all be able to operate "independently", not to mention there is no PLAN requirement to operate in the Mediterranean or the Atlantic, not to mention any unique missions that would require such remote theaters could be accomplished out of Djibouti. Incidentally an F125 at 7,200t is about the same size as a 052D and larger than a 052C, so yeah, it would be kind of stupid to build a ship that would not even be considered a "pocket" destroyer, would actually be a destroyer, and then ridiculously call it a frigate while making it do destroyer things. So no, the PLAN isn't going to be building any F-125-sized ships and calling them "frigates". What it will actually do is build F-125-sized ships and call them "052Es".

Lethe said:

A 2500-ton corvette would be designed primarily as an affordable, first-rate ASW combatant to asymmetrically counter the most formidable undersea force in existence (US SSNs + Japanese SSKs) where they pose the greatest threat, i.e. within the first island-chain. The 056 has several limitations holding it back from assuming this role:

- no hanger
- low speed
- limited munitions
- no Type 87 or next-generation equivalent for short-range target prosecution or anti-torpedo defense.

Click to expand...

Nothing you mentioned here necessitates a ship of 2,500t, not to mention that a corvette being tasked to "asymmetrically counter" US SSNs and Japanese SSKs doesn't have to involve anything more than sending a helicopter armed with a sonobuoy and a pair of torpedoes, something the 056A is ALREADY being tasked with. And let's not forget the slant-launched ASW missiles 056As are certain to carry. Anything more than that and you have 30 054As to choose from.

now noticed the tweet





Si le compte est bon, la marine chinoise aurait actuellement au moins 11 navires de surface déployés en océan Indien, à savoir 7 destroyers et frégates, 1 navire amphibie de 20 000 tonnes et 3 pétroliers ravitailleurs. Il y aurait fort probablement des sous-marins également.

Translated from French by
If the account is good, the Chinese navy would currently have at least 11 surface vessels deployed in the Indian Ocean, namely 7 destroyers and frigates, 1 amphibious vessel of 20 000 tonnes and 3 tankers. There would most likely be submarines as well.

11 ? Which ones

Iron Man said:

Certainly funding has a lot to do with less ships and less classes overall, but I don't know what you mean by "lack of clear role". Regardless, the trend towards more ships in less classes is abundantly clear, especially for the mature navies of the world, a club into which the PLAN has assuredly entered at this point.

Click to expand...

Most western navies were built around countering the threat posed by the Soviet Union, particularly its submarines but also its strategic naval aviation capability. With the demise of a peer threat, anti-submarine warfare capabilities in particular were de-emphasised and a greater emphasis was placed on "flexibility" and confronting "non-traditional" threats. The trend towards ever-larger vessels that do a bit of everything -- and arguably none of it particularly well -- clearly emerges from the combination of funding restrictions and a diversified mission set.

LOL I see an obvious sign of an obvious trend and you want to infer something suspicious. I guess we'll just have to disagree.

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The Virginia-class is basically an underwater Super Hornet. That is to say, it is a limited platform conceived in a particular politico-budgetary context to fulfil particular requirements. For the sake of argument, let us assume that, like Super Hornet, the Virginia-class submarine has fulfilled its role admirably to date.

Yet, Super Hornet has a shelf life -- and so should the Virginia-class.

The Virginia-class is not just a smaller, cheaper Seawolf, it reflects a fundamentally different sense of mission priorities. As a late Cold War design, Seawolf was intended as an underwater ATF, to restore US undersea supremacy that had been eroded by Soviet advances. To that end it doubled the number of torpedo tubes, enlarged both the tubes and the magazine, and deleted the VLS cells. The Virginia-class reverted all of this, not because Seawolf was dumb, but because the Cold War had ended. Hunting other Soviet submarines was no longer the top priority, while lobbing cruise missiles at third-world countries had taken on new significance. The integration of the Virginia Payload Module promises to push this trend even further in future, but in an era where both China and Russia will be fielding advanced SSNs. Is today's US Navy

One might question just how important these factors are, but my point is that they reflect the institutional patterns that are occurring, and which undoubtedly manifest in many other forms. Even at the inception of the Virginia class there were questions about the non-competitive nature of US submarine design and its resistance to innovation:

"The panel noted that core submarine technology investments are generally too small to investigate important and/or revolutionary options in a timely manner. As a result future modifications or new designs will be limited to evolutionary improvements over their predecessors."

Anything more than that and you have 30 054As to choose from.

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The point is precisely to free blue-water ships for blue water taskings rather than having them confined to the littorals because your littoral ships are not up to the job.

AlyxMS said:

Not sure if this has been posted before.
A very informative lecture&analysis of Chinese navy's general strategy by Dr. Christopher Yung.
(Long Video 1:11:33)

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I watched this some time ago and thought there was at least one major issue. At 22:00, there's a slide titled PLA Navy Focus on "Far Seas" Operations: Are we Sure?, which seems to be the foundation for the subsequent analysis of Chinese naval ambitions and the comparison to the US. It highlights the discrepancy in the number of replenishment ships and nuclear submarines. However, were the comparison to be made for 2030, the situation would look a lot different (at least for nuclear submarines; I don't know how many replenishment ships China will be making), undermining the speaker's argument.