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Iron Man

Major
Registered Member
Cont'd:


The De Zeven Provincien has room for 8 more VLS (48 total):
DeZeven_2.jpg

The Iver Huitfeldt has room for 8 more slant launchers (16 total):
0074-DSC_4497.jpg
 
Indeed, the Sachsen class looks significantly underutilized. ...
couldn't resist after I had seen "underutilized":
Sep 27, 2017
Aug 1, 2017
Jun 8, 2017

Achtung! Achtung! POLITICALLY CORRECT TIN-CANS ...
... graphics:
DKvWwLjXUAUNFjZ.jpg:large

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LOL probably the most remarkable European solution (eight (8) Harpoons on 7+k hull, and that's it) since
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330px-The_deck_of_the_Novgorod_circular_ironclad.png
 

Tam

Brigadier
Registered Member
That thing looks awful. There is an entire space there that should have been a VLS instead of putting the RAM on it. The RAM could have been moved to the step in front of it. There is certainly room for another 8 Harpoons, I am not sure if they plan on using Harpoons or going to use NSM.

The four faced AESA is one of the first confirmed naval GaN AESAs in the world, and the F125 is probably the first 'confirmed' ship to use it (the Type 055 isn't officially confirmed on GaN). The other ships in the world to have GaN AESA right now are two new Japanese "lite" destroyers that's significantly lighter than the F125 or many of the Euro frigates.

Despite having such an advanced radar, the F125 doesn't match those with any proper SAM defenses. And even if the ship has VLS, the TRS-4D radar is a search and track only radar, and runs on C-band, which means it cannot light up targets for Standards and ESSMs that require X-band. It will have to be fitted with Asters, because they have active seekers, and use Sylver VLS, which looks like the A50 can fit. The TRS-4D is fittingly chosen, in a revolving form, as the radar for the next block of guess what --- the Freedom class LCS ships. Currently the Freedom class uses TRS-3D, a revolving phase array radar used by German corvettes.

Speaking of Sylvers, do note A43 means 4.3 meters, A50 means 5.0 meters and A70 means 7.0 meters in depth. Other than the A70, the Sylvers are shallow compared to Mk. 41s, the Russian UKSK and Chinese U-VLS. The A70 can be used to fire a cruise missile but the A43s and A50s are strictly SAMs only, with the A43 the short ranged Aster 15 and the A50 the medium ranged Aster 30. The RN Type 45 destroyers, which has 48 VLS, are all A50s. The Italian frigates use all A50s, and the French FREMM ships Aquitaine class use half A43s and A70s.

So basically these ships are incapable of throwing any cruise missile other than the French ships, though you can't fault frigates for being like that, despite these frigates are destroyer sized. Although the A70 cells can use the medium length Aster 30, and supposedly a new ABM variant of such, one can't help but think that the Aquitaine will have to rely on short ranged Aster 15s for much of their air defense if the Aquitaine class are to be used for a strike role. Obviously some other ships, preferably equipped with the A50 VLS, to defend it.

Ironically, the Sylvers are not very multirole for a VLS thats intended to be used for 'multirole' frigates.

Since the Type 45 destroyers are all AAW only, the RN conceived the Type 26 frigates with strike length (7.7m) Mk 41s so they can carry Tomahawks and such. Note that the RAF uses the Scalp cruise missile, which is the cruise missile used with the Sylver A70 VLS. But for air defense, the Type 26 uses CAMMs, which is a short to mid ranged SAM, so the Type 26 is going to need the Type 45 to cover it. Its no wonder the RN is in trouble when you have geniuses behind these.

Going back to the F125. It has a sonar. Designed to detect swimmers. Its not a proper anti-submarine sonar of any sort. The ship also has water hoses.

This "frigate" seems like its meant to deploy special forces, and I get the feeling the kind of humanitarian and rescue missions the Chinese and the Indians, along with the Turks and Pakistanis, pulled on Libya and Yemen. Its like that "Operation Red Sea" movie.

Just with Germans instead of Chinese people.
 

Lethe

Captain
if they so wished to install them; note also that this class has 4 fixed AESA panels that your hypothetical 6,000t frigate does not.

I should have been more precise. I meant that the vessel would lack the large radars and long-range missiles SAMs of 052D. Indeed it would probably duplicate the sensor fit of the smaller 054B/X series.

This doesn't mean the Virginia is somehow an ineffectual or subpar submarine. Which submarine do you think is the better of the Virginia, may I ask?

I didn't say that it was ineffectual, only that it is limited. The future threat environment -- a world of advanced Chinese and Russian SSKs and ASW capabilities -- will barely resemble the world in which the Viriginia-class was conceived. To imagine that the Virginia-class will continue to be adequate in such a world is hubris of the highest order.

The VPM is also meant to replace part of the capacity being lost with the retirement of the Ohio SSGN, and is not planned to be installed on all or even most Virginias.

The VPM is a good example of institutional sclerosis. The capability it is replacing was born in the unipolar moment where there was no peer threat as something to do with now surplus SSBN hulls. Back when the US was building literally dozens of SSBNs in the Cold War, a cruise missile boat was nowhere on the horizon because it was not a priority. Fitting future Virginia's with VPMs is basically going to undermine USN ASW capabilities right when China's submarine capabilities will be surging.

Bottom line is that you can't design a platform intended to be good for forty years, because you have no idea what those forty years are going to bring. And if your institutional processes are sclerotic enough to actually adhere to such a plan, it will increasingly diverge from the real world until the platform is obsolete or irrelevant.

Also, I expect 054As to be more and more relegated to independent, low-to-medium threat missions in the littorals as more and more 054Bs appear and displace them out of CSGs and SAGs, missions such as ASW. The 054A, and especially the 054A+, is really nothing more than your idea of a super-corvette, and is good enough for the PLAN of the 2000s and 2010s, but more and more dated and less and less protected as time goes on due to its lack of an AESA and therefore lack of a strong resistance to multi-axis saturation attacks, which BTW is the very feature you wish to delete from your super-frigates. The more you try to supersize your corvette and give it more endurance and firepower and what not, the more it looks like a 054A, which begs the question of why would the PLAN invest time and money into a new design when they could just build more of an available design.

054As will be upgraded, probably including with new radar. Yet they will remain a 4000-ton class vessel with 160 crew designed for blue water operation. Why wouldn't PLAN design a vessel 50% of 054A's size with 80-100 crew intended to offer high-end ASW capability within the littoral region, and thereby realise significant operational savings over time?

Long-term, submarine and anti-submarine warfare will likely emerge as the single most important axis of US-China contestation. My prescription for a first-rate littoral ASW combatant is intended for such a future.
 
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Tam

Brigadier
Registered Member
054As will be upgraded, probably including with new radar. Yet they will remain a 4000-ton class vessel with 160 crew designed for blue water operation. Why wouldn't PLAN design a vessel 50% of 054A's size with 80-100 crew intended to offer high-end ASW capability within the littoral region, and thereby realise significant operational savings over time?

Long-term, submarine and anti-submarine warfare will likely emerge as the single most important axis of US-China contestation. My prescription for a first-rate littoral ASW combatant is intended for such a future.

Maybe allow for 450 tons more, and the best thing I can think of is this.

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Not just having two helicopters with a hanger for 2450 tons, but a trimaran design has advantages when it comes to cruising, fuel efficiency, hull noise, and stability.
 

Iron Man

Major
Registered Member
I should have been more precise. I meant that the vessel would lack the large radars and long-range missiles SAMs of 052D. Indeed it would probably duplicate the sensor fit of the smaller 054B/X series.
Well you said "APAR". More correctly "AESA", but regardless of your original meaning the sensor fit of the 054B will be more than enough to accomplish whatever your 6,000t frigate is trying to accomplish, especially now that you have divested yourself (or rather your frigate) of long range air defense duties. You've painted yourself into a corner with this frigate which literally has no reason to be as bloated as you want it to be or to be any different than what the 054B is expected to be.

I didn't say that it was ineffectual, only that it is limited. The future threat environment -- a world of advanced Chinese and Russian SSKs and ASW capabilities -- will barely resemble the world in which the Viriginia-class was conceived. To imagine that the Virginia-class will continue to be adequate in such a world is hubris of the highest order.
While the Virginia is not as powerful as the (overpriced) Seawolf, this is not even remotely the same as saying it is "limited". And hubris of the highest order is outright dismissing 7 blocks worth of upgrades to further one's argument. 3 blocks and the 688i is already considered by many to be a separate class from the 688. As if the USN is somehow stupid enough to stand still in technology for 40+ years while China and Russia advance in sub tech. That's hubris right there.

The VPM is a good example of institutional sclerosis. The capability it is replacing was born in the unipolar moment where there was no peer threat as something to do with now surplus SSBN hulls. Back when the US was building literally dozens of SSBNs in the Cold War, a cruise missile boat was nowhere on the horizon because it was not a priority. Fitting future Virginia's with VPMs is basically going to undermine USN ASW capabilities right when China's submarine capabilities will be surging.

Bottom line is that you can't design a platform intended to be good for forty years, because you have no idea what those forty years are going to bring. And if your institutional processes are sclerotic enough to actually adhere to such a plan, it will increasingly diverge from the real world until the platform is obsolete or irrelevant.
LOL so in your mind VPM = decreased ASW capabilities; I struggle to discern how you are going to try and wring a connection out of this one. BTW, the Ohio SSGN perfectly reflects changing priorities, mainly a decreased nuclear threat. Has this threat changed substantially since the early 2000s? The US military unambiguously disagrees with your analysis, as it is planning 12 Columbia SSBNs each with 16 tubes, compared to the Cold War's 18 Ohio SSBNs each with 24 tubes. Last I heard 12x16 is significantly less than 18x24 despite China and Russia's "surging" capabilities. BTW, you think these Ohio SSGNs are intended only or even mainly for jihadis? Think again. You think PLAN warships starting to be armed with LACMs are intending them for use against American or Japanese jihadis? LOL think again.

054As will be upgraded, probably including with new radar. Yet they will remain a 4000-ton class vessel with 160 crew designed for blue water operation. Why wouldn't PLAN design a vessel 50% of 054A's size with 80-100 crew intended to offer high-end ASW capability within the littoral region, and thereby realise significant operational savings over time?

Long-term, submarine and anti-submarine warfare will likely emerge as the single most important axis of US-China contestation. My prescription for a first-rate littoral ASW combatant is intended for such a future.
Aren't we fudging the numbers a little here? 63%, but what's 13% here and there, right? In any case why use 054As when you could design a new class? Pretty simple, because they are already sitting right there, and they will eventually be replaced/displaced by more survivable 054Bs, who will take their place on the high seas in support of CSGs and SAGs, relegating these less effective frigates to lower intensity scenarios like littoral ASW, international visits, anti-piracy, backup for 054Bs, etc. Make no mistake, a PLAN commander will pick a 054B over a 054A any day of the week to fill up his CSG or SAG or ARG, and the more time passes, the more 054Bs there will be, and the less spots 054As will fill in these high intensity roles. In same way the 052E will displace the 052D just as the 052D is displacing the 052C and other destroyer classes in the high end/high intensity roles. In the case of the 054As, they are still being built right now, which means they will have as long a shelf life as the 056s, which means there is going to be no room at the bottom for your 2,500t supercorvette for another 30+ years. 056s and 054As will eventually be slowly retired one by one, but the remaining 054As will be tasked to operate alongside the remaining 056s and share not too different roles with them, perhaps even complementary roles. I can see an 1,800 to 2,000t corvette design begin to emerge as these two classes wind down starting in the 2040s, one with a hangar and slightly more weaponry, something similar to the 1,800t P18. Perhaps eventually a steady state ORBAT consisting of a mix of 2,000t corvettes, 5,000t frigates, 8,000t destroyers, and 12,000t cruisers with maybe your odd arsenal ship here or there is going to be the long term goal of the PLAN.
 

Lethe

Captain
Well you said "APAR". More correctly "AESA", but regardless of your original meaning the sensor fit of the 054B will be more than enough to accomplish whatever your 6,000t frigate is trying to accomplish, especially now that you have divested yourself (or rather your frigate) of long range air defense duties. You've painted yourself into a corner with this frigate which literally has no reason to be as bloated as you want it to be or to be any different than what the 054B is expected to be.

The point of such a vessel would be to offer greater range and endurance than the 054 series for long-range and/or extended deployments reflecting China's growing sphere of interest, while offering more flexible facilities to accommodate aviation assets, special operations forces and equipment, and potentially land attack capabilities. The availability of such a vessel would also mitigate against mission creep and bloat for the 054x and 052x types.

As if the USN is somehow stupid enough to stand still in technology for 40+ years while China and Russia advance in sub tech. That's hubris right there.

And yet there is considerable evidence that this is in fact the case. By the end of the Cold War the Soviets had caught up to or surpassed the United States in most domains of undersea warfare -- the Seawolf program was a response to that. The Virginia-class may have many attractive qualities, but the structure of the program and how it came about gives good reason to believe that the conservative, closed-minded nature of US submarine development has not fundamentally changed (indeed, given the broader post-Cold War record of USN, one suspects things are a good deal worse than they used to be). And as China continues to progress, such conservatism will come back to bite them, as it did in the 1980s with the Soviet Union.

LOL so in your mind VPM = decreased ASW capabilities; I struggle to discern how you are going to try and wring a connection out of this one.

Slower, less agile, and more expensive, therefore coming at the cost of capabilities that are relevant to ASW.

BTW, you think these Ohio SSGNs are intended only or even mainly for jihadis? Think again.

They were intended to save hulls and crews from retirement and give more work to Electric Boat amidst a general downturn.

Aren't we fudging the numbers a little here? 63%, but what's 13% here and there, right?

2500 tons is just a figure pulled from the air. The point is to incorporate the additional capabilities discussed earlier, while also increasing range, seaworthiness, and endurance to a certain degree. Such a vessel could be 1800 tons, or 2000 tons, or 2200 tons, or 2400 tons, or 2700 tons.

In any case why use 054As when you could design a new class? Pretty simple, because they are already sitting right there, and they will eventually be replaced/displaced by more survivable 054Bs, who will take their place on the high seas in support of CSGs and SAGs, relegating these less effective frigates to lower intensity scenarios like littoral ASW, international visits, anti-piracy, backup for 054Bs, etc.

This assumes that PLAN only requires X number of blue water frigates and is going to have the budget and desire to construct enough 054Bs to displace the 054As from those roles. Assumptions piled on top of assumptions, when the whole point of this discussion has been that the future possibility space is much broader than you give it credit for.
 
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Iron Man

Major
Registered Member
The point of such a vessel would be to offer greater range and endurance than the 054 series for long-range and/or extended deployments reflecting China's growing sphere of interest, while offering more flexible facilities to accommodate aviation assets, special operations forces and equipment, and potentially land attack capabilities. The availability of such a vessel would also mitigate against mission creep and bloat for the 054x and 052x types.
If the PLAN wanted to mitigate against mission creep for the 054 series, it would not have designed a ship that is by current rumor not much bigger than the 054A. If it had wanted any of the things you mentioned for its frigate class, it would have designed a bigger frigate. Fact is that replenishment ships and newer bases along the lines of Djibouti have mitigated any significant need for larger frigates to have greater "range" and "endurance", as if such ships would ever even go out on distant deployments without a replenishment ship in any case. The IEP nature of the 054B should already be mitigating against range, endurance, and size increases all by itself anyway. And why a frigate needs to have extra room for SOF is beyond me, as is the need for land attack capabilities that somehow can't be provided by slant launchers or by UVLS modules.

And yet there is considerable evidence that this is in fact the case. By the end of the Cold War the Soviets had caught up to or surpassed the United States in most domains of undersea warfare -- the Seawolf program was a response to that. The Virginia-class may have many attractive qualities, but the structure of the program and how it came about gives good reason to believe that the conservative, closed-minded nature of US submarine development has not fundamentally changed (indeed, given the broader post-Cold War record of USN, one suspects things are a good deal worse than they used to be). And as China continues to progress, such conservatism will come back to bite them, as it did in the 1980s with the Soviet Union.
Your accusations are extremely vague, like "the structure of the program" and "how it came about" and "conservative, closed-minded nature" of US sub development. I don't know what you mean by any of these statements or how you intend to provide evidence for these claims. The Seawolf certainly came into being after the advent of the Akula, but this does not mean it was a response to the Akula specifically, or that US sub designers thought that the Akula had surpassed the 688. The timing suggests to me it was just part of the usual submarine development cycle. The first 688i was laid down in 1985, while the first Seawolf was laid down in 1989, hardly enough time to be a "response" to the improved Akula, also first laid down in 1989. Meanwhile neither the baseline Akula nor the improved Victor III were considered to be superior to the 688i.

Slower, less agile, and more expensive, therefore coming at the cost of capabilities that are relevant to ASW.
I am 100% certain that you are unable to prove that a VPM attached to a Virginia would cause it to be significantly slower so as to mitigate its ASW capabilities to any measurable degree. You have also yet to prove that the increased expense of the VPM is not mostly or even completely made irrelevant by funding increases to the Virginia program to offset the increase cost.

They were intended to save hulls and crews from retirement and give more work to Electric Boat amidst a general downturn.
Please provide citable evidence for this claim.

2500 tons is just a figure pulled from the air. The point is to incorporate the additional capabilities discussed earlier, while also increasing range, seaworthiness, and endurance to a certain degree. Such a vessel could be 1800 tons, or 2000 tons, or 2200 tons, or 2400 tons, or 2700 tons.
I'm fairly certainly you would not be able to achieve your dreams for this supercorvette in a hull of 2,000t or less. Even my own far more modest dreams for a PLAN corvette cannot be accomplished in a design of less than 1,800t.

This assumes that PLAN only requires X number of blue water frigates and is going to have the budget and desire to construct enough 054Bs to displace the 054As from those roles. Assumptions piled on top of assumptions, when the whole point of this discussion has been that the future possibility space is much broader than you give it credit for.
And yet you are arguing for a significantly larger new frigate class that based on your descriptions won't even remotely be in the same ballpark as the 054A, and as part of a two-tier blue water navy, no less, which means its numbers will be significantly jacked up compared to a three-tier navy. You can't have your cake and eat it too, sorry.
 

Tam

Brigadier
Registered Member
cool tweet
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Le porte-avions américain USS Carl Vinson, en mer de Chine méridionale le 10 Février, et un destroyer chinois Type 052D qui surveille de loin.

Translated from French by
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The American aircraft carrier USS Carl VINSN, in the South China Sea on 10 February, and a Chinese destroyer Type 052D who watches from afar.

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DWC0y72XUAEPWPn.jpg


This is taken from... Yes, that's not an Arleigh Burke destroyer in the distance.

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