That is not true Huawei lack strategic vision and complacent couple with slavish west worshiping result in the pickle they are in now Look when he build his campus in Shenzen instead of building Tang dynasty style he use ersatz western architecture. Look at this home completely style in western architecture His statement about apple Show that Ren has no visionary vision compare that to Samsung here is the story of Samsung semiconductor. Using his own money instead of Samsung money the founder family of Samsung bought a struggling semiconductor company and make what is now Samsung semiconductor SMIC for 13 years languish in wilder ness because nobody funding them until the government took interest in them
Developing DRAMs
Lee and his son understood one important concept that Kang and their own management team had missed: when it comes to chips, fab cap ex comes first, and if timed correctly, profits follow. Without sufficient fab capacity ready at the moment demand materializes, even the best chip designs cannot succeed. That lesson would repeat itself many times over as Samsung grew.
By November of 1970, Samsung Electronics produced its first vacuum tubes and 12” black and white TVs, based on the designs of their Japanese partners. Samsung TVs evolved for the next few years, including a 19” transistor-based black and white model in 1973. (At the time, Korean domestic TV broadcasts were in black and white; color TVs were outlawed. Japanese TV imports were blocked – except those made through the joint ventures.) Lines of white goods, including refrigerators, air conditioners, and washing machines debuted in 1974.
From the start, Samsung’s strategy in consumer electronics was vertical integration – and a new capability was about to fall into their hands.
Kang Ki-Dong acquired a Ph.D. at The Ohio State University in 1962, and went to work at Motorola in Phoenix, Arizona in one of the largest discrete transistor plants in the world. As a Korean engineer who also spoke Japanese, he gave many plant tours to visiting engineers, building a network. When the time came to open a Motorola facility in Korea, Kang was sent ahead to perform an initial assessment for land and contacts, including interviewing prospective engineering staff.
After returning to the US and working for another firm, Kang encountered two old friends. The first was Kim Chu-Han, a prominent radio network operator Kang had introduced to ham radio years earlier. The second was a classmate, Harry Cho, an operations manager in semiconductors. Kim had access to financing, Cho could sell, and Kang knew fab technology. Together, the three formulated an idea for a new company: Integrated Circuit International, Incorporated, or ICII.
ICII designed a digital watch chip, and made its first 5 micron CMOS large-scale integration (LSI) parts on a small 3” line in Sunnyvale, California during 1973. Demand was substantial, many times bigger than what ICII could produce, and customers held back volume production orders. Kim’s firm was willing to finance expansion, but would only do so if the capital expenditure remained inside Korea.
Kang decided to pivot. He would continue ICII chip design operations in the US, but send the ICII fabrication line to Puchon and expand it there. The new joint venture was Hankook Semiconductor. However, the global oil crisis in 1974 and a litany of import red tape made the relocation much more expensive than planned. The fab finally came up and produced chips, but operating funds dwindled dangerously low within a few months.
There were only so many places to go for major technology financing in Korea. The economic climate was worsening, with oil prices continuing to skyrocket and the Japanese pulling back. Samsung had money. Lee Byung-Chull and his son, Lee Kun-Hee, were convinced they had to enter the semiconductor business, not just buy chips. They tried persuading their management teams that advanced chips such as Hankook was building would be the future. Management balked.
Against such sage advice, on December 6, 1974, the Lees funded a stake in Hankook Semiconductor – using money from their own pockets. By the end of 1977, the operation was fully merged, becoming Samsung Semiconductor.
Developing DRAMs
Lee and his son understood one important concept that Kang and their own management team had missed: when it comes to chips, fab cap ex comes first, and if timed correctly, profits follow. Without sufficient fab capacity ready at the moment demand materializes, even the best chip designs cannot succeed. That lesson would repeat itself many times over as Samsung grew. Happily producing appliances, watches, radios, and TVs, Samsung focused on efficiency. Its assembly plants became more automated, and both Korean consumers and export trading partners were being supplied goods. An indicator of progress: Samsung Electronics America opened in New Jersey in July 1978. Research on semiconductors in Korea was booming. In 1976, the government-backed Korea Institute of Electronics Technology (KIET) opened a research center in Kumi. Among many activities, they set up a joint venture with VLSI Technology, and created a VLSI wafer fab with capability for 16K DRAMs by 1979.