In the 2007 Defense Authorization bill, Congress wrote into law that we must not go below eleven. Since December 2012, this has been lowered to ten so that USS Enterprise could be retired before USS Ford’s 2016 commissioning. The law was passed alongside development of the 2007 Maritime Strategy, which codified the need for combat power in two regions, the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean and Western Pacific. The strategy made certain key assumptions to arrive at eleven carriers operating out of two combat hubs.
First, the hubs would be occupied by a carrier continuously and indefinitely. This means no gaps in coverage, with coverage provided far into the future. Second, it does not matter specifically where the hubs are. Carriers could move to conduct operations outside of one of the hubs. The final assumption is that only one carrier at a time is required to “fill” a hub. With these assumptions, the math works like this:
To provide carriers in two regions, two must be in place. One will have recently arrived home. One will be on the way, with another in training. Thus, eight are necessary. However, eight carriers can provide continuous, but not indefinite coverage. Carriers require maintenance, like a three-and-a-half year midlife refueling process. Extended maintenance levies a requirement for a ninth carrier.
But ships need regular maintenance, too. Maintenance periods occur between regular deployments, lasting three to six months. So two additional carriers are required, one in maintenance for each hub, bringing us to eleven total.
The fleet has been at ten carriers since December 2012. This fall, Navy officials announced a gap of several months in the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean hub. After four years of lengthening deployments and preserving coverage from operationally strained geographic distances, ten proved insufficient to cover two hubs.
Keep in mind, eleven carriers are required for two hubs each requiring one carrier. If U.S. leadership determines a third carrier is required to supplement an existing hub (as was the case in the Middle East from 2010-2013) or to establish a temporary hub elsewhere, eleven carriers instantly become insufficient.
A new 2015 Navy strategy does not repeat the “two hub” construct, though combat power continues to be called for in the Western Pacific and the Middle East. Additionally, there has been no discussion of reducing naval presence in these two hubs.
The two hub concept was an artifact of the “War on Terror” and the Navy’s desire for a compelling planning narrative. China’s concerning behavior had yet to emerge, and Russia’s invasion of Georgia was a year away. Eleven carriers were deemed sufficient to meet the requirements of a world without today’s “near peer” power competition. This won’t be sufficient to preserve American naval superiority beyond 2015.
