Modern Carrier Battle Group..Strategies and Tactics

NikeX

Banned Idiot
Re: The End of the Carrier Age?

you forget that china is already capable of blinding imagery satellite with laser.

Your information is out of date. Countermeasures to deal with attempts to use lasers to blind satellite sensors were developed by the Americans and Russians decades ago. China is a new comer to the laser blinding business. These countermeasures were developed as part of the Starwars program in the 1980s

"....The U.S. Congress banned anti-satellite weapons testing for ten years in 1985, fearing it may spark an arms race. After this ban expired, the U.S. Army gained approval for testing from President Clinton in order to "develop countermeasures" in case American satellites are targeted. On October 21, 1997 the U.S. military tested an anti-satellite laser called the Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIACL). This TRW laser has been around since the 1980s, a left over from Reagan's "Star Wars" research programs. Test laser shots were fired at unused U.S. Air Force satellite 260 miles above Earth. The satellite was not destroyed, but the Army was more interested in testing the vulnerability of delicate satellite sensors. Huge ground based lasers probably cannot burn up anything in space because most all of the laser beam is scattered as it passes through the Earth's atmosphere. Nevertheless, blinding a reconnaissance satellite effectively destroys it. In December 2000, UPI published an article revealing that the U.S. and the Soviet Union have already fought in space...."
 

escobar

Brigadier
Re: The End of the Carrier Age?

Your information is out of date. Countermeasures to deal with attempts to use lasers to blind satellite sensors were developed by the Americans and Russians decades ago. China is a new comer to the laser blinding business. These countermeasures were developed as part of the Starwars program in the 1980s

"....The U.S. Congress banned anti-satellite weapons testing for ten years in 1985, fearing it may spark an arms race. After this ban expired, the U.S. Army gained approval for testing from President Clinton in order to "develop countermeasures" in case American satellites are targeted. On October 21, 1997 the U.S. military tested an anti-satellite laser called the Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIACL). This TRW laser has been around since the 1980s, a left over from Reagan's "Star Wars" research programs. Test laser shots were fired at unused U.S. Air Force satellite 260 miles above Earth. The satellite was not destroyed, but the Army was more interested in testing the vulnerability of delicate satellite sensors. Huge ground based lasers probably cannot burn up anything in space because most all of the laser beam is scattered as it passes through the Earth's atmosphere. Nevertheless, blinding a reconnaissance satellite effectively destroys it. In December 2000, UPI published an article revealing that the U.S. and the Soviet Union have already fought in space...."

The laser dazzling is not to destroy the satellite but blind it when it pass over critical military installation. After the pass-over the satellite works normally.
So Excuse me but your article doesn't say that US has developped and operate countermeasures which make laser dazzling useless against their imagery satellite sensor unless Unless I completely misunderstood your post.

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Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
Re: The End of the Carrier Age?

Your information is out of date. Countermeasures to deal with attempts to use lasers to blind satellite sensors were developed by the Americans and Russians decades ago. China is a new comer to the laser blinding business. These countermeasures were developed as part of the Starwars program in the 1980s

"....The U.S. Congress banned anti-satellite weapons testing for ten years in 1985, fearing it may spark an arms race. After this ban expired, the U.S. Army gained approval for testing from President Clinton in order to "develop countermeasures" in case American satellites are targeted. On October 21, 1997 the U.S. military tested an anti-satellite laser called the Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIACL). This TRW laser has been around since the 1980s, a left over from Reagan's "Star Wars" research programs. Test laser shots were fired at unused U.S. Air Force satellite 260 miles above Earth. The satellite was not destroyed, but the Army was more interested in testing the vulnerability of delicate satellite sensors. Huge ground based lasers probably cannot burn up anything in space because most all of the laser beam is scattered as it passes through the Earth's atmosphere. Nevertheless, blinding a reconnaissance satellite effectively destroys it. In December 2000, UPI published an article revealing that the U.S. and the Soviet Union have already fought in space...."

The point is that MOIRE satellite system is no more invulnerable than China's own satellites... and even if it did have 24/7 coverage over the westpac and could detect DF-21D firings it's not much different from today where early warning radars and satellites provide similar info...
Not to mention the fact it's service is hardly guaranteed. I wouldn't be surprised if this half a billion per pop satellite gets shut down in another round of budget cuts.



---------- Post added at 04:08 PM ---------- Previous post was at 04:05 PM ----------

why people labeled every weapons system china fielded "area denial".
sorry Bltizo but I am not at ease with this expression. If the AShBM was developped by USN, nobody will call it "USN area denial weapons"
the df-21d is an powerfull offensive weapon. call it "Area Denial Weapons" make it look like a "toy"

AShBM clearly is an A2AD weapon though. Sure every weapon can be called "offensive" but the way 022 FACs, shore based YJ-62 and the DF-21D are being used it's clearly meant to make it dangerous for the USN to operate in westpac during times of hih tension. And it's a potent doctrine, so calling DF-21D an "area denial weapon" isn't degrading it or anything.

And no one's called every PLA weapon "area denial" -- only the ones which are currently being used in that manner or could help in the A2AD system.
 
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escobar

Brigadier
Re: The End of the Carrier Age?

DF-21D ASBM Deployed, but China Daily Probably Incorrect in Claiming “2,700km Range”; Gen. Chen Bingde Never Said That

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The 2011 ROC National Defense Report has confirmed that “a small quantity of” DF-21D ASBMs “were produced and deployed in 2010,” thereby (in the report’s view) “increasing the difficulty of military maneuvers in the region for the U.S. Army.”

Now a key question remains: what are the missile’s specific capabilities? Unfortunately, open sources do not yet offer conclusive information on this subject. In fact, a Chinese state media source has confused the situation with what appears to be mis-applied datapoint.

On 11 July 2011 PLA Chief of General Staff General Chen Bingde became the first Chinese government official to confirm publicly that China is developing the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). According to an English-language China Daily article, the missile has “a maximum range of 2,700 kilometers” (1,678 miles). Of note, General Chen did not in any way ascribe a range or other specific missile performance parameters at the press conference. Indeed, an official in his position would be unlikely to do so. This was the China Daily’s own (likely erroneous) inject. China Daily was probably citing the DF-21A’s range, which SinoDefence and Wikipedia both list as 2,700 km. The reporters and editors at China Daily most likely mistook the DF-21A range figure for that of the DF-21D.

Here is a translation of General Chen’s statement:

Q: “I’m with the Associated Press and I have a question for General Chen. …There’s been much speculation about the operational readiness of the Dong-Feng 21-D, the so-called “carrier-killer” missile…. Can you give us some up-to-date information about these programs….”

GEN. CHEN: “Thank you for – (inaudible) – your questions to me. As for DF 21-D, in our meeting, Admiral Mullen talked about it. As for this type of weapons system, it is still under research-and-development process. It is not equipped yet. Even though we – if – even though if, in the future, we are successful in research and development of this kind of weapons system, it will, and remain, be a system for defense. And I expect that Chinese scientists will make some contributions in this aspect.

However, for all kinds of high-tech weapons systems, as far as the research and development is concerned, that is not an easy thing to do, because it requires a huge amount of resources, timings, technologies and so on. …”

General Chen addressed the topic of Chinese ASBM development by telling Chinese reporters that it was one of the issues that he had discussed with Admiral Mullen. He took pains to emphasize, however, that China’s ASBM is “still in the research stage” (还处于研究阶段), and “has not yet achieved operational capability” (尚未形成作战能力). Specifically, “the DF-21D is undergoing research, development, and testing, has not developed into an operational capability [or developing into capability is not an issue at present]” (东风21D正在研究, 正在科研, 在试验之中, 还没有形成能力问题). Xinhua paraphrases General Chen as explaining that he “hopes Chinese experts can contribute in this regard, but this sort of high-technology advanced weapon is very difficult to bring to maturity” (希望中国的专家们能在这方面有所贡献, 但是这种高新技术的尖端武器很难成熟). It quotes him directly once again as stressing that doing so “requires funding inputs, advanced technology, and high-quality talented personnel; these are all fundamental factors constraining its development” (要经费投入, 要先进的技术, 还要有高素质的人才, 这都是制约它发展的根本因素). The English-language China Daily article renders this as “It is a high-tech weapon and we face many difficulties in getting funding, advanced technologies and high-quality personnel, which are all underlying reasons why it is hard to develop this.” Specific documentation for these and other quotations is provided in the articles appended below.

Additionally, in YouTube and other footage of the 11 July 2011 press briefing with his closest American counterpart, Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, in which General Chen takes questions from reporters, it appears that he also uses the phrase “numerous difficulties” (困难重重) to describe the course of the missile’s development. This tone could be interpreted to reflect a high level of uncertainly and ambivalence about the missile’s immediate prospects, directed at a Chinese audience through Chinese media. Viewed in this light, the three factors General Chen outlines (funding, technology, talent) may be viewed as serious constraints, even bottlenecks, in the challenging task of successfully maturing and integrating an ASBM system of systems. According to Aviation Week’s Bradley Perrett, “Chen’s comments imply that any DF-21Ds that have been deployed are not regarded as properly developed.”

However, it is unclear why General Chen would choose a prominent venue to raise the issue of such a controversial and provocative a weapon as China’s ASBM only to say something that might undermine deterrence credibility—the equivalent of having ‘the onus without the bonus.’ As Perrett correctly points out, “The appearance of his statement in the China Daily is itself meaningful. The English-language newspaper’s special role is to act as a government mouthpiece directed at the outside world. Its reports on sensitive subjects often show signs of being carefully written to deliver a message for Beijing. The DF-21D is one such sensitive subject.”

As for the definition of “operational,” it seems likely that the U.S. and Chinese militaries have different definitions of what it means for a weapon to be operational, with the PLA’s definition in this case being more stringent, at least in certain respects. This would explain why Admiral Robert Willard, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, stated in December 2010: “I would gauge it as about the equivalent of a U.S. system that has achieved [Initial Operational Capability] IOC.” Perhaps also whereas Admiral Willard was speaking of the U.S. concept of IOC, General Chen is alluding to a Chinese benchmark closer to the U.S. concept of Full Operational Capability (FOC)—a much higher standard to meet, and one that no U.S. official has claimed publicly that China’s ASBM has achieved. In any case, this apparent discrepancy highlights the pitfalls of using U.S.-specific terms to describe foreign systems and capabilities. But it is worth revisiting Admiral Willard’s own statement of December 2010, which is not necessarily so different from General Chen’s: “The anti-ship ballistic missile system in China has undergone extensive testing. An analogy using a Western term would be ‘initial operational capability,’ whereby it has—I think China would perceive that it has—an operational capability now, but they continue to develop it. It will continue to undergo testing, I would imagine, for several more years.” As in so many other areas, authorities on the respective sides of the Pacific may be talking past each other when in fact they are saying broadly similar things. It would be a mistake to let semantic issues obscure real Chinese progress with real strategic implications.

There may be other factors at play as well: General Chen may be downplaying Chinese capabilities to attempt to minimize foreign development of countermeasures to them. At the same time, the PLA may feel the need to meet a higher standard of testing before it can be confident of a novel weapon’s effectiveness because it lacks the U.S. military’s years of experience in high-intensity combat, sophisticated testing, and simulation. But it would be a mistake to assume that China’s DF-21D ASBM lacks what the U.S. military would consider to be lower-end “operational” capabilities just because it apparently does not yet meet General Chen’s definition. Here an American example may be relevant. The U.S. Air Force did not receive its first E-8 Joint STARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System), an airborne battle management, command and control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platform, until June 1996—meaning that the aircraft officially did not achieve IOC until then. However, two developmental aircraft were employed operationally as early as 1991 in Operation Desert Storm even though it was still in test and evaluation at the time.

Definitional issues aside, the bottom line is that General Chen would likely not be mentioning China’s ASBM in public if the PLA were not confident that it was maturing effectively and already had reached the necessary development level to begin to credibly shape regional strategic thinking in Beijing’s favor. China seeks not to wage war, but to have to have an effective conventional deterrent capability; and, in a worst case scenario, to have a strike capability if deterrence failed. This is why, General Chen is quoted as stressing in the English-language China Daily article, China’s ASBM “will be used as a defensive weapon when it is successfully developed, not an offensive one.” The goal is to push foreign aircraft carrier groups away from sensitive areas in the event of a crisis or conflict, and to influence the perceptions of people in Taiwan, Japan, and other parts of the region about the likelihood, and likely effectiveness, of U.S. intervention therein. From a Chinese perspective, this appears inherently defensive; from the perspective of the U.S. and other regional actors, it may not appear “defensive” at all. Herein lies a substantial challenge for Sino-American strategic relations even as the two great powers move to explore possibilities for mutually beneficial security cooperation in the future.

This will bear close study as further data points become available. Stay tuned!

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NikeX

Banned Idiot
Re: The End of the Carrier Age?

The point is that MOIRE satellite system is no more invulnerable than China's own satellites... and even if it did have 24/7 coverage over the westpac and could detect DF-21D firings it's not much different from today where early warning radars and satellites provide similar info...
Not to mention the fact it's service is hardly guaranteed. I wouldn't be surprised if this half a billion per pop satellite gets shut down in another round of budget cuts.

The subject was laser blinding of the satellite sensors. The reference I gave shows that this would be difficult with the level of technology China possesses today. Also MOIRE is a fresh new technology that uses concepts noone has tried before. The key thing to pay attention to is the use of a lightweight membrane optic etched with a diffractive pattern to perform the imaging. This lens method allows this surveillance satellite to perform its mission of 24 / 7 real time video from geosynchronous orbit and not use low earth orbit like current surveillance satellites use. This makes it a very difficult satellite to deal with. All in all the MOIRE satellite represents a major leap forward because it replaces several redundant systems. This makes it cost effective and saves money

Finally this is a DARPA project and DARPA gets their funding right off the top

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escobar

Brigadier
Re: The End of the Carrier Age?

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Transcript of Remarks by Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General Chen Bingde , Beijing, China Monday, July 11, 2011


MR. : (In progress) – (in Mandarin).

(In English) – first of all, I would like to give the floor to General Chen.

GENERAL CHEN BINGDE: (Remarks delivered in Mandarin, and translated into English.) Good afternoon, friends from the press. At my invitation, Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, is now officially visiting China. His visit is the reciprocal visit of my May visit to United States. I’d like to take this opportunity to extend my heartfelt welcome to his visit. I would also speak highly of the tremendous efforts that Admiral Mullen has done for the friendship and the – (inaudible) – of relations between the two nations and two militaries of China and United States.

In a period of a little bit more than one month’s time, the senior military leaders of China and the United States have realized exchanges of visit. This has been unprecedented in the past history of engagement between Chinese and American militaries, and I think it also sends out a very positive message to the international community on the shared commitment of the two militaries in implementing the consensus reached by the two presidents and shared vision for a friendly and cooperative relations between the two militaries.

The Chinese side places great value on Admiral Mullen’s visit. And we have made careful preparations and thoughtful consideration taken in putting up the itinerary for Admiral Mullen’s visit. Chinese national and military leaders will meet – will have meetings with Admiral Mullen, and Admiral Mullen will – or already visited units and facilities of PLA across different services. He will visit PLA military bases and also observe new type of PLA military equipment. In addition to that, he will also observe a command post exercise. This fully demonstrate the very positive attitude of the Chinese side attaches towards the development of Chinese-American mil-to-mil relations.

Just now, Admiral Mullen and I haved meetings both in small scale and large scale. We exchanged ideas in a very in-depth and candid manner on relations between the two countries and two militaries, on issues regarding global and regional situation, as well as issues of common interests. In many areas, we reached agreement, and of course we have acknowledged that we do have some differences, too.

And the main content, we already have released to you in the written form.

In a small-scale meeting, we mainly talked about four issues: first, South China Sea; second, some American politicians’ or leaders’ attitudes towards China; three, cyberspace security; and fourth, PLA force development.

Senior visit is an important indicator for the level of mil-to-mil relations. And the purpose of senior visit is to further promote sound, steady and reliable development of military-to-military relationship. We clearly acknowledge that further upgrade of China-U.S. mil-to-mil relations is faced with both good opportunities for development, and also quite a number of difficulties and obstacles. Some existing issues have yet to be properly addressed and solved. And we are also having some new issues too. Some artificial frictions or difficulties are worrisome.

Only with – (inaudible) – these principles of mutual respect, mutual trust, equality and mutual benefit, only by taking concrete measures to deal with the frictions and difficulties, could the mil-to-mil relations surely achieve new progress.

The key to develop a healthy, stable and reliable mil-to-mil relations is mutual trust. And the precondition of it is mutual respect. One who respects others will be respected by others. When a country who respects other countries will be respected by other countries. If one does not show respect or trust on matters, that is the – that will hurt feelings of others most. If there is lack of respect and trust between countries, then the relationship between countries will be baseless.

I sincerely and truly hope that our American friends will understand the underlying logic, be more modest and prudent in words and deeds. We are very pleased to see that at present, the China-U.S. military-to-military relationship is coming back to its track; it is recovering very well. And such a product that has not come by easily deserves efforts from both sides to cherish and to keep it well.

In the meetings with Admiral Mullen, I very candidly talked about what we Chinese people are thinking. And to be frank, from our perspective, we are also aware of the fact that there are people in America who intentionally make troubles for the development of relations between the two nations. Lately, as we observed, for example, Dalai Lama visited U.S. again, and there are already senior politicians meeting with him. And the damage to bilateral relations is obvious.

On various occasions, U.S. side has expressed that U.S. has not – does not have the intention to intervene into the disputes in South China Sea. However, we are observing the latest joint exercises between U.S. and other countries – for example, Philippines and Vietnam. Although we acknowledge that those exercises were (the ?) – in the past, however, those – however, the timing of those joint exercises is inappropriate, as we see it.

As both senior leaders of Chinese and American military, Admiral Mullen and I share the responsibility and capability to make our due contribution for the development of bilateral and mil-to-mil relations. Thank you.

MR. : Admiral, please.

ADMIRAL MICHAEL MULLEN: Thank you, General Chen, for your kind invitation to visit. And I actually give you a great deal of credit for taking positive steps to renew this mil-to-mil relationship, and recognize the example you set by taking the first step to – step to visit the United States.

And I also want to thank you for the personal attention you paid to making my time with you productive and positive. I’m looking forward to the rest of my itinerary and seeing several of your installations and military units.

But I must say that already, it’s been very much a worthwhile trip. Indeed, we discussed many important issues of mutual concern this morning, and I believe we went a long way toward advancing some of the initiatives to which we both committed during your visit to the United States in May.

I was pleased that we were able to confirm that military maritime consultative agreement working groups will meet in China and at the U.S. Pacific Command in Hawaii to discuss the operational safety issues, and that our navies will participate in joint counterpiracy exercises in the Gulf of Aden by the end of this year.

I was also gratified to begin discussing more details about our efforts to conduct joint humanitarian assistance and disaster-relief exercises in 2012.

All of these initiatives speak to the very real challenges and security threats our two nations share not only in the region but around the globe. And it is vital that we begin to plan seriously around the cooperative efforts to deal with these challenges.

Time is not on our side; piracy, for instance, continues to grow more costly and more prevalent near the Horn of Africa, depriving the commercial shipping industry of millions of dollars each year in ransom, insurance and security measures. Nearly 12 percent of the world’s petroleum passes through the Gulf of Aden alone, making it one of the world’s most important waterways. Threats to that free flow of commerce affect everyone, and therefore everyone has a stake and a responsibility to work together to secure it.

Likewise, everyone is affected directly or indirectly by natural disasters and humanitarian crises. And those two seem more frequent and more deadly. By some estimates, natural disasters killed at least a quarter of a million people in 2010, making it the deadliest year in more than a generation.

And we’ve already seen our share of such crises this year, from powerful earthquakes in Japan and New Zealand, to catastrophic flooding in Pakistan and Australia, to a significant hailstorm right here in China last April.

These pressing and largely unpredictable events drive militaries around the world to respond and to cooperate in ways they have not expected, and for which they might not always be prepared.

That is why it is essential for our two militaries – which although we possess significant capabilities, do not have a long history of sharing those capabilities – to begin to develop that sort of mutual support.

It will not be easy. We are trying to fashion together a relationship and build much-needed trust at a time of great change and great uncertainty, all the while working and expending resources to do those things that our governments and our citizens logically expect of us, and this in a region that remains as dynamic, and it is vital to global economic health and prosperity.

As I said yesterday to the university students at Renmin, the really hard work begins right now. We can shrink from this great opportunity or we can rise to meet it. We can allow narrow interests and suspicion to define us in our relations with each other or we can try to find ways to put those aside for better and more transparency, clear and more pragmatic expectations of one another, and a more focused effort to address our common challenges.

I believe I speak for General Chen when I say, we both seek the latter. We both seek a better and more consistent relationship; we both seek the beginnings of a strategic trust. This does – this does not mean we will always agree. There remain between us many issues of misunderstanding and, quite frankly, apprehension. Some are geographic in nature, some are philosophical, some are economic, and others are driven by history. But we cannot let that history render our future more perilous than it is already.

We cannot let past be prologue. The world is too dangerous and the threats are too near. Now is the time for our two militaries to move forward and try to achieve the vision our two presidents have articulated. Now is the time to find common ground and lay a foundation upon it. And I would not be here today if the United States were not ready to do just that.

ADM. MULLEN: Xiè xiè. (Thank you.)

MR. : The floor is open.

MR. : First question is going to go to Alexa Olesen from the Associated Press.

Q: Thank you very much. I’m with the Associated Press and I have a question for General Chen. OK. There’s been much speculation about the operational readiness of the Dong-Feng 21-D, the so-called “carrier-killer” missile, and also speculation about when we’ll see sea trials for China’s first aircraft carrier. Can you give us some up-to-date information about these programs and elaborate to say, if you would, how many aircraft carrier – aircraft carriers China should have by 2020?

And also, could you maybe respond to the concerns that China’s growing military capability has aroused in the region and also in Washington? And finally, for clarity, could you maybe tell us, does China consider the South China Sea a so-called “core interest?” Thank you.

(Cross talk.)

GEN. CHEN: Thank you for – (inaudible) – your questions to me. As for DF 21-D, in our meeting, Admiral Mullen talked about it. As for this type of weapons system, it is still under research-and-development process. It is not equipped yet. Even though we – if – even though if, in the future, we are successful in research and development of this kind of weapons system, it will, and remain, be a system for defense. And I expect that Chinese scientists will make some contributions in this aspect.

However, for all kinds of high-tech weapons systems, as far as the research and development is concerned, that is not an easy thing to do, because it requires a huge amount of resources, timings, technologies and so on.

As far as aircraft carrier is concerned, actually, I do not have anything to add, since it’s already widely reported by press. I’m sure American friends is aware of the fact that we did purchase the hulk of a Ukrainian aircraft carrier before. It is out of service, and it is a valuable thing for us to make some research and development based on that.

I didn’t have the opportunity to visit a U.S. aircraft carrier during my visit to United States. I know U.S. possessed a dozen of aircraft carriers, and with that, you can truly – America could truly call itself a major military power. China is a big country, but we only have quite a number of ships, but small ships. And this is not commensurate with the status of the country of China.

Of course, I hope that in the future, we will have aircraft carriers. But you asked about how many carriers do we plan to build in the future? Actually, I am not briefed on that. My leaders, my boss hasn’t told me about that. Therefore, I cannot answer that here.

Well, in the future, if I do have the information, if my leader tell me about that and also ask me to release the message, I – you will be the first one I will – I will – I will release the message to. So please give me your name card when you leave.

I will take the third question that you raised, about the military development of PLA. Indeed, we increased input on the force development of PLA since the beginning of reform and opening up. However, you have also to be clear – crystally (ph) clear of the fact that before the reform and opening-up period, the input on the military has been very – was very limited. And if I quote the famous saying of the late Mr. Deng Xiaoping, the military must be patient at that time, as he instructed us, and all the money needs to go to the economy first. Therefore, the current modernization drive that we are conducting now is purely compensatory.

As I said in the press conference while I was visiting D.C., there is still an over 20-year gap between China and the United States in terms of its weapon system. The input – the military spending between the two nations are also incomparable. U.S. has a military budget over $700 billion, where ours is only 800 billion RMB. This is not in the same scale. So there is really not necessary for American friends to truly worry about that.

The sole purpose of our force development is to ensure territorial integrity, national security, and to prevent secessionist forces from Taiwan to separate Taiwan from the country. Of course, although I said that, our priority and our hope is that we may eventually unify the country through peaceful and – through peaceful means and through good political wisdom.

United States has the most advanced military power in the world. U.S. is the bellwether in the military field in the world. We are still 20 or 30 years behind, so no matter how we developed, we’ll still be behind U.S. I remember I said that after visiting U.S. facilities and watching U.S. military equipments, I was a bit sad in the press conference in D.C. And why I was sad, I didn’t elaborate on at that time.

Actually, what I was thinking is, I know U.S. is still recovering from financial crisis, still have some difficulties in its economy, while at the same – while at the – again, in such circumstances, U.S. still spending so much money on the military. And isn’t it placing too much pressure on its – on the taxpayers? If U.S. could reduce a bit military spending to spend more on the improvement of livelihood of the American people and also do more good things for world people, wouldn’t it – wouldn’t it be a better scenario?

But somehow, I also think, trying to persuade myself that maybe it’s because U.S. has high income and American people has high income, and that’s why they are willing to pay hundreds of billions of U.S. dollars in its military. Maybe that’s the underlying logic in it. But still, in my mind, what I am thinking is that it would be a better thing if U.S. does not spend so much money on the military while a little bit more on other areas so as to play a very positive role – constructive role for world peace and stability.

China is the largest developing country in the world. Since the beginning of reform and opening up over several years ago, Chinese economy has made remarkable progress, as we recognize it. Now China’s economy ranks world’s number two.

However, at the same time, I hope friends could truly understand that no matter how big that number is, once it’s – sorry, divided by the 1.3 billion Chinese people, then the per-capita GDP ranks about 100th place in world ranking. If Chinese people are leading a life – are leading a life as good as Americans, we would be much, more optimistic.

In the process of development, and from opening up, we did have this – difficulties and problems of this or that kind. However, we think we regard them as the issues in the process, in the way ahead. We are still moving forward. And I believe China’s leaders are capable and wise enough to solve those issues and to press ahead with reform, opening up a course. But right now, the problem is – our sole purpose is to make China a better country, and make China’s people’s lives happier lives. If we spend so much money on military, I don’t think China’s people will agree on that.

The forced development in the – of the Chinese military will be conductive for world peace and stability, as demonstrated by China’s participation in peacekeeping operations, counterpiracy operations in Gulf of Aden, and participation in international HADR operations. For example, last year when an earthquake took place in Haiti, within 38 hours China’s rescue team arrived in Haiti, before the Americans had arrived.

And this has been raised to me for a couple of times during the various meetings between Admiral Mullen and I since May. But actually, although we’re happy about what we did, but still we are aware of the fact that what we lack most is the capability of first projection – long-distance projection. As for South China Sea, we’ve already talked about it, and I don’t intend to make too much time out of Admiral Mullen’s portion, so I will give the floor to him.

Q: (In Mandarin.) With CCTV. First question: This time, Admiral, you have received with a high degree of courtesy and the thoughtful arrangements extended to Chinese – by Chinese host. As we know it, your first stop actually in the military portion of the itinerary yesterday afternoon was to very mysterious Second Artillery force. Is it true, as sort of guessed by many press, that you became the first senior American military person to have a close look at Second Artillery’s weapon system? And if that’s true, how do you like it? How do you feel about it?

Second, I noticed that the end – to the end of the last – in the end of last year you talked about mil-to-mil relations between China and the United States. And you emphasized that the military – the two militaries should not have a zero-sum game; both should look into the future. And we do notice that since the beginning of – in the first half of this year, there has more frequent exchanges of senior visits, while at the same time one cannot deny that during also – during the same period U.S. has been engaged in very frequent military exercises or maneuvers in the peripheral areas of China, including South China Sea. How do you define or how do you explain the relationship between those two frequent –trends of frequency with reduction of miscalculation and confidence building between China and United States?

ADM. MULLEN: Well, first of all, I greatly appreciate the opportunity yesterday to visit the Second Artillery. And I know there have been other visitors there historically, but there were some specific details which I know I was the first one to be able to see. And I know General Chen made that a priority, and it was a significant effort to recognize the importance of my visit here. And so I greatly appreciate that.

As I indicated in my discussions with General Chen, the two recent visits – his to the United States, mine here – are the renewal of the military-to-military relationships starting, really, with Secretary Gates’ visits here in January. And we both think that this is absolutely vital between our two countries, but also for the prosperity and security in the region – and stability in the region. The United States is had a – has had a presence in the Asia-Pacific region for decades. And we’ve exercised with our allied and friends in this part of the world for decades. And we will continue to do that.

I think the challenge that you raise in your question is how do we – how do we coordinate, now do we integrate, the long-standing interests that the United States has had, and the presence and military capabilities that we have in the region with the interests and concerns of China, particularly as China grows and I think that’s part of the challenge that we are obligated as leaders to address, and we’re trying to do that. Both of us committed to do so in a peaceful way to ensure that stability.

I think the ability to coordinate – to reach an understanding is greatly facilitated by these counterpart visits. And we’ve had very frank and open discussions, and in a few weeks we know each other a great deal better than we had in the past. And I’m encouraged by that. And it gives us an opportunity to focus on those things that we have in common, and also those differences for the betterment of the relationship between the countries and, I think, peace and stability in the region.

We, the United States, has enduring interests in the region, and we will continue to support those enduring interests. And we want to do it in a way that is supportive of this relationship as well. Thank you.

MR. : Now, we are running out of time, so the last two questions, one from each side.

MR. : Next question will be from Jeremy Page, Wall Street Journal.

Q: Thank you. I have a question for – some questions for both General Chen and Admiral Mullen about the South China Sea. General Chen, you mentioned that the South China Sea was the first of four issues which you raised in your meeting with Admiral Mullen. I was wondering if you could give us some details about what you said on the subject, and why. And going back to an earlier question, could you also clarify whether China does consider the South China Sea to be one of its core interests? Admiral Mullen, I was wondering if you could tell us more about your response to General Chen on the subject.

And a question for both of you: Has either side moved any closer towards reaching a compromise from your respective positions? Specifically, is the Chinese side any more willing to accept that the U.S. has an interest in freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and that some of the issues there might be resolved through multilateral negotiations, rather than bilateral ones?

And Admiral Mullen, is the U.S. prepared to consider rolling back any of its reconnaissance activities there, for example? And if no progress was made on this issue, how do you, both sides, intend to go forwards to try to achieve some compromise on the subject? Thank you.

GEN CHEN: I will give the honor to my guest to take these first. (Laughter.)

ADM. MULLEN: As I indicated earlier, we had very frank discussions about this issue. It focused, in my – or actually, our focus focused on freedom of navigation. And quite frankly, we have no differences with respect to freedom of navigation. It’s a very important underlying principle that doesn’t just apply in the South China Sea, but applies around the world. I’m a sailor; I’ve been navigating freely my whole life. And it’s an underlying principle we must, I believe, both constantly support.

This is a critical area, critical sea lane, lots of commerce. Many countries depend on it, not just China and the United States. And we agree that we need to continue to pursue peaceful resolution of the – of the disputes, if you will. The United States has a very important relationship with China, but we also have important relationships with other countries, the countries that General Chen mentioned, Vietnam, the Philippines. But there are other countries who are certainly involved in disputed territories.

And so I am certain that the United States will stay engaged. We choose not to take a position with respect to how the disputes should be resolved, and I’m sure that we will sustain that position. But we are very anxious to see that, one, the sea lanes stay open and, two, that these issues get resolved.

GEN. CHEN: (Chuckles.) So your question – your question is composed of three smaller ones, and I must confess that American journalists are very professional. China has undisputable sovereignty over islands in South China Sea, and its peripheral waters. Although there are some countries who host different opinions, but I think our differences could be worked through diplomatic means and peaceful communications. China’s position in this aspect is clear-cut and consistent. Our sovereignty has sufficient, adequate, historical and legal evidence and foundation.

As for those territorial disputes, our position has always been to solve this issue through bilateral channels in a peaceful manner. In this issue, China has always been emphasizing the principles of shelving differences and common – the common exploitation of the resources. By shelving differences, we mean shelving differences between China and other claimants. By joint exploitation of the resources, we mean that between China and claimants. It is not an issue of irrelevant countries intervening into either shelving differences or joint exploitation of resources.

Of course, while some countries engaged in unauthorized resource-exploitation programs, China has every right to safeguard its own interests. As stated by your State Department and also explained by Admiral Mullen, this position in this issue is that U.S. does not take positions and U.S. does not intend to intervene into this issue. As for those – as for those exercises, there were exercises before of this kind.

These are simply words; however, what we are observing is that at this particular time, when China and related claimants have some difficulties, have some problems with each other, U.S. decided to host such large-scale joint exercises with other claimants. At least, I think, this is bad timing, and the timing is inappropriate.

As for freedom of navigation, my question, actually – I’m always thinking this, even among the – (inaudible) – about those reports about – on the accusation of China’s standing in the way of freedom of navigation. My question is, as far as all the information available to me, is there any case that China stood in a way that really impact the freedom of navigation of United States? Actually, in South China Sea, freedom of navigation has never been an issue or a problem. Or, rather, it only drives me to think in an alternative way, the issue of freedom of navigation simply serve as an excuse or a reason to play up the sensationalization.

I don’t think it is realistic for some countries who might be thinking of using U.S. support to address this issue. I’m confident that China, together with other, related claimant countries, are wise and capable enough to appropriately address this issue in a peaceful way, through diplomatic and political channels. Therefore, I believe that there’s no need for our American friends to worry about the freedom of navigation in this region.

You also raise the question regarding the reconnaissance activities by U.S. aircraft and ships. Actually, it is a very good question, and I want to take this opportunity to express some of my feelings. I know it has been a consistent kind of policy by United States that this practice has been in the past, and it has been a common practice in all parts of the world by U.S. military. It is simply an issue of doing it more closer or more further, more often or less often. However, even so, could serve our demand.

The closest the distance between the operating unmanned aerial vehicle of U.S. is as short as 16 nautical miles away from Chinese territorial line – or, territorial-waters line – and above. And I truly think that our American friends could take into consideration of the feelings of Chinese people and the military of China and truly do something more conducive to – for the peaceful development of the bilateral and military relations.

China is a responsible country, and it is not that necessary for U.S. to engage in so frequent closing reconnaissance activities against China. And in fact, it does not help the friendly and cooperative relations between the two militaries. On the contrary, it increases the difficulty.

As I mentioned in the large-scale meeting with Admiral Mullen, I said that we truly hope that U.S. would be prudent in words and deeds. Thank you.

Q: (In Mandarin.) (Inaudible) – National Radio. Admiral Mullen, as we observed in the past, there were many senior American leaders who publically announced that the U.S. plans to regard China as a partner while they were visiting China, and then while they were visiting neighboring countries of China they would – were likely to highlight the so-called China threat. So my questions is for Admiral Mullen: When do you think it is appropriate to – how do you look at this phenomenon? And how do you think – what – (inaudible) – should be proper for the West to highlight the partnership side of China and the threat side of China?

And also, I noticed that before your visit to China you mentioned to the press that U.S. plans to keep long-term presence in South China Sea. My question is, in what form that U.S. is planning to keep long-term presence in South China Sea? Does it mean the establishment of new military bases? If so, what countries in which the bases will be established? And with that, I want to ask General Chen that if a long-term presence of U.S. is there, how do you look at it? And how do you think that the two countries should work together in that aspect?

ADM. MULLEN: With respect to the first question, I’d – I guess I’d let my actions speak louder than my words as I travel to other countries with respect to how I see China. I’m here because I think we need to focus on the military-to-military relationship, which looks to a future between our countries that our president has put a vision out in support of as partners, and certainly not as enemies.

When I spoke to an enduring presence, I speak of the region, not specifically of the South China Sea, although we’ve operated in the South China Sea for decades and will continue to do that. And that doesn’t speak to plans for new bases in the region at all. I mean, we have forces – we have U.S. forces which are stationed in the region already. We also have transitory forces that come through the region as well.

I would only add for clarity purposes, because you ask about our presence here, is the exercises to which General Chen referred actually were long-planned, and I would differ from him in the sense that – not really large-scale. We could have a debate about that. But again, they are exercises we had planned with our other allies in the region.

And the reconnaissance flights that were mentioned, obviously we have challenges there. I understand that. We discussed that. And we need to continue to work for – work towards an understanding as these differences continue to be out there. And that’s one of the reasons I’m here, that’s why General Chen visited the United States, and that’s why it’s so important that we have a robust military-to-military relationship.

These flights, these operations, these exercises are all conducted in accordance with international norms, and will – and essentially, we will continue to comply with that in the future. And at a very high level, we see resolution of our differences so that his partnership can get stronger and stronger. Xiè xiè.

GEN. CHEN: Thank you for the question. As for the U.S. presence in South China Sea, actually it is already a fact. And the U.S. position, I understand, is their existence is for U.S. interests – because of U.S. interests, and therefore their presence will be there. However, there are some other issues I cannot get very clear answer. For example, for presence, how big should be the presence? For what, and for those exercises, who is it targeting at?

And in terms of the purpose of those exercises, Admiral Mullen and I do have different opinions in our discussions. I’m not trying to force – insist so much on my own understanding, but I still – I believe that no matter how small the exercise would be, they’re still military exercises and they are conducted – they were conducted at a time when China had some problems with Vietnam and Philippines.

If U.S. truly intends to make positive contributions in that, I think a change of the schedule wouldn’t be an issue. If that would be the case, then the peace and stability of this region will be ensured, and every country – China, U.S., Vietnam, Philippines – will benefit from it too, I believe. It’s not that difficult thing to change a schedule.

All in all, I hope the U.S. military presence in this region will make every country pleased, and for the sake of regional peace and stability instead of anything unpleasant.

---------- Post added at 05:26 AM ---------- Previous post was at 05:16 AM ----------

- he said nothing about the missile range

-
As I said in the press conference while I was visiting D.C., there is still an over 20-year gap between China and the United States in terms of its weapon system. The input – the military spending between the two nations are also incomparable. U.S. has a military budget over $700 billion, where ours is only 800 billion RMB. This is not in the same scale. So there is really not necessary for American friends to truly worry about that.

Military budget 800 billions RMB = 123 billions $
is it an error or the real officially military budget?

- the chinese general can be pretty funny
 

NikeX

Banned Idiot
Re: The End of the Carrier Age?

The laser dazzling is not to destroy the satellite but blind it when it pass over critical military installation. After the pass-over the satellite works normally.
So Excuse me but your article doesn't say that US has developped and operate countermeasures which make laser dazzling useless against their imagery satellite sensor unless Unless I completely misunderstood your post.

We are not talking about destroying the satellite but damaging its sensors for some period of time. As the reference I posted showed the Americans and Russians both used lasers in the way China is attempting today. This use occurred in the 1980's. And from these uses several countermeasures were developed that address what China is attempting today.

Remember this was in the 1980s. Unless China has developed something new it is likely they will use methods that were tried before by the Russians and Americans.

Just so you will understand, one method developed was the use of coatings on the optics that reflected the incoming laser light away from the sensitive imaging instruments. Other methods used were girds that acted like mirrors on one side but allowed the satellite sensors to see out from the other side. Something like a two way mirror

There are many ways to deal with someone attempting to blind your satellites

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Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
Re: The End of the Carrier Age?

No doubt there are ways to limit the damage a laser can do to a satellite's optics.

I wonder how the MOIRE's membrane will change the satellite's survivability...
 

NikeX

Banned Idiot
Re: The End of the Carrier Age?

No doubt there are ways to limit the damage a laser can do to a satellite's optics.

I wonder how the MOIRE's membrane will change the satellite's survivability...

Actually its the very high geosynchronous orbit that offers a great degree of protection

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escobar

Brigadier
Re: The End of the Carrier Age?

We are not talking about destroying the satellite but damaging its sensors for some period of time. As the reference I posted showed the Americans and Russians both used lasers in the way China is attempting today. This use occurred in the 1980's. And from these uses several countermeasures were developed that address what China is attempting today.

Remember this was in the 1980s. Unless China has developed something new it is likely they will use methods that were tried before by the Russians and Americans.

Just so you will understand, one method developed was the use of coatings on the optics that reflected the incoming laser light away from the sensitive imaging instruments. Other methods used were girds that acted like mirrors on one side but allowed the satellite sensors to see out from the other side. Something like a two way mirror

There are many ways to deal with someone attempting to blind your satellites

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ok i see.
So if i understand there already US imagery sat with this feature?

---------- Post added at 06:04 AM ---------- Previous post was at 06:01 AM ----------

Actually its the very high geosynchronous orbit that offers a great degree of protection

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put imagery sat into geosynchronous orbit??:confused:
 
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