Re: The End of the Carrier Age?
This paper discuss several way China are contemplating to fool ABM like THAAD or SM3 Very interesting old from 2002 but still relevant Check chapter 5
Counterintercept (fanlanzai).
The second major category of countermeasures seeks to deny missile
defense interceptors the ability to properly engage their targets. These
include: (1) multiple warheads, (2) maneuvering reentry vehicles, and
(3) hardening/spinning of ballistic missiles.
1. Multiple Warheads. China has had the capability to develop and
deploy a multiple reentry vehicle system for many years, including a
MIRV system. As of January 1996, CALT was in the midst of developing
multiple warhead payloads, each with its own guidance system and
maneuvering capability.74 Research and development on multiple
independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs) was initiated as early as 1970.
Technical difficulties, however, stalled the program. CALT renewed
research and development in 1983, shortly after the SDI announcement in
March 1983. The DF-5A, able to strike targets throughout the United
States, was the designated recipient of the MIRVs, although there is no
evidence to date that they have been deployed. The U.S. intelligence
community assesses that China could develop a multiple RV system for the
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DF-5 ICBM in a few years. Chinese pursuit of a multiple RV capability for its
mobile ICBMs and SLBMs would encounter significant technical hurdles
and would be costly.75
Critical to this effort is the miniaturization of warheads, a possible
objective of tests at Lop Nur over the last few years.76 According to
Chinese missile designers, real and decoy warheads can be mixed using
multiple warhead technology. Real warheads can be coated with radar
absorbing materials in order to weaken radar returns and reduce the
ability of interceptors to discriminate real from decoy warheads.77
2. Maneuvering Reentry Vehicles. CALT also is developing
maneuverable reentry vehicles in order to complicate missile defense
tracking. Missile designers believe maneuvering is not only a means to
complicate ballistic missile defenses, but is essential for terminal
guidance packages. While vehicles can maneuver at any time during
flight, Chinese engineers see most utility in programming a reentry
vehicle to maneuver in its terminal phase, 20-30 seconds before striking its
target. A reentry vehicle traveling a notional range of 10,000 kilometers has
the ability to maneuver within a lateral range of 556-900 kilometers.
Another maneuvering option discussed is to send the warhead up to a
higher altitude after separation from the missile, slowly descending in a
glide for a very long distance, and then finally dive toward the target.
Missile designers have demonstrated a special interest in the speed control
maneuver used in the 1,800-kilometer range Pershing-II.78 Chinese
engineers are addressing problems associated with maintaining accuracy
after exoatmospheric maneuvering.79 Through modeling and simulation,
CASC has determined that maneuvering is a viable means to reduce
land-based lower tier missile defense systems’ probability of kill.80
China allegedly acquired PATRIOT technology to calibrate an auxiliary
propulsion system on the DF-15 reentry vehicle to enable the payload
to outmaneuver a PATRIOT system as it reenters the atmosphere.81 After
computer simulations and modeling exercises, CALT is confident that its
maneuverable theater ballistic missile reentry vehicles can defeat
In addition to the techniques described above, a range of other technical
and operational countermeasures also are under consideration. These
include: (1) trajectory techniques, (2) longer range development of nonnuclear
electromagnetic pulse warheads, (3) indigenous missile defense
development, (4) anti-satellite (ASAT) development, and (5) multi-axis
strikes.
1. Trajectory Techniques. The type of trajectory Second Artillery
engineers select can affect the ability to penetrate missile defense
systems. Types of trajectories include: (1) fractional orbital
bombardment system, (2) depressed trajectories, and (3) lofted
trajectories. China conducted a feasibility study on a fractional orbital
bombardment system (FOBS) in 1966. This system launches a missile into
very low orbit, approximately 160 kilometers above earth. Before
completion of the first orbit, a retro-rocket reduces the speed of the
warhead, which hits the target with only a few minutes warning. Chinese
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engineers explored the potential of launching a missile to a
predesignated point over Antarctica as a means to penetrate the weakest
point in the U.S. Warning network.85 Still viewing a FOBS as an
alternative, Chinese designers continue feasibility studies on fractional
orbiting missiles (bufen guidao daodan).86
Chinese analysts view depressed trajectories (yadi guidao) as another
option to counter space-based and mid-course missile defense systems.
Chinese engineers note that ICBMs often reach altitudes of 2,000
kilometers on a normal trajectory. However, launching a missile at a
depressed trajectory could allow the missile to achieve only a 100
kilometer altitude, complicating the ability of some space-based systems to
engage the ballistic missile. Testing and modeling has been done on the
DF-3, which normally has a range of 2,780 km and an altitude of 550 km
when flying a nominal trajectory. With depressed trajectory, the DF-3
travels 1,550 km at 100 km altitude.87
Lofted trajectories (tagao dandao) are another option that Chinese
missileers may consider. A longer range ballistic missile does not
necessarily mean the missile will be used at its maxim umeffective
range. A longer range system, fired on a lofted trajectory, can also
serve as a technical countermeasure to missile defenses. Lofted
trajectories can increase reentry speed, thereby complicating intercept
solutions for terminal defense systems or reducing the footprint or
defended area.88
2. EMP warheads. PRC engineers also are conducting feasibility studies
on electromagnetic pulse weapons (EMP) to overcome defenses. EMP
systems, such as a high powered microwave (HPM) warhead, could negate
space or ground-based sensors that support a missile defense
architecture. PLA writings indicate that fielding of an EMP warhead is a
relatively high priority. HPM devices in particular are viewed as a
“natural enemy” of more technologically advanced militaries and an
“electronic trump card” (dianzi shashou).
