Anatomy of a Blunder
NATO expansion redivided Europe, isolated Ukraine, and enabled Vladimir Putin.
Michael Mandelbaum
Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of the Post-Cold War Stalemate (2021) by M.E. Sarotte, the Kravis Distinguished Professor of Historical Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, recounts the sequence of decisions, especially within the American government, that produced NATO expansion. It builds on the author’s previous books about the end of the Cold War in Europe, taking the story into the first post-Cold War decade. In part through the use of the American Freedom of Information Act, Sarotte gained access to many previously unavailable records. They help to make this gracefully written history, which bends over backward to be fair to all points of view—Russian, Eastern and Western European, and American—the most authoritative account of this historical episode that is ever likely to be written.
......It had a variety of motives. The countries of Central Europe, especially the first three to be admitted—Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—lobbied hard for full membership, and senior administration officials pressed their case.
The ultimate decision rested with Bill Clinton, and he seems to have acted on the basis of domestic political considerations, seeking to win the votes of Americans with ancestral ties to these countries in the upcoming 1996 presidential election. Since it involved a treaty, expansion also had to secure a two-thirds majority in the United States Senate, and succeeded because some Senators were persuaded that the stakes were small, with no risks or costs involved, and that America was simply doing a good deed for small, friendly, would-be democratic European countries. The belief, fostered by the Clinton administration, that expansion would have no serious adverse consequences turned out to be catastrophically mistaken....
Those consequences were foreseeable in the 1990s. Indeed, they were foreseen. A group of fifty former Senators, foreign policy officials, and experts on Russia and European security signed an open letter (the present writer also signed it) calling expansion “a policy error of historic proportions.”
George F. Kennan, the former American diplomat who first prescribed the post-1945 policy of containment toward the Soviet Union, termed expansion “the most fateful error of the entire post-Cold War period.” Clinton’s secretary of defense, William Perry, opposed the measure so strongly that he seriously considered resigning over it. The Clinton expansionists charged ahead with their project anyway....