Lessons for China to learn from Ukraine conflict for Taiwan scenario

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ecaedus

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But the Taiwanese aren't imperialists.

Remember that Taiwan is a high-income and hi-tech economy.
If Taiwan comes to terms, they get to remain like this, like Hong Kong.

But the longer Taiwan fights, the more Taiwan is devastated.

And Taiwan does understand that China is far larger.
that's true, in the end it all comes down to how much the taiwanese are willing to bleed for their country and their own way of life.
 

ecaedus

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The problem with Taiwan is less the area but more the terrain. You will basically enter into a city fighting phase from day one. And you cannot do what the Russians are doing here, making people evacuate the main cities. They will have no place to evacuate to.
As for communications you guys seem to be forgetting submarine optical fiber cables. Those would have to be cut.
most likely they'll either be taken hostage as human meat shields by extremist ROCA officers or mobilized/radicalized into fighting PLA. in a dense tw city of 2 million you only need 1% of the population to be willing to fight till death in order to halt the invasion down to a grind.
 

AndrewS

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The problem with Taiwan is less the area but more the terrain. You will basically enter into a city fighting phase from day one. And you cannot do what the Russians are doing here, making people evacuate the main cities. They will have no place to evacuate to.
As for communications you guys seem to be forgetting submarine optical fiber cables. Those would have to be cut.

There are less than 10 submarine cables with landing points on land
 

AndrewS

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most likely they'll either be taken hostage as human meat shields by extremist ROCA officers or mobilized/radicalized into fighting PLA. in a dense tw city of 2 million you only need 1% of the population to be willing to fight till death in order to halt the invasion down to a grind.

Yes. But the possible solutions are:

1. Ensure the Taiwanese leadership accept terms

2. Build an automated drone/quadcopter warfare system which can handle urban combat. Plus it's a lot easier to deploy large numbers of small drones than soldiers to Taiwan. And China will deploy a system which is just "good enough"
 

Shadow_Whomel

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Share two articles, one from a Taiwanese military commentator and the other from China.

This is from the China Times in Taiwan. Interestingly the China Times removed it, but I found a copy from the Union-Tribune.
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既是战争,战况讯息就会严格封锁,也是高度机密。大家都知道,医院不能打,学校不能打。我要是指挥官,在处处是战场的考量下,为了求胜,一定叫营或连的指挥所必要时开到医院或学校,因为敌人除非有百分之百的把握,否则不敢炸这类场所。这次14天新制教召,召员报到地点在桃园一个小学,就是这个道理。

translate by deepl:
Since it is a war, the war message will be strictly blocked, but also highly confidential. As we all know, hospitals cannot be fought and schools cannot be fought. If I were a commander, under the consideration that everywhere is a battlefield, in order to win, I would tell the battalion or company command post to drive to a hospital or school if necessary, because the enemy would not dare to bomb such places unless they were 100 percent sure. This time, the 14-day new system of teaching call-ups, the call-ups reported to an elementary school in Taoyuan, which is the reason.

Looks like the Taiwanese want to learn from the Ukrainians by deploying their troops in hospitals and schools! And they are already rehearsing this way.
 

Shadow_Whomel

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This one is from
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translate by deepl:

The thing is, in the past, the Taiwanese pseudo-military was very sensitive to the fineness of Google Maps, and at one time asked Google not to show 3D images of Taiwan, and many important sections of the streetscape were coded. The most typical is the Taipei area, although the headquarters of all the major military branches and military police and constitutional special in Taiwan are not shielded, but the roads around the headquarters of the Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan are coded to a paste. And recently there are a few batches of Google Street View I don't know what oversight, did not do the processing according to the requirements of Taibazi, so we saw some interesting things. The headquarters of the Taiwan Fake Ministry of Defense was set up in the Boai Camp in the Dazhi Fortress Area of Taipei, which took 18 years to build, with the crotch pulling problem in the middle, and even the architect hung up. There are four main buildings in Boai Camp, most of the command functions are located in the main Boai Building during normal times, while in times of war they are transferred to the Hengshan underground command post in the back of the mountain through underground tunnels and surface roads (whenever there is movement on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, the top brass of the Taiwanese pseudo-military will pull out their legs and run here, such as the U.S. elections when the Taibazi hid in here).

The mistakenly leaked Google Street View allows us to see a part of the interior of the Boai camp that is normally coded, and although the street view behind the camp leading to the Hengshan command post is not shown at all, we can still notice something strange appearing on the Yonggu building inside the camp. From the pictures, a significant portion of the surface of the Yonggu building's windows are obscured by a peculiar device that clearly has normal windows within the obscuring structure, something that is clearly not decorative. If these baffles were made of solid metal, they would not only be able to block small caliber weapons, but could even withstand machine gun fire. The arrangement of these panels is also very interesting, covering the majority of the window area, but intentionally revealing a bit of the top, very much like a shooting shelter. From other information, it appears that this design was not used on all sides of the Yonggu Building, but only the north side facing the hillside and the east side facing inside the Boai camp were fitted with suspected armor plates.

The Yonggu Building does not appear to house key departments and key personnel like the Boai Building, so why does it have this extraordinarily reinforced design? The Taiwanese military actually rarely mentions what specific functional organs are inside this multi-story building, and public materials only mention that it houses the service brigade and medical facilities of the Taiwan False Ministry of National Defense. What is even more bizarre is that the infamous Taiwan Pseudo-Political Warfare Bureau seems to have deliberately advertised the building as having a welfare station and a post office, and even deliberately opened and encouraged the public to shop here in addition to serving military families (the welfare station's direct supervisor is the Political Warfare Bureau). As the second largest building in the headquarters of the Ministry of Defense, it is obvious that the interior of the building cannot only have these painless functions, and if it is really harmless to people and animals, there is no need for special reinforced protection.

Preliminary assessment: It is strongly suspected that the TDF military intended to use the Yonggu Building as a stronghold to resist after a full-scale defeat during the war. The northern perimeter of the Yonggu Building can cover the route of attacking the entrance to the Hengshan underground command post along the hillside trail, while the eastern perimeter can suppress the path of attacking northward from the southern gate of the Boai camp area, not only to protect the Hengshan command post as well, but also to seal off the helicopter landing pad on the square south of the Boai Building. The more common heavy firepower of the front of the attacking force that arrived here in the first place was also 30mm machine guns, and if they could not penetrate the armor on the Yonggu building, and a small number of anti-tank missiles were not enough to fully suppress the fire points, then if they wanted to quickly seize the entrance to the Hengshan command post they might have to go around the hill from Chongsi Road east of the Boai camp area. Here it is necessary to mention some sinister intentions of the Taiwanese pseudo military. The Dazhi fortress area is densely packed with various schools from universities down to kindergartens, forming a tight meat shield in the southeast two directions of the Boai camp area, the headquarters of the Taiwanese pseudo defense ministry. Once the attacking forces had to detour from these directions, it could not be ruled out that the Taiwanese pseudo-military would deliberately create tragic cases against civilians, especially young children, and use them to frame and use them as leverage to proclaim their pleas for help to the world. By staying here, the last of the TFP troops could buy as much time as possible for the military and political leaders in the Hengshan underground command post to wait for U.S. aid. And if the Yonggu building is taken by force, the citizens of Taipei who are usually invited in to shop are the best hostages, and with everyone's knowledge of the past misdeeds of the Goa'uld army, this is definitely something they can do. No matter what, the building is definitely not as simple as the TFP military says, there must be something they care about to design it that way.


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Shadow_Whomel

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0025ANYfgy1gu5s6o0j0yj62471o04qr02.jpg
The schematic he made
Translation of Chinese notes in the figure:
Yellow part, From left to right, top to bottom:
园山地下指挥所政军指挥中心--Yuanshan Underground Command Post Political and Military Command Center
衡山地下指挥所联合作战指挥中心--Hengshan Underground Command Post Joint Operations Command Center
勇固楼--Yonggu Building ;博爱楼--Boai Building ;武艺馆--Wuyeikan ;武德楼--Wude Building ;
台伪海军司令部--Taiwan Naval Command ;台伪空军司令部--Taiwan Air Force Command ;
台伪国防部总部博爱营区--Taiwan Ministry of National Defense Headquarters, Boai Camp ;
台伪国安局特勤中心-- Taiwan National Security Bureau Special Service Center;
往宪兵福西营区-- To Military Police Fusi Camp ;往松山机场--To Songshan Airport ;

Red part:红色为永固楼强化防护区-Red is the reinforced protection zone of Yonggu Building

Blue part:大学-University; 幼儿园-Kindergarten; 小学-Elementary School; 高中-High School; 初中-Middle School

White part:基隆河。往淡水河入海口-Keelung River. Towards the mouth of the Danshui River

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ACuriousPLAFan

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I believe this is some new "actions" by NATO that should garner everyone's attention:

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Basically speaking, the warfare of today and in the future is not merely limited to physical, but also mental. This kind of warfare is called "cognitive warfare", or in layman terms, "battle for the brain".

Being the absolute senior in such warfare, and with the near total monopoly of the mass media and social media networks worldwide, I believe the West has the upper hand as of current time. This is very evident by how easily the West is shaping the world's opinion regarding the current war in Ukraine.

China would need to learn, do and battle harder and more intensely if she wants to win this warfare on a holistic level.

This is especially true for Taiwan - Winning the minds and hearts of the Taiwanese over is very vital to disuade and break the independence and resistance spirit of the ROC government and the ROCAF.

And don't forget about the rest of the world too - The image of China MUST be raised and upheld in order to garner worldwide support for China's reunification efforts (which is something I believe China would need to put in extra effort into).
 

cn_habs

Junior Member
So is China going to import some KA-52 or Mi-28? The PLA doesn't have any modern heavy attack helicopters.
 

Jingle Bells

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You may be right but no planner can bet on the opposing side making mistakes or not fighting. The assumption of no resolve on the opposing side is what lead to Russia's current situation in Ukraine. It is also the reason for US failures in Vietnam and Afghanistan. It is also how Imperial Japan justified attacking the USA.

China can not bet on Taiwanese surrendering or even being low in morale. China must assume Taiwan will fight until it loses the capability to do so. That is the only way to maximize the chance of success.
If you actually read What I have been writing, you will know that I have never implied that the PLA will "bet on Taiwanese surrender or low morale", in fact quite the opposite.

I have been saying from the start that this Russia-Ukraine war will shatter any fantasy (by the decision makers of the party, the government and the PLA) of a "王师降临,百姓箪食壶浆以迎王师" ("The King's Righteous Army descends upon the people, and they all welcome the with open arm") type of easy occupation scenario. And thus the PLA will NOT really solicit a surrender, but rather the totally annihilation and total destruction of the EFFECTIVE fighting capability of the whole island (including any ability to mobilize the population on the island in a "People's War" manner). "Effective" meaning destroying its organizational structure, and leave only sporadic left-over militants, unable to coordinate or organized as a whole across the island.

I thought I made that point plenty of time.
 
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