looking at the absolutely abysmal performance/strategy of the VDV being sent to capture local airfield outside of Kyiv (also maybe to "capture" UKR leadership?), and the fact that they even lost a Maj. Gen while doing it, i think it's safe to say the PLA shouldn't try any massive vertical landing assault unless there are established and secured beach heads for further ground reinforcements.
As far as I understand, general wasn't lost there. That was a ~batallion raid with very high risk, not something for army vice-commanders to be in.
Furthermore, failure of Hostomel operation is assumed based on huge reported helicopter losses(1) and multiple Ukrainian reports that the airfield was overrun(2). Both don't appear to be right.
Second thing is definetely wrong - we have civilian video with Russians still there on the next morning (and relaxed enough to manage civilian traffic at that). The first one... reports of >10 destroyed helicopters haven't been confirmed for more than a week - something would've surfaced for sure. We only saw
2 confirmed escort helicopters, and probably a single 1 ground attack plane(su-25sm) shot down in that operation, with 2 pilots KIA(mi-24p). If there is no confirmation of more than a dozen of wrecks in a highly urbanized terrain with cameramen looking for every possible media victory - chances of it are nil.
Thus current confirmed result is that
all Russian transport helicopters managed to reach the landing zone, landed the troops, and then pulled out.
I'd argue it was one of things that weren't bad. Significant material losses (3 aircraft) - but they probably also ensured that Ru army managed to pull through Pripyat' marshes in the first place. It's one thing when that huge convoy is sitting outside of Kiev within strike distance, it would've been another thing completely if it'd be stopped on a single available highway in marshy terrain near the border.
Basically a recipe for a Teutoburg forest disaster.
In the end, VDV clearly managed to hold their ground till reinforcements reached them, and managed to gather enough attention for main column to reach far enough down south. (VDV reinforcements, though, did suffer ambushes on the way)
And no, I just don't believe anyone ever seriously intended to fly in il-76s right into an s-300 bubble with IIRC full 5 brigades around Kiev, and that's without levies.
IMO the lesson is that a serious military option is off the table for Taiwan. Sometimes the truth is hard to accept. Ukraine had 8 years to prepare for war with Russia and it did a very good job. Taiwan has had 25+ years to prepare if we count starting from the time the idea Taiwan independence started to gain traction and China responded with the 1st Taiwan strait crisis.
It doesn't work this way, this is a human organization, not a strategy game.
Yes, Ukraine under existential threat improved.
Russian army, on the other hand, apparently
regressed organizationally
- despite all the spending (orders more than Ukraine, actually) and much better visible material state. Regressed despite being right in front of improving enemy, and having all possible indicators of him improving(donbass militias fought for the same 8 years).
7 years of pounding largely defenseless Syrian rebels didn't help either - it was far away, only aerospace forces and special forces really got a lot of new knowledge in this campaign.
We're talking about human organizations - and the capability of a human organization lacking major fighting experience for 70 years is...up to debate. There was more than enough time for peacetime career officers to build their dynasties. Almost 10 times more than Russians had since 2014.