They will not last long enough for it.
Lessons for China to learn from Ukraine conflict for Taiwan scenario
- Thread starter tphuang
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It’s is not a matter of hopeful assumptions.
I presented a multilayered approach to disrupting telecommunications services.
In Canada, a software upgrade bug knocked out the 25% of the internet traffic of the whole country for days. That was a single provider. That would be the optimistic possibility of a cyber attack vector.
The electrical infrastructure of Taiwan is weak due to low redundancy of high voltage power lines and limited investment in power generation capacity (highly centralized), just Google “Taiwan blackouts” and you will see large ones happen every few years and for days at a time, this would be the optimistic possibility again.
Jamming is a state secret, so we cannot give any solid examples of this, but we know that by design, civilian communications are at well defined frequencies and will accept any military jamming.
Other cyber realm vectors include collection of geolocation data. The US government was able to track down numerous January 6 rioters through this way. The PLA could round up civilian collaborators in a similar way (who is hanging around military formations?). Phishing attacks like fake reporting sites. Deep packet inspection to detect probable video and image transmissions if the encryption is not present or weak. The whole bag of tricks would be opened.
One argument against is why Russia is not leveraging these capabilities (even though they demonstrated a cyber attack on Ukrainian infrastructure before), it could be a signal that they aren’t as effective as imagined. It is possible, but at the same time we have seen successes like Stuxnet. Maybe they are saving it for Americans if needed, hard to say.
As I mentioned, if PLA has established a hold on the island, it is unlikely that such civilian action could have a significant effect. At that point, ROCN is likely out of action, a significant portion of ROCAF as well. A lot of the ROCAF non air-to-air munitions are aimed towards disrupting mainland operations (SLAM-ER) or knocking out ships (Harpoon). The best weapons to use cellphone information would be Apache or F-16, but would they be able to handle the fully deployed air defense forces? Furthermore, the primary facilities to capture would be port facilities and airports. These would be known to the ROC armed forces. Cellphone info could provide information on defensive formations, but the issue would be mustering the firepower to retake them since capturing them would have meant a decisive defeat in the first place.
Yes, the wave forms will be messed up for each antenna. But given the timing differences for the signals reaching each antenna, you can work out what was the original signal and its direction
The Wifi 6 home router standard includes generating 8 beamforms and receiving 8 beamforms
So we already have phased array transceivers/transmitters at a consumer-grade electronics level
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@FairAndUnbiased
Ok. Here's an example of what is commercially available to buy now for about $2000
It's a handheld device which detects and also provides the direction of a GPS jamming signal
I expect this sort of tech has already been integrated with military-grade GPS systems, but if not, it's dirt cheap to do.
Ok. Here's an example of what is commercially available to buy now for about $2000
It's a handheld device which detects and also provides the direction of a GPS jamming signal
I expect this sort of tech has already been integrated with military-grade GPS systems, but if not, it's dirt cheap to do.
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And a military grade jammer pod isn't going to be of the same sophistication of a pocket one. And I also noticed that the device doesn't actually allow you to still use GPS through a jammer, only know where the hammer is.
I've found an old article below on how a JASSM has a 12kg jam-resistant GPS system with a directional phased antenna array which can measure the time difference from when a signal is received between the receivers
Note this was published 21 years ago
afcea.org/signal-media/jam-proof-signals-guide-navigation
And I've also noticed commercially available GPS receivers (today) which can predict satellite locations 3 days in advance
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I don't understand why anyone would be worked up about GPS being useful
The vast majority of the US guided weapons arsenal is composed of JDAMs which literally need to be dropped by an aircraft flying overhead. That means most of those JDAMs are actually useless because there are only a small number of bombers which have the range to reach Chinese targets.
In comparison, China will easily have air superiority over the skies of Taiwan, and could actually drop large numbers of JDAM-equivalents. Alternatively, those JDAMs could deploy by themselves in the form of a Shaheed-type munition.
And all these munitions will be able to rely on said low-cost INS/GPS guidance.
EDIT. Note that a Shaheed-136 is roughly the same weight as a 500lb Bomb, and both can be equipped with the same INS/GPS system. The Shaheed warhead is about half the size, but that is more than enough for any armoured vehicle or soft ground target.
The concept of JDAMs flying 2000km to the target by themselves is something new
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Jam resistant doesn't mean jam proof. The simple physics dictates that given a known frequency and phase, you can jam a broadcast signal.
Please explain to me how a directional phased-array receiver (which can measure the time difference from when signals are received) can be jammed, and feel free to go deep into the fundamental physics of constructive/destructive wave interference at a university level.
If you go back to high school physics, remember the light/water experiments showing the patterns of constructive/destruction wave interference? How would a third-party (sitting at a different angle and to the side) be able to generate the waveforms to cancel out the signal located at the receiver?
Theoretically it is possible, given the hideous constraints above.
But in order for a jammer to send out the perfect set of signals to destroy the real GPS radio waveform, you would have to know the exact location of the GPS receiver to be targeted.
That is not going to happen because INS/GPS guided munitions produce no radio emissions.
Plus there will be multiple GPS receivers on multiple munitions.
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As another analogy, look at the example of noise cancelling earbuds
The noise cancelling works because the sound waves have to pass through the earbuds to reach the ear drum.
So the earbud measures the incoming sound waves (which are really slow in comparison to electronics), then uses a tiny speaker to generate the exact opposite sound waves to cancel out the noise and prevent it reaching the ear drum
But a noise jammer (located somewhere else in the room) doesn't know exactly where your ear drum is and therefore what sound waves to produce to create a silent zone with no sound waves.
You don't need to know exactly where the receiver is located. In 3D all that is known is the azimuthal and polar angle to the source, and the magnitude of the signal from the source.
A satellite and an aircraft could have the same azimuthal and polar angle from a given point on the ground, as long as it's not directly overhead. Given that multiple GPS satellites are required for triangulation in 3D, it is likely that not all of them will be directly overhead and in fact may be on the horizon where a distant aircraft would be.
A jammer on the aircraft can emit a signal of equal frequency and equal or greater magnitude as that would be received from the satellite.
a signal of same frequency, magnitude, polarization, azimuthal angle and polar angle is indistinguishable from another signal with these characteristics.
Even if the exact azimuthal and polar angle was not found, at equal frequency, you can overpower the native signal. This is typical same channel interference.
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