Lessons for China to learn from Ukraine conflict for Taiwan scenario

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bjj_starter

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Since I think I'll accidentally doze off before the timer resets and I can post again, here's my response as a pdf. Only 3600 words...

jeez
I did learn a lot from that, thank you. Those psyops aren't the sort of thing I'd considered before, that's very interesting. Even if they don't pull people away from combat, I could see them seriously affecting performance. I wonder how much effort goes into compiling appropriate attack packages for individuals, and I would be really interested in what that database looks like and what deployment looks like on the ground. A high-tech call centre, I guess. Gotta wonder about whether similar strategies could exist for other potential opposition to the PLA, and whether other major militaries are doing the same thing en masse. I've heard the US has done similar stuff as part of COIN/counterterrorism work, and the Russians are infamous for that general sort of thing (targeting families, disinfo), but I've never really considered the possibility of it being deployed on a mass scale.


Once you're rested, I would love to hear more about what a series of strikes that successfully disabled a typical airfield would look like. Learning about aimpoints, repair attempts, how to confirm effects, how long effects could last for etc all sound very interesting.

Sleep well Patch, sounds like you need it.
 

tphuang

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Since I think I'll accidentally doze off before the timer resets and I can post again, here's my response as a pdf. Only 3600 words...

jeez
Love it. btw, I really appreciate that entire section on how to degrade an adversary's preparedness through psychop. Lol, that's honestly something I almost never think about. But, it does make a lot of sense. One thing I do want to ask you about is the usage of J-6 drones. Given that they are basically being used like cruise missiles in this scenario, what kind of advantage or disadvantage would you see that they have over something like ground launched cruise missile?

Another question I have is regarding follow on strikes. Since you discussed about the complexity of planning and aerial attack mission in the carrier post, it got me pondering how long it would take PLAAF to do a second strike. From my understanding, you will have your first wave of aircraft going over there, trying to degrade military targets as much as possible. When that is over, I would imagine your ISR units would have to do battlefield assessment to figure out what a second wave of attack looks like. One of the issues that Chinese analysts pointed out regarding Russian Air Force is that they took way too long to do battlefield assessment and launch secondary wave of strikes. In my cases, it's like they are incapable of doing more than 1 attack a day. Given what you know about PLAAF, how long would it take them to do a secondary strike. Is it possible that they are so well "coached" on the Taiwan scenario that they wouldn't need a lot of preparation for second wave. Based on how large ETC is, they can probably don't need the same aircraft to participate in 2 attacks.
 

FairAndUnbiased

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Love it. btw, I really appreciate that entire section on how to degrade an adversary's preparedness through psychop. Lol, that's honestly something I almost never think about. But, it does make a lot of sense. One thing I do want to ask you about is the usage of J-6 drones. Given that they are basically being used like cruise missiles in this scenario, what kind of advantage or disadvantage would you see that they have over something like ground launched cruise missile?

Another question I have is regarding follow on strikes. Since you discussed about the complexity of planning and aerial attack mission in the carrier post, it got me pondering how long it would take PLAAF to do a second strike. From my understanding, you will have your first wave of aircraft going over there, trying to degrade military targets as much as possible. When that is over, I would imagine your ISR units would have to do battlefield assessment to figure out what a second wave of attack looks like. One of the issues that Chinese analysts pointed out regarding Russian Air Force is that they took way too long to do battlefield assessment and launch secondary wave of strikes. In my cases, it's like they are incapable of doing more than 1 attack a day. Given what you know about PLAAF, how long would it take them to do a secondary strike. Is it possible that they are so well "coached" on the Taiwan scenario that they wouldn't need a lot of preparation for second wave. Based on how large ETC is, they can probably don't need the same aircraft to participate in 2 attacks.
One thing about J-6 drones (WJ-6?) is that they take up at least part of a sortie slot. Ground launched cruise missiles don't. On the other hand a WJ-6 can have tricks a cruise missile doesn't like an internal radar, a huge 1000 kg payload (regular payload + gun removal), etc.
 

AndrewS

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Well, they take a good bit longer to get airborne, but they have a lot more versatility in performing evasive maneuvers and soaking up interceptor munitions.

Regarding follow on strikes, it's a looooot easier to prosecute a well studied, well known, extensively detailed ETF as part of a pre-planned operation as opposed to a dynamic, far off threat like a CSG.

Once the ROCAF airbases are neutralised in the first few strikes, wouldn't SDB glide bombs be the preferred munition?

With a range of 100km+, they can be safely launched by JH-7 and J-16s. If say 100 aircraft are launched per day, they could carry 1600+ SDBs.

And because the GPS/INS version has a low cost of $40K, you don't really care if many get shot down. But they will force defending SAM systems to reveal themselves.

And there are a lot of soft targets in Taiwan. And the mission planning is simpler for fixed targets with standoff munitions.

Yes, the SDB warhead is small. But I imagine that is where the J-6 drones come in as they can carry a large bomb. Again they are expendable, low cost and force defending SAM systems to reveal themselves.

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Then in the following airstrikes, I imagine shorter range JDAM glide bombs (70km) would be preferred, for targets that require a heavier warhead.
 

AndrewS

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Well it really depends on the target set, but yeah SDB-pattern munitions are a fantastic example of "volume"-optimized munitions, and could certainly do a lot of damage very *very* rapidly.

There's easily 1000 fixed military targets/buildings that would justify a glide bomb.

In terms of potential dual-use targets, I get the following figures

a) 3 oil refineries
b) approx 20 fuel distribution terminals
c) a guestimate of 5000 individual Fuel Distribution Tanks in various fuel depots/terminals
d) 2494 petrol stations

e) approx 20,000 mobile telephone masts
f) approx 1500 telephone (Broadband) exchanges

g) 45 major electricity power stations
h) At the next level, 598 electricity substations

i) approx 300 bridges which would cut Taiwan into 15 isolated regions of 1-2 million people each


I would say the petrol stations and mobile telephone masts would be lowest priority, assuming it is worth attacking them.

The petrol stations would likely be emptied out within the first day and there are just so many mobile phone masts, but most run off the electricity grid anyway.
 

bjj_starter

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There's easily 1000 fixed military targets/buildings that would justify a glide bomb.

In terms of potential dual-use targets, I get the following figures

a) 3 oil refineries
b) approx 20 fuel distribution terminals
c) a guestimate of 5000 individual Fuel Distribution Tanks in various fuel depots/terminals
d) 2494 petrol stations

e) approx 20,000 mobile telephone masts
f) approx 1500 telephone (Broadband) exchanges

g) 45 major electricity power stations
h) At the next level, 598 electricity substations

i) approx 300 bridges which would cut Taiwan into 15 isolated regions of 1-2 million people each


I would say the petrol stations and mobile telephone masts would be lowest priority, assuming it is worth attacking them.

The petrol stations would likely be emptied out within the first day and there are just so many mobile phone masts, but most run off the electricity grid anyway.
An important consideration is that they'll still have to rebuild afterwards. The better the economic conditions, the less material basis there would be for an insurgency/renewed separatist movement, and I imagine after reunification the PLA will have a lot of assets stationed in Taiwan to push A2AD further out.

That reminds me: @Patchwork_Chimera a while ago you shared an image of (IIRC) salvo generation numbers within ranges of the PRC mainland. It was quite aesthetically pleasing, with smooth red gradients originating from the mainland and spreading out in big bubbles. I believe I also saw a graphic from you that showed a relatively safe area for US submarines to operate, maybe in a context of a hot war between the US and the PRC. Once you've gotten some rest and if you'd be interested, something I'm really curious about is how PRC control of Taiwan and the PLA building up military forces in Taiwan would affect those maps. Would that make it unlikely for the US to be able to operate its subs in that relative "safe zone"? How would it affect salvo sizes and ranges in potential areas of conflict?

If you're too busy for these questions or I'm pestering you too much, please let me know! I'm simply curious, because we often hear about how the US holding Taiwan is a significant strategic advantage and the PRC holding Taiwan would give them a much better strategic position, but I've never seen anyone go into detail on exactly how that better strategic position would manifest.

Edit: I'm new to the forum and there was some technical weirdness when posting this, hopefully it doesn't result in a double tag. If you're seeing this edit it hopefully means I've fixed it lol.
 

supersnoop

Major
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There's easily 1000 fixed military targets/buildings that would justify a glide bomb.

In terms of potential dual-use targets, I get the following figures

a) 3 oil refineries
b) approx 20 fuel distribution terminals
c) a guestimate of 5000 individual Fuel Distribution Tanks in various fuel depots/terminals
d) 2494 petrol stations

e) approx 20,000 mobile telephone masts
f) approx 1500 telephone (Broadband) exchanges

g) 45 major electricity power stations
h) At the next level, 598 electricity substations

i) approx 300 bridges which would cut Taiwan into 15 isolated regions of 1-2 million people each


I would say the petrol stations and mobile telephone masts would be lowest priority, assuming it is worth attacking them.

The petrol stations would likely be emptied out within the first day and there are just so many mobile phone masts, but most run off the electricity grid anyway.

Mobile telephone infrastructure can also be eliminated by disrupting the backhaul. Most of Taiwan’s internet is routed through HK, and some through Japan. Local communication would still be possible, but effectiveness would be limited.

In Ukraine, Russia has generally refrained from generally destroying infrastructure and Huawei (the main cell equipment provider in Ukraine) actually deployed more staff and donated equipment to keep up cell networks.
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
An important consideration is that they'll still have to rebuild afterwards. The better the economic conditions, the less material basis there would be for an insurgency/renewed separatist movement, and I imagine after reunification the PLA will have a lot of assets stationed in Taiwan to push A2AD further out.

My gut tells me the cost of a shorter war (due to additional destruction of Taiwan's infrastructure) will far outweigh the additional cost of rebuilding.

A China-Taiwan war will incur at least a billion in Chinese military costs every day.

A China-Taiwan war would also inevitably depress Chinese domestic economic activity.
In terms of Chinese imports and exports, there is $16 Billion of direct trade happening every day.
With economic multiplier effects, every additional day of a China-Taiwan war would cost China billions every day.

And China does have surplus construction capacity to quickly rebuild everything in Taiwan.
So during reconstruction, the actual cost to the Chinese government will be offset by the additional economic activity and taxation.

Remember that there are only 23 million people in Taiwan. Taiwan's economy is like 20x smaller than China, so even the cost of rebuilding from scratch is manageable.

---

And look at the optics of leaving Taiwanese society functional. If Taiwan is perceived to be surviving or winning, then the US will be very tempted to intervene to support Taiwan (if this hasn't already happened). Then the military and economic costs to China increase exponentially.

---

From that perspective, it's better to completely destroy Taiwanese infrastructure at the beginning so that there's no electricity, fuel, water, food or communications. After a few weeks, we'll start seeing hungry civilians and the disintegration of Taiwan. How can the Taiwanese military function in a broken society surrounded by hungry civilians? Think Japan or Germany in the closing days of WW2. Then it will be clear to both Taiwan and the USA that:

1. Taiwan's collapse is inevitable and will happen in weeks
2. China does have the power to blockade Taiwan for months even if the US military tries its best
3. The only way to prevent the collapse of Taiwan (with people fighting for food) is a China-Taiwan deal.

Then there's no point in the US going to war with China or the US continuing a war against China.

---

I wouldn't expect a China-Taiwan settlement to be particularly harsh and for it to be similar to Hong Kong.
For example, Taiwanese semiconductor engineers are paid 3x more in China than in Taiwan.
In the aftermath, it's essentially a single market, but which still has a huge shortage of skilled semiconductor staff.
So I expect wages for semiconductor engineers in Taiwan to easily double.

And we can look to the experience of Germany and Japan in the aftermath of WW2. Japan has the distinction of being the only country which has actually been nuked. And those US nukes worked as a terror weapon which persuaded Japan to surrender. Then Japan reconciled itself to being a loyal American "ally".

In comparison, Taiwanese will be officially equal citizens to everyone else in the PRC. So come to think of it, a better comparison would be to the defeated people of the Confederate States of America who reconciled themselves to being conquered by the USA.

And yes, the A2AD perimeter would be pushed out into the Pacific. At a minimum, the hardened mountain airbases and some ports will be transferred to the Chinese military.


That reminds me: @Patchwork_Chimera a while ago you shared an image of (IIRC) salvo generation numbers within ranges of the PRC mainland. It was quite aesthetically pleasing, with smooth red gradients originating from the mainland and spreading out in big bubbles. I believe I also saw a graphic from you that showed a relatively safe area for US submarines to operate, maybe in a context of a hot war between the US and the PRC. Once you've gotten some rest and if you'd be interested, something I'm really curious about is how PRC control of Taiwan and the PLA building up military forces in Taiwan would affect those maps. Would that make it unlikely for the US to be able to operate its subs in that relative "safe zone"? How would it affect salvo sizes and ranges in potential areas of conflict?

If you're too busy for these questions or I'm pestering you too much, please let me know! I'm simply curious, because we often hear about how the US holding Taiwan is a significant strategic advantage and the PRC holding Taiwan would give them a much better strategic position, but I've never seen anyone go into detail on exactly how that better strategic position would manifest.

Edit: I'm new to the forum and there was some technical weirdness when posting this, hopefully it doesn't result in a double tag. If you're seeing this edit it hopefully means I've fixed it lol.
 
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