The second one was another question that I really could not have answered back in 2012. All around them, there were navies that simply could just cut off their trade. Japan had that ability with their submarine fleet and modern surface combatants. Australia had the ability to do that around Malacca straits because China could not project its navy that far out. Same with Singapore. 10 years later, most of these problems seem to have went away. 3 major changes:
1) The rapid development of new generation of Chinese missiles with DF16/17/26/100.
2) The SCS island buildup
3) The blue water fleet expansion and longer AF projection from J16/J20/Tankers.
So now, no country (including Singapore) in ASEAN can mess with China due to the missiles threat. They can knock out the Japanese threat with the huge missiles arsenal as well as the longer range projection of PLAAF. Australia really can no longer wonder too far north into SCS before getting picked up by PLA. Even the military base in Northern part of Australia could get targeted by a regiment of H-6K as well as 055 fleet launching longer range cruise missiles. The northern RAAF/RAN base in Darwin is only about 3000 km away from Spratly Islands. They are now capable of degrading it. The only places they really can’t get to right now are Perth/Sydney/Wake Islands/Diego Garcia. All of which will be accessible once they have H-20s.
IMO, the issue was not geography, but rather not having the right equipments to deal with them. With the right military capabilities, the island chains are in fact not geographical disadvantages. They become targets. PLAN cannot currently surge to 2nd island chain due to lack of nuclear carrier, submarine and oversea base, rather than “hostile” islands. As long as surrounding countries don’t have the same resources, they simply aren’t able to build up the type of military infrastructure that China has build up in South China Sea.
The other smart thing China has done is this major buildup of cutters. That along with covered 056s and naval 056A form a large force capable of enforcing China’s maritime policing in nearby waters. They are extremely important in any blockade during wartime, since they provides the quantity needed to actually direct civilian ships to go in the directions that China wish them to go. For example, they can be used to intercept any oil tankers/LNG carriers from America coming to Japan. Similarly, they can prevent any ships coming north from Australia. As long as China maintains naval superiority in the surrounding regions, these cutters can act with impunity during war time. Just the share number of sea-worthy cutters allow them to cover a huge area in SCS and westpac.
SCS itself has now turned into a major advantage following the build up the Spratly Islands. Any civilian ships passing through SCS will have to go through this area controlled by PLAN and cutters. As such, they can simply deny trades between outside world and ASEAN countries. China can use this to punish hostile countries during a war scenario, so that none of them would contemplate providing air fields to American forces. China can also use this to encourage countries like Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia to not allow overfly rights for American/Australian aircraft/missiles and allow them for Chinese aircraft and missiles. They can sell/deliver air defense system to these countries to intercept hostile aircraft/missiles. This will also allow China to continue with robust trading with ASEAN countries during war time, This will also allow them to significantly reduce trading between Australia/NZ and their largest markets.
During war time, I would also expect them to utilize Okinawa and possibly other Ryuku islands to help extend the range of their aircraft to further control the waters in westpac. As such, while these islands may look like weak points, they could entirely be turned into advantages if an initial round attack can knock them out (which they can) and a later landing could be attempted with air dominance + 075/071s. These islands are not built to oppose large scale landing. As such, they would be far easier amphibious operations than Taiwan. China could power these islands with their floating power plants and quickly build out their own air base infrastructure and setup their air defense. If they defeat JSDF in the opening phases of the war and bring Japan to its knees through blockade, I do expect them to force Japan to stay out of the war and to not allow anymore American bases on its territory. As such, they might be able to utilize Okinawa in exchange for providing power and without having to do a forced landing. I don’t see how China can leave JSDF alone unless Japan promises to not allow US military from using bases in Japan during a conflict. The strike power that USAF might deliver from Japanese air bases is far greater than JASDF itself is able to deliver. As such, forcing USAF to operate from Alaska would be a huge win.
Of course, all of this assumes they have a few weeks to set up infrastructure while they wait for multiple American CSGs to come. As we discussed previously, they can plan their operations to start at a time that would be the least advantageous for US Naval ship deployment, so that it would take a long time (2 months) for USN to be able to come at China with a large force. During this time, China will be able to use blockade, military power and economic coercion to set up bases in advantageous spot. For example, I would expect Taiwan to surrender and allow PLA to utilize its air and naval bases. If that doesn’t happen, I still would expect them to be able to successfully land and use selected airport from Taiwan proper along with Penghu and Orchid. Even if Taiwan itself refuses to surrender, I would expect them to capture certain parts of Taiwan, which can be used as launch point for fighter jet and tankers.
During this period, I would also expect them to work with Myanmar and Cambodia government to establish bases of operation from those countries. The goal here is extend the engagement zone of the aircraft and navy, so that mainland and even SCS bases will have buffer zone. It would also allow them to target Diego Garcia with H-6K or DF-26. Stationing HALE drones and long range radar system would allow them to significantly increase their ISR into Indian Ocean. It would also allow them to combat any attempt to obstruct civilian ships from sailing into SCS. Base in Cambodia would allow them to dominate the southern part of SCS and control Malacca straits itself.
In general, I no longer see the first island chain as effective controls against PLA advancements. I see geographical situation working to China’s favor as they develop longer range strike capabilities.
