I think there are also strategic considerations for the PRC to keep pressure in the border areas. This will not only force India to supply Ladakh and other flash points over winter but also prevent them from cutting manpower within the Indian army. Chinese military modernization was tremendously helped by the collapse of the Soviet Union since it made cutting down the ground force possible. As a result more money could be allocated to the air force and navy as well as mechanization of a smaller ground force. China could prevent a lot of Indian defense budget from going to weapons procurement by tying down the Indian army.
I don’t think the current troop dispositions in disputed boarder areas will have much bearing on overall Indian strategic thinking in terms of overall troop numbers and modernisation efforts. It’s not a new dispute after all, and if India was planning to make troop reductions, it was never going to cut its mounting corps.
I think the reason China has maintained its forces in the boarder region rather than withdraw them as it has before has an element of caution to it.
With tensions at an all time high and the US elections coming up, I think there would be serious concern in Beijing that Trump might try something as a last ditch effort to rescue his re-election chances.
As such, I think the strategic calculus regarding the Indian threat has also been re-evaluated and Chinese defence posture changed from minimal presence on the boarder and defence in depth to maximum threat.
Historically, the PLA just maintained minimal numbers on the Indian boarder to be just enough to patrol it, with little emphasis on being able to effectively repulse a determined large scale Indian assault.
That fitted well with the Chinese defensive philosophy of letting the Indians throw the first punch.
There were minimal targets of worth for the Indians to alpha strike, and the empty nature of the region meant there wasn’t really anything worth defending. If the Indians attacked, the PLA is happy for them to make initial meaningless gains that it could then roll back with interest once it has brought its main forces to bear.
It was really a ‘come and have a go if you think you are hard enough’ sort of strategic trap, that would cast India as the undisputed aggression while denying them any worthwhile opening targets, all to set the stage for the PLA to come and curbstomp the Indian army on Chinese soil where their supply lines and routes of retreat could be easily cut. After China has destroyed the Indian army in China, it could then roll on into India with next to no opposition.
But that was assuming India would be the only foe China will be fighting.
The main threat now is that India and America would team up to start a two front war.
Also, China need to consider the worst case scenario in terms of American moves to the East, which would be them recognising Taiwan Independence and effectively forcing China into launch a war of reunification.
Under such circumstances, China really does not want to have to waste time and resources putting down Indian nonsense. As such Chinese defensive strategy against India has now changed to one of maximum deterrence. To make it abundantly clear that any India misadventures on the boarder would be met with an immediate and overwhelming response.
It’s not ideal as it ties up significantly PLA assets, but it would still be a tiny fraction of the forces needed to crush the Indians after they launched an attack.