As I told Indian contacts, Modi is the most pro-China politician in India. That's why India can get away with all of this; China knows that beyond Modi, they have no one else to move in India. If it were a Congress government running the show in India, China would already have escalated and used its artillery superiority to destroy the Indian force build-up in Ladakh.
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The other part is that the Indians are plain delusional; on CDF, a non-Chinese poster mentioned that the Indians are delusional as to their relative power compared to China. They seriously think they have military parity, whereas a strong factor restraining China's hand is the threat of sanctions from the West if they escalate the Indian conflict fully.
When it comes to the military force equation, India DOES have more airbases close to China, but China has a few key tools at its disposal:
-China has a massive superiority in SPGs / SPHs, provided they actually want to move their equipment to the sector. China has way more modern SPG / SPH systems than India does, and most of these are long-ranged 155mm guns, whereas India has a good number of long-ranged rocket artillery systems (but not more than China's), but fewer 155mm caliber SPGs and a substantial number of 122mm or 105mm guns, too short-ranged to win an artillery duel. India also has a substantial number of towed artillery, but these can't shoot and scoot.
-China has more technologically advanced aircraft. India does have more airbases closer to the border than China, but China can, first, bombard these with ballistic missiles, and second, China has more modern systems. India mostly has Russian-built aircraft that are 4th generation. The best Indian Air Force equipment until the Rafales arrive on July 27th is the Su-30MKI, which has some Israeli electronics that may make it superior to Chinese Su-35s in the ECM-sphere.
However, Indian warplanes carry 4th generation missiles. Chinese missiles are 4.5th or 5th generation; the Chinese might not have a missile inventory more "advanced" than the United States in terms of electronic warfare, but, first, the PL-10 ASR is superior to the R-74Ms the Indians use, having 90 degree off-boresight with LOAL, rear-targeting, and anti-SAM functions, and more importantly, the R-74Ms purportedly have a 40 km aerodynamic range. The PL-10 ASR has a 20 km effective range and likely has a 60 km aerodynamic range. Second, the PL-15s outclass the R-77s the Indians use, likely being on par or superior to the Russian experimental K-77Ms for the Su-57.
The only missile the Indians will have that can match the PL-15 would be the Meteor coming in with the Rafales, but it'd be available in few numbers, and the Chinese J-20 would have a half to 1 generation advantage over the Rafales.
-More importantly, the Chinese don't even need to win the air war by a huge margin. The key Chinese capability is their superiority in artillery firepower, and artillery puts out more firepower for cost than aircraft does. Where the air war matters is that the Chinese SPG advantage is not usable if the InAF conducts airstrikes on Chinese SPGs; SPGs can counter towed-artillery quite effectively, but can do nothing against strike aircraft.
In other words, despite its inferiority in airbasing on the Sino-Indian border, China only needs to stop the InAF from bombing its aircraft effectively. And that's where the Chinese technological advantage comes in; the modern (4th generation) Indian aircraft can all be countered effectively by Chinese 4.5th and 5th generation aircraft and equipment. Less modern Indian aircraft can be effectively countered by Chinese ground-based air defense.
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One key aspect that I think both Indians and Chinese are misinformed about is the nature of Indian politics, that is to say, Indian politics are driven by nationalism, and in a different way than China is. Chinese nationalism is fueled by its economic and technological development. In other words, when the Chinese government wants to stir up their population, they point to the GDP growth rate, and how close the Chinese are to passing the United States as the world's key technological and economic power. India, in comparison, does not have the same developmental rate, and many informed Indians are in despair about its growth, development, and governance capability.
What India, in contrast, has for its nationalism, is its regional control. Indians are usually in denial about their status as an aggressive power, but India, unlike China, was not effectively contained by the United States during the Cold War and was regionally hegemonic. In the aftermath of decolonization, India was effective at annexing nearby powers and manipulating its neighbors. For instance, the Indians undertook the annexation of Goa and the annexation of Sikkim. They have been able to do well in most anti-Pakistani conflicts and were able to break off East Pakistan into the modern state of Bangladesh. Before China's recent emergence and development, they had moved Nepal into its sphere of influence, and still have undue influence in Bhutan, effectively rendering most of its neighbors its satellites.
China, in comparison, annexed the de facto independent territories of Xinjiang and Tibet, but all of these happened close to Liberation in 1949, and its territorial expansion has been limited since then; the main gains being gains on the border with Vietnam and the de facto annexation of Hong Kong. The closest China has to a satellite would be Pakistan, but Pakistan exerts its independent foreign policy and was also a partial American satellite during the Cold War.
In other words, we can see the difference in Indian and Chinese priorities. India wants to obtain sovereignty or suzerainty over former British India, and that is a priority over its own development. China also wants to reform the Sinosphere, but it is more focused on its internal development than to attempt, by force or by crook as with India, to do so. And neither India nor China's ambitions are unreasonable, given their population preponderance relative to its neighbors. But India is going to be more aggressive about it because of its own lackluster development.
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The best way to end the Ladakh stand-off would be both sides making mutual concessions. That it's escalated to this degree is the result of Chinese error; i.e, the Galwan clash was likely never supposed to have led to Indian fatalities, or to Indian fatalities to this degree.
What China needs is for India to agree to Chinese-mediated talks with Pakistan, with an eye to ending the Sino-Indian border disputes and the incessant Indo-Pakistani conflict. This is, in itself, a Chinese accommodation and acknowledgment of India's sphere of influence, but hopefully will come along with India acknowledging that China is not a defeatable strategic rival under the present circumstance. Likewise, China needs to accept Indian rights to its own strategic region, but only in the circumstance that India does not actively attempt to thwart Chinese interests. This requires that India is willing to put the border dispute away and provide territorial concessions to China in Aksai Chin and possibly Tawang.
The impediment to this, of course, is Indian nationalism which is unwilling to make any territorial concessions for anything. So we are, for the moment, at an impasse.