@Bltizo
I stand by my statement.
I expect the first operational J-20 squadron to be deployed to either Beijing or Wuxi. Note that Wuxi covers Shanghai, Japan, Korea and the East China Sea.
Given a modest production rampup, I wouldn't be surprised if 2 squadrons will have been delivered and IOC declared towards the end of next year.
2 squadrons? I suppose you mean regiments, in PLAAF parlance? Assuming a J-20 regiment is the same size as a flanker regiment, that's probably 24 aircraft each, with 48 aircraft total? I cannot imagine they will be able to build 48 aircraft by the end of the year -- frankly I would be impressed if they're able to produce 24 aircraft by the end of the year, let alone achieve IOC.
Given that that the Chinese Air Force has now doubled flights to an average of 2 flights per day in the ECS, they should be running unpredictable flight patterns as they have the initiative and can choose where/when/how many planes to put into the air.
Even with the extra F-15 squadron, does this mean Naha airbase/airport is now running on a 24/7 footing where nobody is getting any sleep?
From the Chinese perspective, they could continue escalating and keep this up for decades.
Note that the same calculation applies to the Chinese Coast Guard in the East China Seas.
Yes, the sheer increase in number of capable assets in terms of the Navy, Air Force/Naval Aviation, and Coast Guard, will likely result in an increase in overall operational tempo as they all move to increase their proficiency.
In terms of aircraft, I expect the Navy to induct a fairly large number of Y-8Qs in the coming years, and I expect the western pacific will see them do patrols quite frequently once we reach about 2020.