He might be undercounting and discounting Chinese manufacturing numbers and J-20 capabilities vs F-35. But what he says about the strategic implications are indeed true and quite depressing for China to be honest. The fact that even if China produces 120+ J-20's per year, it still won't catchup to US and its anglo-saxon allies and client states in the Pacific such as Japan and Korea. They will still have almost 2 to 1 advantage in terms of number of planes. Yes, one could argue that they will never be able field more than 50% of those planes into a war against China due to large distances involved and logistics. But its still enough to put China on the defensive.
The takeaway is that China is still not investing enough on Air power and on its military overall. With China's manufacturing prowess, making 3-400 fighter jets per year should be easily doable. But China is making just enough planes to slowly get to parity with US+allies in maybe 15-20 years. But it will never get to a position of dominance where US will be afraid of even contemplating a fight with China and slowly get out of the west Pacific due to caution and fear. That's still a long way off.
There is a reason why I don't like these posts of these YouTube videos because it almost invariably leads to discussions of details of weird parts.
I wrote the following as an initial follow-up to my other post, but I declined to post it as I was hoping people would exercise self restraint as well and not comment on the off topic parts of the video.
But seeing as it is now being raised, I will post it below which directly addresses the points you made and which the video made:
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One third of the video seems to be used trying to actually ascertain what J-20's numbers and production rate actually is (and even the numerical conclusions reached are not exactly great), while the remaining two thirds of the video is basically dedicated to trying to explain why increased J-20 production rate is actually "not a big deal guys".
The focus on F-35's production and procurement numbers is natural and understandable, because that is the 5th generation fighter type in production for the US et al at present and thus is the natural "high end adversary" of J-20.
But much of the video is also spent trying to look at how an "actual westpac high end conflict may be fought" in a system of systems manner (fair) but seems to give the US not only the benefit of the entire tactical air fleets of multiple partner nations that the puppet assumes can be deployed and operate in theater, but also assumes the entirety of the US tactical air fleet can be deployed and operate in theater as well.
Naturally, some deploy-to-theater constraints exist for the PLA as well, but the ability of elements of the PLA's internal air fleet to redeploy among its plentiful air bases within the country from one strategic direction to another by anywhere from a few hundred km to a thousand km (depending on ferry distance) is far easier than the intercontinental journeys the bulk of the US air fleet (which are not permanently based in the westpac theater) and that of some allies (like Canada, Australia) would need to do to get in theater, not to mention the need for more basing (which the US and partners are working to expand of course, but the ability to simply absorb the entirety of the US tactical air fleet and that of Canada and Australia isn't going to happen at the drop of a hat).
Watching the video, the puppet seems to be implying that if a high end westpac conflict were to occur today, the US and partners would have a numerical advantage in terms of deployed, in-theater fighter aircraft versus that of the PLA, which is just so mind boggling to imply that I wonder if the people who wrote the script actually realized what they were suggesting to begin with.
But really the most bemusing part of the video is near the end "in the grand scheme of things, considering the thousands of potential enemy aircraft, even a hundred J-20s made per year won't really make much difference for power projection outside of Chinese borders".... which is kind of true in the sense that a general air superiority fighter aircraft obviously isn't designed to project power in the traditional sense, but the fleet size of any kind of fighter aircraft is naturally going to be important for one's ability to contest air superiority at operationally relevant distances, and the ability to contest air superiority will determine one's ability to project power.
The difference between maintaining a future sustained procurement rate of say only 20 J-20s a year, versus 50 a year, versus 100 a year, versus 120-150 a year, most definitely would have their effects felt at the strategic level across even a half decade's period of procurement (let alone the total active production run duration of an aircraft)... and the size of the J-20 fleet would of course determine the ability to contest air superiority at extended distances, which in turn determines the ability to project power by follow-on forces (whether it is naval or long range air power).
Putting it a different way, if the J-20 program had gone the way of the Su-57 program in terms of developmental pace and procurement scale, or even if they had gone the way of the F-22 program in development and procurement, the size of the J-20 fleet (and thus the deliverable effects) would be significantly lower, to potentially a magnitude lower than what it is now and where it is likely to be in the near future.