That illustration has opened my eyes a bit, although it has a few errors.
And in regards to strategy, you just have to do some homework as to what rhetoric "The Party" is going on about. When it comes to military strategy and what their military is gearing up for, from the research that I have done, they are attempting to disuade US influence in the Pacific, so they can replace it with their own. That's been their modus operandi for the past few decades, IIRC. Certainly they have other things to worry about (India, most prominently), but their focus for developing weapons is on the Pacific.
The strategic perspective is fine, but in addition to the points Kyanges mentioned there are other reasons why it's not necessary to conclude that the J-20 was designed for the mission profile described both in the different tactical approaches that could achieve the same ends and in the physical attributes of the plane.
One point that stands out for me which seems counter to the idea that the J-20 is a long range striker/interceptor is that if the J-20 were meant to take out aerial support assets to neutralize the F-22's effectiveness without direct engagement, that doesn't necessitate the J-20 having greater range than the F-22.
If we assume the safest distance for a tanker while still being able to refuel an F-22 on mission, the absolute maximum should be half the F-22's ferry range. That means for a J-20 to take out an aerial tanker and then make a trip back, it would only need to match the F-22's range. If the J-20 were meant to take out critical AWACs, it would only need less than the range of the F-22's, since the effective operating range of AWACs would be limited by the range of their radars. Furthermore, that same mission profile could be done with a J-11. The only reason to use the J-20 would be for the element of surprise, but I can't imagine the USAF leaving these assets unescorted with the threat of an opposing stealth fighter, which would mean the J-20 would still have to engage, probably in WVR if the escorts are also stealth fighters.
On the other hand, if we assume the F-22 can travel further than its base of deployment to refuel, that is, its point of deployment is less than half its total ferry range so that tankers can sit further away, there is more incentive to knock out the base of deployment than the tanker, simply because if you took out the tanker the F-22 could still return to base for refueling. In fact, I would imagine that in a conflict scenario, the first assets China would seek to knock out are nearby air bases. That would do far more to hurt the range and capability of the USAF in the China theater than taking out aerial tankers and AWACs. Clearly, given the limited size of the weapons bay, the J-20 wouldn't be able to do that on its own, even if it were to take a key role in taking out early detection and response assets. Even this scenario indicates a need for a fighter that could go toe to toe with the F-22, in the event that you couldn't prevent the air base from scrambling some of its assets before being neutralized.
Now that doesn't mean the aerial tanker couldn't be sitting further than half the maximum range of the F-22, but if it is that still doesn't necessitate the J-20 having a greater internal fuel capacity to target those tankers. Just like the F-22 the J-20 can probably be outfitted with external fuel tanks. And again, you run into the problem of the J-11 also being able to fulfill that role. Assuming the J-20 was designed with long range intercepting in mind, the only advantage it would bring would be stealth, and that matters far more for knocking out early detection and defense systems, which would have a smaller effective operating range than the F-22's maximum range.
Then there are the physical details of the J-20's design. For one, based on satellite pictures, we know the J-20 isn't that much longer than the F-22. It does have a longer fuselage, but keep in mind that volume is more than just fuselage length, and the J-20 has both smaller elevators (canards vs tailplanes) and stabilizers. It's hard to say for sure, but its wings also look thinner. Therefore, the increased volume of the fuselage could simply be offsetting reduced fuel capacity in, say, the wings for example. Or if the J-20 does carry more fuel, it could be for less fuel efficient engines. Either way, the J-20 isn't so much bigger than the F-22 that any potential increase in fuel capacity translates to a greater range. This would less true if it were indeed 23 meters long as some initial assessments had it, but it isn't.
In conclusion, even if we assume China's strategy is to focus on the Pacific Theater (and I think that's the right direction), tactically, I just don't see the J-20 being a dedicated long range striker/interceptor working out in the details. I can certainly see it knocking out major support assets as one of its roles, but it hardly seems specialized to do that at an expansive range, nor would it need to have expansive range to fulfill those specific roles in an effective manner. In fact, it seems the reason such a conclusion was reached was based purely on the mistaken notion that the J-20 was the size of an F-111, which would have greatly increased the size of the J-20's weapons bay as well as fuel capacity, so that it could really be able to do a silent search and destroy mission way passed enemy lines in the Pacific on its own. Given the drastically smaller 20-21 meter length though, I don't think any potential increase in fuel capacity relative to the F-22 would translate to a significantly greater range, and therefore a completely different mission profile.
When the J-20 was first being envisaged (in the early 90's?), I doubt the PLAAF thought it would have anywhere near the number of tankers needed to support multiple strike packages going downtown. Fighters are normally initially designed for pretty narrow purposes actually, from what I've seen of fighters in the American inventory. Perhaps the Chinese are different, but I'd be surprised if they were. Last time I checked, the level of coordination between the PLAAF and PLAN was next to nothing in battle (circa late 00's), and something similar to that in the boardroom. In short, I doubt a PLAAF program would be influenced by a PLAN doctrine (not to mention that the internal fight in the PLAN between subs and carriers is on-going).
Heck, I could be wrong, but I certainly don't think so.
Ah, but we know the design of the J-20 was finalized in the mid 2000s, giving them significant time to revise requirements and look ahead.