janjak desalin
Junior Member
Additionally,
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ISIS/ISIL conflict in Syria/Iraq (No OpEd, No Politics)
- Thread starter Jeff Head
- Start date
janjak desalin
Junior Member
Now, consider what this graphic would look like should the SAAF (Syrian Arab Armed Forces, not Air Force) regain control of either, or both, of the airbases at Kuweires and Deir ez-Zor!Map-scheme of deliveries of Russian military aid to Syria
janjak desalin
Junior Member
Maps to support my strategic analysis/predictions for regime offensive operations:
QUOTE="janjak desalin, post: 372522, member: 11452"][...] the Aleppo offensive (north and south) is supplied, solely, by a route that connects highways from the coast to Hama, to highway 42, (Homs to Raqqa), to a road from Ithriyah that connects the to the Khanaser highway network that serves southwestern Aleppo. This, circuitous route, most likely, is a primary contributor to the slow pace of action by the regime coalition in its Aleppo offensive.[...][/QUOTE]
QUOTE="janjak desalin, post: 372522, member: 11452"][...] the Aleppo offensive (north and south) is supplied, solely, by a route that connects highways from the coast to Hama, to highway 42, (Homs to Raqqa), to a road from Ithriyah that connects the to the Khanaser highway network that serves southwestern Aleppo. This, circuitous route, most likely, is a primary contributor to the slow pace of action by the regime coalition in its Aleppo offensive.[...][/QUOTE]
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Earlier today I asked about confirmation of US sending trainers into NW Syria. The first map shown by Janjak shows the importance of that area for the supply route SAA needs for its campaign against ISIS. Those trainers are a legitimate target of the defenders of Syria unless US asked permission from the Syrian government.
janjak desalin
Junior Member
Delft, I'm don't think the location is critical to the regime coalition's offensive against ISIS, right now, as the primary, and less contested, routes go through Hama and Aleppo Governorates. However, this location does situate US Special Forces within the same Governorate, Latakia, as Russian forces, and can only be interpreted as a direct challenge. The map, below, illustrates that
Salma is ~35 km from Latakia city.
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Thanks Janjak, your maps and analysis have been very interesting to read.
I have been looking at this and trying to work out what the immediate objectives are.
In one sense the main offensive around Aleppo is almost counter intuitive as it starts a fight with the two enemy camps with the SAA in the middle and doing so against very well prepared hardened defences.
It is however the case that Aleppo secured by Government forces removes one significant potential political threat, namely of being set up Benghazi style as a credible rebel Capital where a rebel regime could be installed and recognised by its backers. The retaking and deep securing of all Aleppo would kill any counter political strategy dead in the water and ensure that the Russian led Vienna process, remains the only show in town.
I can also see a more general practical reason. I read somewhere earlier that these areas in the North West under rebel control are the main habitable areas not under government control and that most of the internally displaced citizens of Syria have sought safety in Government controlled areas. Many of these no doubt will be from Aleppo and the environs, which means that returning the city and surrounding countryside to Government control will mean that very large numbers will start moving back and begin the rebuilding process and other economic activities.
It could also prompt large numbers displaced abroad to return to Syria and there home areas.This would carry a very strong political message and kill the regime change agenda for good.
If it also stopped the Exodus into Europe.........
The fighting at the moment must be a real meat grinder, but it seems clear the Government forces are gaining the advantage. Hardened enemy defences are tough, but they cannot be built everywhere, so that the ongoing aerial reduction and the heavy casualties all rebel/terrorist forces must be taking means that a major break through is probably not far away.
Wolfie asked me a couple of days back why dedicated Russian CAS platforms were not being used in the role. I think the answer is simple. There are relatively few Russian aircraft and these must be used to optimum effect and they are the only pro government aircraft capable of the precision strikes destroying fuel and arms dumps, reducing bunkers and killing commanders.
The Syrian Government has an Air Force and this is more than capable of providing CAS, especially against moving targets.
I can also see Russian reticence in getting involved to close to actual battle zones, as language issues and a lack of general familiarity could cause tactical delays and significantly increase the risk of friendly fire incidents.
I think the current strategy is working well and we are just starting to see the fruits unfold.
I have been looking at this and trying to work out what the immediate objectives are.
In one sense the main offensive around Aleppo is almost counter intuitive as it starts a fight with the two enemy camps with the SAA in the middle and doing so against very well prepared hardened defences.
It is however the case that Aleppo secured by Government forces removes one significant potential political threat, namely of being set up Benghazi style as a credible rebel Capital where a rebel regime could be installed and recognised by its backers. The retaking and deep securing of all Aleppo would kill any counter political strategy dead in the water and ensure that the Russian led Vienna process, remains the only show in town.
I can also see a more general practical reason. I read somewhere earlier that these areas in the North West under rebel control are the main habitable areas not under government control and that most of the internally displaced citizens of Syria have sought safety in Government controlled areas. Many of these no doubt will be from Aleppo and the environs, which means that returning the city and surrounding countryside to Government control will mean that very large numbers will start moving back and begin the rebuilding process and other economic activities.
It could also prompt large numbers displaced abroad to return to Syria and there home areas.This would carry a very strong political message and kill the regime change agenda for good.
If it also stopped the Exodus into Europe.........
The fighting at the moment must be a real meat grinder, but it seems clear the Government forces are gaining the advantage. Hardened enemy defences are tough, but they cannot be built everywhere, so that the ongoing aerial reduction and the heavy casualties all rebel/terrorist forces must be taking means that a major break through is probably not far away.
Wolfie asked me a couple of days back why dedicated Russian CAS platforms were not being used in the role. I think the answer is simple. There are relatively few Russian aircraft and these must be used to optimum effect and they are the only pro government aircraft capable of the precision strikes destroying fuel and arms dumps, reducing bunkers and killing commanders.
The Syrian Government has an Air Force and this is more than capable of providing CAS, especially against moving targets.
I can also see Russian reticence in getting involved to close to actual battle zones, as language issues and a lack of general familiarity could cause tactical delays and significantly increase the risk of friendly fire incidents.
I think the current strategy is working well and we are just starting to see the fruits unfold.
kwaigonegin
Colonel
Well it's beginning to look more and more like ISIS's handy work with the latest report though the investigation shows internal pressure blast and not external (i.e SAM)
I have heard reports leaning towards a bomb nothing confirmed yet though please advise if anyone else has heard anything along these lines of thinking
janjak desalin
Junior Member
Thank you, SampanViking, for your acknowledgement. I find your analyses intriguing, as well, and, in fact, my southwest Aleppo prediction was inspired by your prediction of the encirclement of Aleppo city and your bemusement, a bemusement we share, with Kuweires.
The aim of the single-envelopment, strategic-flanking, maneuver I anticipate would be to place FSA coalition forces centered in Idlib Governorate into a doubly-enveloped position, applying pressure from regime strongholds of Latakia Governorate, to the west, Hama Governorate, to the west and the south, and from the territory to be taken in the ongoing southwest Aleppo offensive, too the east. This would cut them off from the rest of Syria, and leave them only with the Turkish border, to the north, as a supply or escape route. More significantly, it would affect a centrifugal response from FSA coalition forces, drawing them out from concentrated central defensive positions (along highway M5) and out towards the directions of attack.
Sorry, but I'm not, yet, familiar with the tools used to graph this on a map.
My expectation is that an eastern Aleppo offensive, against ISIL's strength, will not occur until at least one, but probably both, of the more direct highways to Aleppo city are under control.
The aim of the single-envelopment, strategic-flanking, maneuver I anticipate would be to place FSA coalition forces centered in Idlib Governorate into a doubly-enveloped position, applying pressure from regime strongholds of Latakia Governorate, to the west, Hama Governorate, to the west and the south, and from the territory to be taken in the ongoing southwest Aleppo offensive, too the east. This would cut them off from the rest of Syria, and leave them only with the Turkish border, to the north, as a supply or escape route. More significantly, it would affect a centrifugal response from FSA coalition forces, drawing them out from concentrated central defensive positions (along highway M5) and out towards the directions of attack.
Sorry, but I'm not, yet, familiar with the tools used to graph this on a map.
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