The most recent reports i've read indicate that southwestern Aleppo is presently the most dynamic battle-zone.
The consensus amongst cartographers is that the FSA coalition still controls critical, strategic, stretches of both the main highway, (M5/Damascus to Aleppo), and the secondary, Hama to Aleppo, route. Consequently, the Aleppo offensive (north and south) is supplied, solely, by a route that connects highways from the coast to Hama, to highway 42, (Homs to Raqqa), to a road from Ithriyah that connects the to the Khanaser highway network that serves southwestern Aleppo. This, circuitous route, most likely, is a primary contributor to the slow pace of action by the regime coalition in its Aleppo offensive. It is also the basis of my anticipation that, soon, in the next strategic phase, the region in which the Aleppo-Hama-Idlib Governorates' borders meet will be the center of offensive action for regime coalition forces.
My logic is that, as the critical, strategic, stretch of main highway, (M5), is centered in Idlib Governorate, itself the center of FSA coalition forces concentration and access to international commerce (read Turkey), and is, therefore, most heavily defended, the battle for this objective would best be initiated subsequent to the concentration of as great a force as is possible. Conversely, the critical, strategic, stretches of the Hama to Aleppo highway network that FSA coalition forces control are at the eastern boundary of their territory, in the region in which the Aleppo-Hama-Idlib Governorates' borders meet. They are defended well only from the west, are vulnerable to the north, south and east, and are under attack, presently, from the north and east. Consequently, a strategy focused on regaining full control of the Hama to Aleppo highway network is the most viable option for maximizing efficiency (speed/fuel efficiency/bulk) in supplying operations with the objectives of either taking or investing Aleppo city and regaining control of the Aleppo Governorate.
Ultimately, all I'm describing is a single envelopment at the strategic level, a strategic flanking. As FSA is both centered, and concentrated heavily, on highway M5 and is significantly less concentrated on the peripheral Hama to Aleppo, highway network, why not by-pass the more difficult work 'til the less difficult is done.
I'm too lazy for mapping, right now; maybe later.
