Well, I have read the thread and while there is no denying that the approaches suggested are logical and practical, I think they miss the kernel of this situation and what it is that makes this so very different from previous episodes of disorder.
The covert options are all valid, but these are things that other Governments would probably expect and subjects which can be discussed with China behind closed doors. The key fact here is that the Ambassador made very public comments and in that respect is suggesting that behind closed doors has had little effect or that Beijing feels that a direct approach to the citizenry of Europe and possibly beyond is required. If so, then this is primarily a matter of perception and if perception is a primary issue then it means the stakes are extremely high.
To go further does require a brief traipse through dangerous territory, but if it is done tastefully and as it is essential to the plot, I think it must be
. I would make clear though, that this is simply describing positions, which are well known and understood and that no comments on right or wrong either way are necessary or expected in any subsequent responses.
There is a perception throughout Western Governments and media, that the CCP is on the "wrong side of history" through its failure to recognise and adopt Western standards of Political System and Policy etc. As a result, they feel free to offer support to those that actively oppose the rule of the CCP and are prepared to countenance any resulting disorder that support of this opposition may Generate. Further, that because the CCP is morally wrong and the opposition is morally right, that China has no option but to accept the outbreaks of disorder and that if they continue to survive in power, must simply accept the situation and clear up the mess until next time.
The CCP however; not surprisingly, does not share this view and while in the past it may well have had no option but to "weather the storm", "clear up" and "prepare for the next one", this situation is no longer acceptable to it, especially as it has had to cope with two major incidents in as many years. There is now, it seems, little appetite to simply accept this as fate and to meekly await the next outbreak. China is now in a position where it feels able to shape global perceptions in its own image and the Ambassadors statement reads as a forewarning of this.
So, assuming that this is the judgement of the senior CCP Committee members, what are the perceptions that China feels it needs to change?
1) Domestic. The CCP is keenly aware that public opinion at home is angry with what it perceives as weakness in the face of the foreign backed forces, which cannot be ignored or denied as the CCP is the key driver of the foreign backed forces arguement
2) International, it needs to demonstrate publicly and forcefully that China is nobody's punch bag and that supporting the enemies of the Government abroad is not a low risk activity.
3) Policy, the CCP needs to not only to deliver an unequivocal statement that addresses the concerns of 1 and 2, but one which also substantiates and justifies the claims of foreign interference which they have made.
This then is the point where the Ambassadors Statement is delivered. It criticises the Governments of Europe for showing preference to the Minority Opposition groups rather than of the Chinese Government (a rebuke which is extended to the civil groups supporting the Opposition within Europe) It puts everyone on notice that many of the Uighur organisations which it blames for the unrest are about to be labelled Terrorist Organisations and that it will expect Europe to recognise this re-categorisation. In short we have a form of "You are either with us or against us" with Chinese Characteristics.
My expectation, is that either at the time this demand is formally made, or shortly afterwards as response to poor European and possible US Enthusiasm to the demand, that China will undertake a "spectacular" of its own and that this will be in form of a major security operation across its Western Border in Eastern Afghanistan. This Operation will be intense, involve huge numbers of Chinese Ground Forces and Aircraft and result in the "capture" of some leading Uighur separatists and possible even embarrassing documentation regarding links to overseas Intelligence Agencies.
In many ways, this operation will be similar to the Russian operation in Georgia last year, in that it will be short, sharp and then followed by a leisurely withdrawal. The result though will have been to have put on a good show, looked tough at home and abroad and delivered the "evidence" necessary to ensure that continued Overseas support for Chinese Minority Opposition groups is made increasingly difficult (especially if the covert activities suggested by other posters are deemed justifiable to bring into play).
While the above is somewhat wordy, I hope it illustrates the significance of the Ambassadors Statement and the probable path of events it so very strongly alludes too.
