Future PLAN orbat discussion

Tam

Brigadier
Registered Member
You're arguing that a Type-56 is useful as a fleet screen and in identifying/engaging enemy ships.

But a Type-56 has the same problem as an airplane in classifying what kind of ship they've found on radar.
Thinking about it, the Type-56 is worse at doing this.

An airplane can fly closer in, identify the target, then disengage safely underneath the radar/visual horizon.
Or an airplane could fly at really high altitude instead.

What can a Type-56 do except sail in closer?
But a Type-56 barely has any air defence against incoming missiles.

---
A useful fleet screen in a high-risk environment needs a decent air defence system. Which basically means a Type-54A Frigate or larger.

So can you see how a Type-56 Corvette has no place as a fleet screen in a high-risk environment.


You are assuming that the Type 056 is operating alone, not with the support of destroyers and frigates.

If the corvette is networked to the rest of the fleet, an incoming search aircraft can be detected via its own emissions alone, no need to use your own radar, report the information to the rest of the fleet, and fall back to the rest of the fleet.

The reason why the ASW corvette is acting as a screen for advanced detection of submarines as the fleet moves forward.
 

Tam

Brigadier
Registered Member
No, you're missing the point.

Bastions are simply areas where you have air and maritime superiority, which means you can safely operate airplanes and ships in relative safety.

Your lack of studying naval history is showing. The Bastion strategy was devised by the Soviets.

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Soviet and Russian Naval Bastions[
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]

The bastion became an important strategy for the ballistic missile submarine fleets of the
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during the
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. The
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was made a bastion for the
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, and the
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for the
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, both of which remain important to the
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and the
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.

The
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had (and, even more so,
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now has) limited access to the world's oceans: her northern coast is ice-bound at least the majority of the year, and access to the Atlantic requires transiting the
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; much of her eastern coast is also ice-bound and requires moderately close approaches to either
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or
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; travel from her southern ports involves transiting first the
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and
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, and then either the
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or the
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.

The
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originally attempted to directly contest with the navies of
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for control of the
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ocean. As the
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progressed, however, it became clear that the Soviets could not win a toe-to-toe fight in the deep water, and the information sold to the Soviets by the
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in the 1980s made it clear that the ballistic missile submarines, in particular, were very unlikely to be able to carry out their nuclear attack missions.

Realizing their vulnerability, the Soviets adopted a two-level approach. They armed their older, noisier, and less reliable "second generation" ballistic missile submarines with shorter-range nuclear weapons and deployed them as close as possible to the
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.
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, which suffered a catastrophic explosion and fire off
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on 3 October 1986, was one such boat. Meanwhile, they used the information provided by Walker to build both dramatically improved attack boats such as the
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, as well as more-survivable "boomers" such as the
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armed with increasingly accurate and long-range missiles. Then they held those "third-generation" boats close to home, patrolling only near and under the Arctic ice cap. To secure the bastions, they also built large numbers of
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and
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, whose primary mission was anti-submarine barrier and picket patrol; furthermore, the Soviet carrier-building projects were dedicated to defense of these bastions as well rather than independent
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, with
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limited to anti-submarine
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,
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carrying
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fighters as well as helicopters and a sizeable array of weapons (hence the designation
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), and, finally,
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fielding
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.

The
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practiced penetrating these bastions; one such attempt resulted in the
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between
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and
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, a
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. The collision was inadvertent and potentially catastrophic, but did demonstrate that US attack submarines were able to get rather near their intended prey.

Chinese Naval Bastions[
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]

There are indications that the Chinese
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is adopting the concept as well, fortifying the
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for use by its growing number of ballistic missile submarines.
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United States Naval Bastions[
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]

In the sense that a bastion is set up to protect the naval forces themselves rather than a land feature (e.g. the
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), the
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has never made significant use of the bastion concept.

Requirement
1. China needs to defend its coast because:
1a. There are densely populated cities all along the coastline
1b. It protects military facilities along the coast, and also in the interior.
1c. The Chinese interior is also densely populated
How this happens
2. Land-based SAMs (with a range of 400km) can effectively hide in the urban terrain of mainland China.
3. These land-based SAMs can work with AWACs aircraft overhead, which also have a radar horizon of 420km
4. Chinese fighter CAP will also be operating in this area.
5. It means enemy aircraft and ships will be at very high risk if they try to operate within 400km of the Chinese coast.
6. And the waters next to the Chinese coast benefit from being under this protective umbrella.

Oh. If the USN can strike off over 400km and hit the Chinese coastal cities and ports, what's the point of all that? Tomahawks have 1000km.

Stealth aircraft and the use of ECM reduces the protective bubble significantly because you cannot detect at the maximum range of your sensors. SAM missiles have the lowest probability of kill at their maximum range. The protective bubble becomes like a sponge then full of holes where things can get through.

And if South Korea declares war, Seoul accounts for half of the population.
But Seoul is only 400km from Shandong province and 350km from Dandong city.
This means Seoul is already within the A2AD bubble created by Chinese AWACs and SAMs.

They don't have to declare war. All it takes is US assets to attack from South Korea.

The Bohai Sea is a SECONDARY theatre.
Will the US have many spare assets, given that the critical action will be elsewhere?
Plus will South Korea and Japan actually declare war on China?

They might be obligated to.

Japan is 1000km from the Bohai Sea. They would have to cross South Korea and pass the Shandong peninsula to get to the Bohai Sea.
What are the odds of US airplanes and ships making it through?

That is more than enough for the US 7th Fleet to go the East China Sea and rain Tomahawks there.

You simply don't seem to have any idea what the other side is capable of, while continuing to propose static, outdated tactics. A Great Wall in the Sea will easily be overcome. 400km isn't enough of a buffer. In a Taiwan scenario, US fleets can stand off even further.
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
You are assuming that the Type 056 is operating alone, not with the support of destroyers and frigates.

If the corvette is networked to the rest of the fleet, an incoming search aircraft can be detected via its own emissions alone, no need to use your own radar, report the information to the rest of the fleet, and fall back to the rest of the fleet.

The reason why the ASW corvette is acting as a screen for advanced detection of submarines as the fleet moves forward.

I don't have an issue with an ASW or AAW screen ahead of a fleet.
What I did disagree with was that the Type-56 had a role in anti-surface warfare/detection in a highly-contested environment, particularly since the Chinese navy has lots of Frigates which are better suited to the role because they have a medium-range air defence system.

You do realise that your original argument is that the Type-56 and Type-54A is obsolete because they Don't have the radars or datalinks/CEC to operate effectively.

For ASW purposes, that is irrelevant because there will only be a few submarines as targets, and they don't move very fast. A 1minute delay means a submarine only moves 500m.
For AAW and ASuW, line-of-sight datalinks require ships to be close to each other. That defeats the purpose of an advance picket, which needs to be much further out, given airborne search radars have a horizon of 420km. That means an advance picket has to be able to survive by itself or be disposable. And it would really benefit from an airborne comms relays back to the main fleet body. But then you're talking about having control of the air with an airborne AWACs and fighter CAP anyway. So the point still stands that airborne surveillance in front of the fleet is really what will protect a fleet.

My position has always been consistent in that CEC/datalinks are a nice to have:

1. Because if the Type-56 and Type-54A have to venture into high-risk areas, they don't really have to use radars/CEC because they can still be covered effectively by nearby air defence destroyers. It's the same principle behind carriers/amphibs with minimal air defence being covered by air defence destroyers.

2. And the Type-56 and Type-54A will still be effective in rear area ASW/Convoy duties. The length of the Chinese coast and down to the South China Seas is a lot of ocean, so these ships are still useful.
 
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AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
Your lack of studying naval history is showing. The Bastion strategy was devised by the Soviets.

I know the history of Soviet bastions very well thank you.

The Soviets used bastions solely for the protection of their SSBNs, and used enclosed bodies of water, which meant it was relatively easy to create a defence perimeter against submarines, ships or aircraft.

But the concept of a Bastion is now DIFFERENT from the past.
You can't rely on the old concepts, and particularly on a wikipedia definition.

Radars and guided missiles with a range of 400km are now relatively cheap and widespread.
That range means bodies of water don't have to surrounded by land or islands anymore to create a Bastion.

So there's little difference between a Bohai Sea "Bastion" versus a "Bastion" running thousands of kilometers along the Chinese coastline.
They both have a defence perimeter of 400km, which is particularly effective against aircraft, missiles and ships.
Both "Bastions" will still be subject to the same standoff missile strikes from LRASMs (560km) and Tomahawks (1500km)

And both "Bastions" represent a similar level of difficulty for enemy submarines to penetrate.
The Bohai Sea does have a relatively narrow 100km entrance, but it is all shallow waters less than 200m deep.
The rest of a Chinese coastline "Bastion" is the same. And ASW aircraft can easily cover these areas, given their speed.

So in summary, I don't see much difference between a Bohai Sea "Bastion" versus a Bastion that runs the entire length of China's coastline.
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
Oh. If the USN can strike off over 400km and hit the Chinese coastal cities and ports, what's the point of all that? Tomahawks have 1000km.

Of course that is what they plan to do.
Bastions just represent the defensive low-risk areas for any Chinese ships and aircraft to operate from.

Offensive operations are a completely different matter.

But note that non-stealthy Tomahawks are *easy* to track.
And travelling 400km requires 20min+ which is *sufficient time* to intercept.
Remember a 50km radar horizon allows for more than 4 full length engagements over 2minutes, which should mean all the missiles are destroyed.
Tomahawks cost $1.9M. But shooting them down is cheap with ESSM ($1M) or Sidewinder ($0.6M) or even Fighter Jet Guns

---

Yes, Tomahawks have a long range.
But equally, Chinese missiles have an even longer range.

So if Chinese missiles can find and hit the Tomahawk launch platforms first, China wins.

And if the US wants to get into a missile war against Chinese coastal cities and ports:
1. There are simply too many targets in Coastal China
2. That still leaves the majority of the Chinese population and Chinese economy untouched in the interior.
3. It invites China to completely devastate the coastal cities and ports of US military allies in the Western Pacific. But these are all small island states which are *critically* reliant on shipping. Shanghai to the Japanese Home Islands is only 800km.
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
They don't have to declare war. All it takes is US assets to attack from South Korea.

If South Korea allows US aircraft stationed in South Korea to attack China - what on earth do you call that except a declaration of war?

Whether China chooses to accept that invitation to war is another matter.

But as a principle, China cannot allow such a precedent and then for it to go unpunished.

There have to be severe consequences for Korea (or Japan or Philippines) if they allow their territory to be used for military strikes against China.
 

Tam

Brigadier
Registered Member
I don't have an issue with an ASW or AAW screen ahead of a fleet.
What I did disagree with was that the Type-56 had a role in anti-surface warfare/detection in a highly-contested environment, particularly since the Chinese navy has lots of Frigates which are better suited to the role because they have a medium-range air defence system.

What the Type 056 does is the role of the classic ASW corvette-frigate that goes back to WW2. You do realize that the Battle of the Atlantic --- which is a pretty blood battle in naval terms even when compared to the Battle in the Pacific --- was greatly helped and won by little ships, ships half the tonnage of the Type 056 and yet traveled across the Atlantic? Not only did they have to deal with U-boats but brave the German bombers.

Now take a look at the Soviet Bastion strategy. This is really what it looks like. Does it look to you stuck on the coast?

0_XSIBZTyihGMOxWoe.png

An important part of this strategy includes ASW vessels. Ironically, or maybe fittingly, some of these vessels are the spiritual ancestors to the Type 056, the corvettes and frigates like those of the Kola and Riga class, were sold to the PLAN and they eventually led to the beginning of the 053H family.

Now I am not saying the Type 056 should go all the way to the blue waters of the Philippine Sea. They have limited range, but most importantly, in order for the PLAN to successfully head out into the Pacific, there are three ways for them to do so, areas that is expected to be blocked off by submarines.

1. Ryukus Islands, Miyako Straits (Between Okinawa and northern Taiwan).
2. Luzon Straits. (Between south of Taiwan and north of the northern Philippine island of Luzon.)
3. Mindanao Straits and Celebes Sea. (South of Mindanao Island and north of Indonesia. Liaoning battlegroup passed through there in the summer of 2019.)

You can expect these bottlenecks to be filled with submarines. China's counter to this would be to send their own submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, and ASW vessels into these areas to clear all threats.

Given the limited operating range assigned to the Type 056, I do not expect them to go further but I would at least expect them to safeguard these areas.

The Type 056 should be operating in league with frigates and destroyers that would provide them air cover. The PLANAF should have long range aircraft, even J-11s that can extend range into these areas.

You do realise that your original argument is that the Type-56 and Type-54A is obsolete because they Don't have the radars or datalinks/CEC to operate effectively.

I said I don't think they have the radars to operate effectively unless their legacy radars may have been upgraded to frequency agile transmitters, but we really don't know that. As for datalinks and CEC, I have been actively pointing out the high possibility of such already installed in those ships. You seem to be the one who thinks digital CEC is useless and you should vocally call out target coordinates on radio.

For ASW purposes, that is irrelevant because there will only be a few submarines as targets, and they don't move very fast. A 1minute delay means a submarine only moves 500m.
For AAW and ASuW, line-of-sight datalinks require ships to be close to each other. That defeats the purpose of an advance picket, which needs to be much further out, given airborne search radars have a horizon of 420km. That means an advance picket has to be able to survive by itself or be disposable. And it would really benefit from an airborne comms relays back to the main fleet body. But then you're talking about having control of the air with an airborne AWACs and fighter CAP anyway. So the point still stands that airborne surveillance in front of the fleet is really what will protect a fleet.

Precisely but you don't need them stuck in a sucky 400km zone from the Chinese coast. That's why carrier air power is being built. Your land based aircraft will supplement that and you need increased range and loiter ability.

Line of sight datalinks means ships like the Type 054A and 056A would likely be between 20km to 30km of each other, which can put the 056 with the 054A's air cover of 50 to 70km. Its possible to compute the maximum distance by getting the height from the top of the deckhouse or bridge of the 056 and the 052C/D, and the height of the hanger roof of the 054A. From there you can get the radar horizon of these units. Unfortunately given the height of the possible Chinese datalinks it won't be as good in terms of range on a ship to ship basis as the US ones which are set high on top of the mast. You can always get a picture of the Burke, see the tall spike on top of the mast there, and their CEC is there.

If you look at the Type 055, the CEC is on top of the mast right below the shishkaboob ESM/ELINT/TACAN antenna. So its set very high. Its also set very high on the Shandong. On the Liaoning its still high on the island but not as high as the Shandong. Possible CEC antenna on the Type 075 is set on the ESM mounted on the mast, with the location slightly higher than the new dual backed AESA. So yeah, the Chinese Navy is learning. New ships from this point on is being designed with this mind.

My position has always been consistent in that CEC/datalinks are a nice to have:

1. Because if the Type-56 and Type-54A have to venture into high-risk areas, they don't really have to use radars/CEC because they can still be covered effectively by nearby air defence destroyers. It's the same principle behind carriers/amphibs with minimal air defence being covered by air defence destroyers.

2. And the Type-56 and Type-54A will still be effective in rear area ASW/Convoy duties. The length of the Chinese coast and down to the South China Seas is a lot of ocean, so these ships are still useful.

They don't need to have active radars. However, these ships have ESM, or passive detection. In fact, the last batch of Type 056A, these were upgraded, just as in the last batch of Type 054A. This is an undocumented upgrade, only visible with high resolution photos. They added something on top of the Type 726-1 ESM unit, but to be honest I don't know what it does. Is this some ECM capability or added ESM capability? My vote is for the latter.

So even if these ships are not using their radars, they can still passively listen for targets. In case to let you know, the 054A has the Type 366-2 ESM units located under its funnel (you can see two globes left and right of the funnel). These correspond to the Mineral ME-2 passive antiship targeting system that has a range of up to 450km. These can be used to target a ship with antiship missiles passively by their emission alone. Similar systems on the 052C/D as well. Such data of targets that are located passively can be shared among other ships within the fleet, enabling a massed antiship missile strike at the emitting ship.

Of course the USN also has such combat directional finding systems, and OTH-T (Over the Horizon Targeting) will be part of the FFG(X) requirement and likely with upgraded LCS.

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Totoro

Major
VIP Professional
Of the three countries mentioned, Philippines is politically most likely to remain neutral. And at least declaratively forbid US forces there. Of course, US may choose to simply put its troops there by force, as Philippines has little means of defending itself. So it may become a war torn country, as China might also be trying to put its troops there at the same time, as a response to the US move.

South Korea is also likely to remain neutral due to the risk involved. Choosing either side would make it lose more than it could gain, in the long run. The fact China has a possible land route there to SK makes the risk quite high.

Japan on the other hand is very likely to fully ally itself with the US. Basically offer its entire soil to the US military, for various staging areas. While Japan too could lose a lot by not remaining neutral, the damage China can do to Japan, compared to the damage China could do to South Korea is much, much smaller.
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
That is more than enough for the US 7th Fleet to go the East China Sea and rain Tomahawks there.

You simply don't seem to have any idea what the other side is capable of, while continuing to propose static, outdated tactics. A Great Wall in the Sea will easily be overcome. 400km isn't enough of a buffer. In a Taiwan scenario, US fleets can stand off even further.

The entire Tomahawk inventory is estimated at 3000 missiles.
That is not enough to keep Coastal China down.
Plus what is to stop China from building an even larger stock of missiles?

And who said anything about a 400km buffer being the end goal?

I'm saying that 400km from the Chinese coastline represents a "Bastion" where Chinese aircraft and ships can operate in relative safety.
Commercial shipping and older Chinese Navy vessels can operate here.

But you need a different set of capabilities beyond this distance eg. Destroyers, ASBMs, HGVs, SSNs, Stealth Fighters, Stealth Bombers, Satellites etc etc

Current US Navy thinking is that their ships will have to operate at a 1000km distance from China, but this needs to increase to 1500-2000km in the future, due to China's increasingly numerous long-range systems.

Eventually, I'd expect the Chinese Navy to build a larger carrier fleet than the US Navy.
But such a development won't be for another 2 decades at least.
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
What the Type 056 does is the role of the classic ASW corvette-frigate that goes back to WW2. You do realize that the Battle of the Atlantic --- which is a pretty blood battle in naval terms even when compared to the Battle in the Pacific --- was greatly helped and won by little ships, ships half the tonnage of the Type 056 and yet traveled across the Atlantic? Not only did they have to deal with U-boats but brave the German bombers.

Now take a look at the Soviet Bastion strategy. This is really what it looks like. Does it look to you stuck on the coast?

View attachment 56779

This Soviet Bastion diagram could reach further because there is nothing except empty ocean, and no opposition.

The nearest opposition is isolated Keflavik airbase on Iceland, which is 2400km from Murmansk.
So of course the Soviet military could easily create a "Bastion" at a greater distance.
It looks like a radius of 1000km from Murmansk, which corresponds to fighter jet range.
So you could operate small Corvettes in this area, because they were theoretically covered by airborne assets, and wouldn't expect to encounter other surface ships. So their primary role was ASW.

But if Japan was sitting 800km off the coast of Murmansk, the Soviet "Bastion" strategy would have to shrink to 400km and would be stuck on the coast.
That is the parallel to China's geography.

---

But eventually, China could come to a political accommodation with the countries on the 1st Island Chain and/or build a sufficiently large military to overpower everyone in the 1st Island Chain.

After all, all of the 1st Island Chain is within 1000km of mainland China.
Then the Chinese "Bastion" could extend out to 1000km.

But that is not going to happen for some time.
 
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