Future PLAN orbat discussion

I've just been thinking about the number of Type-052C/Ds which will be in service after 2025

Say the PLAN is aiming to match the US Navy, which has 11 CVNs and 10 LHD type ships as the centrepiece of a blue-water fleet

We've seen a modernships graphic which shows a Chinese CSG comprising

1x Carrier
1x Resupply ship
2x Type-055 Large Destroyers (Cruisers)
3x Type-052C/D Destroyers
3x Type-054A Frigates

If you further assume that each LHD has 1 Type-052C/D as an escort, it means there is a requirement for approximately 40 Type-052C/Ds to escort CSGs and LHDs

We've already seen 31 Type-052C/Ds launched or in service, along with rumours that between 2021-2025, 20 more Type-052Ds will be produced. That's a total of 51 ships.

The implication is that the current (desired) fleet structure of Type-052C/Ds will be largely be built by 2025
Afterwards, I'm speculating that PLAN surface navy construction will switch to more carriers instead of these destroyers

AndrewS said:

1x Carrier
1x Resupply ship
2x Type-055 Large Destroyers (Cruisers)
3x Type-052C/D Destroyers
3x Type-054A Frigates

Click to expand...

If CSG is forced to combat speeds, those 3 will struggle. 1-2 may still be useful for detached tasks (say, escorting AOE away), but otherwise, they are going to be a problem.

So there is merit in increasing 052C/D allocation at the cost of 054A - if only from this perspective alone. Existing numbers support such a shift pretty well.

Furthermore, as soon as 054Bs arrive(which should start within a few years per leak) - they'll probably be far more welcome with the carrier fleet(assuming they aren't going to be just CODADs anymore).

This will also free 054As for other, more suitable tasks.

AndrewS said:

Say the PLAN is aiming to match the US Navy, which has 11 CVNs and 10 LHD type ships as the centrepiece of a blue-water fleet.

Click to expand...

What estimates do we have for number of carriers that the PLAN is aiming for?

6-8 or actually up to the ~10 that the current US navy has?

Michaelsinodef said:

What estimates do we have for number of carriers that the PLAN is aiming for?

6-8 or actually up to the ~10 that the current US navy has?

Click to expand...

It's mostly speculation

But historically, the world's largest trading nation builds the world's largest Navy to protect its overseas trade.

I just can't see the Chinese Navy settling for 8 carriers and accepting a position where China's overseas seaborne trade is still subject to the US Navy, if the resources to build a bigger Navy are available

Currently, the World Bank has the Chinese economy at about 30% larger than the US
That would be able to support a Chinese Navy that matches the size of the US Navy
By 2035, the Australian government white papers project the Chinese economy to be twice the size of the USA

So my minimum estimate is 11 Chinese supercarriers which matches the USA. Such a force would be able to credibly contest blue-water maritime supremacy beyond the 2nd Island Chain

But if the Chinese economy is twice the size, then why couldn't they aim for a Navy which is 50% larger than the USA.
That would imply a fleet of 16 Chinese supercarriers, and demonstrate a clear margin of superiority if there was any conflict

This topic might be old but that's the closest thing I found about the PLAN's orbat.

Do you guys know this blog?

I can't really formulate an opinion yet, because I haven't read everything, however, I can highlight the effort made toward sourcing the articles, with mentions and links.


PS: Please educate me on what to do in such a case: should I open a new thread (eg. about new sources) or do just that, ie. find the most appropriate existing topic, even if it's old?

ClaudeJ said:

Do you guys know this blog?

Click to expand...

Tbh I found very strange notion of the author, that, quote, conflict will be contained to or within 1st island chain.
Relative orbats don't support such notion anymore, this is but a case of wish thinking based on ... outdated input.

Conflict - provided it will flow badly for China - may more or less be decided with a decisive action around 1st IC, sure. But given the concentrated Chinese fleet and strategic situation, for most of it to be here just doesn't make any sense.

Gloire_bb said:

Tbh I found very strange notion of the author, that, quote, conflict will be contained to or within 1st island chain.
Relative orbats don't support such notion anymore, this is but a case of wish thinking based on ... outdated input.

Conflict - provided it will flow badly for China - may more or less be decided with a decisive action around 1st IC, sure. But given the concentrated Chinese fleet and strategic situation, for most of it to be here just doesn't make any sense.

Click to expand...

a longer quote is
"if there is a major prolonged conflict with the Chinese, that the primary theater of operations will be inside and around the “” with Taiwan the critical center (Think Malta in the Mediterranean during WWII). The Chinese surface fleet is not likely to make significant operations outside this area. Chinese conventional submarines will also concentrate in this area but will also operate in the Straits that access the South and East China Seas. The Chinese will make air and missile attack out to at least the “,” including Guam."

to which i think make some sense. i think PLA attack beyond 1IC will be mainly air and missile, surface fleet will not break out 1IC big time, UNTIL PLAN SSN fleet and CSG grow much stronger, which i expect to happen before 2030

caohailiang said:

to which i think make some sense. i think PLA attack beyond 1IC will be mainly air and missile, surface fleet will not break out 1IC big time, UNTIL PLAN SSN fleet and CSG grow much stronger, which i expect to happen before 2030

Click to expand...

There is no point in current PLAN(and in capabilities it currently develops) within 1st chain. If things are right - it shall be a rear area of complete Chinese sea superiority (i.e. ability to fully exploit benefits of the sea to its benefit) with at most suppressed enemy submarine activity.

I'd even go as far as to say, that PLAN bottled within 1st chain is as good as effectively contained, as it serves no strategic purpose there.
'Contents' of first chain are Chinese coastal&1st tier international trade, inner bastions for SSBNs, basic secure perimeter away from the mainland coast and naval bases (pushing out immediate tactical strike&intercept), and so on. Compromising this list is a de facto defeat of PLAN, and a big question mark on what are all those investments for.
It isn't a list of things that shall be defended - they can not. This is a list of things that shall not be meaningfully contested in the first place.

From 2010s onwards, the PLA Navy's purpose can be very roughy summed as "to make insides of 1st chain a safe rear area, to prevent the blockade of 1st chain, to push beyond the chain - as far as possible"(in that order). Preferably, the contested area should be at least in the second chain (desirably, the Indian Ocean commerce shall also be retained) as it makes the geostrategic situation b/n China and the most likely opponent remotely even.

Defense in the sea is always going by the bases - either your opponents', or yours. The only way to hack this equation is to move your bases forward, collapsing the net of forward bases of the opponent (case study - PTO of WW2). As a side benefit, such a move doesn't just force the opponent back - if pursued with sufficient determination, it forces the opponent off the balance, potentially cleansing vast swathes of Earth oceans' of his presence.