Taiwanese independence forces may well be emboldened by the events of this crisis, but this is not to say that they will certainly go ahead and cross the red line. There is still a big risk that China will deviate from its usual risk aversion and simply react with lethal force, particularly given the domestic cost of inaction for Beijing. So formal independence will be deterred for the time being. However, the risk I see is that Taiwanese independence forces will continue to salami slice right up to the red line, to test Beijing's resolve. They may undertake further provocations, e.g. inviting more foreign leaders to Taiwan, changing the RoC flag, changing the anthem, disavowing Sun Yatsen, disbanding/renaming the KMT, further desinicisation policies, stationing sizable foreign troops, or making military agreements. The lack of a strong reaction by Beijing to any of these moves, particularly the lack of lethal response, could very well convince the independence forces that Beijing's red line is just a bluff. They would then cross it and declare independence if they have reliable confirmation of US military support. This is where I see the danger to both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and especially more so for Taiwan, in the medium term.
Couple of comments.
1. Stationing US troops on Taiwan would be a red line. It automatically means a China-Taiwan war involves the US, which makes a unification scenario far more difficult. So China would go to war immediately if this starts to happen
2. There are lots of economic and grayzone activities that China can impose on Taiwan. Suppose military exercises and a soft blockade keep running for longer and longer times whenever there is a visit? That should be a suitable deterrent against many activities and signal on red lines.
In summary, I see China has many economic and grayzone actions that it can use to signal lower levels of displeasure